Not a day goes by without some major media outlet running a story, an editorial or simple commentary on Turkey's path toward full membership in the European Union. The importance attributed to this matter has created an exaggerated sense that Turkish membership is directly linked with the preservation of the West. Indeed, even Turkey's staunchest detractors would be hard pressed to deny that it is an important country, certainly from a geopolitical perspective. It is also possible to argue that in many respects Turkey is no more problematic a candidate for accession to the EU than many of the countries that were brought into the fold in 2004, or for that matter in the two earlier expansions. Whether Turkey should become part of the EU is a subject for serious discussion - one that should concentrate on the country's objective needs and capabilities, as well as its ability to contribute and coexist with a coalition of 27 countries. However, the current debate is based on certain problematic assumptions.

One of the more troubling aspects has to do with a possible Turkish contribution to the stability of the Middle East, specifically in Iraq. It is often reiterated (in an International Herald Tribune editorial as recently as January 2, 2007) that Turkey "is an underutilized resource" in quelling the war in Iraq. If there is, however, one Muslim country in the Middle East that has very little to contribute constructively to Iraq, it is Turkey. Bypassing the fact that Ankara refused to allow United States forces to invade Iraq from its territory in 2003 - chipping away at that mythological maxim that the Western alliance can always rely on Turkey - the only contribution Turkey can have in Iraq will be a negative one.

Any Turkish effort to become involved in Iraq will conflict with one of the three main components that constitute that country: the Kurds, the Arabs and the Sunni-Shi'a divide. Seeing as the northern third of Iraq, the Kurdish third, is also the most stable part of the country, any direct Turkish involvement would have disastrous results because it will clash with Kurdish national aspirations - a fact already acknowledged by U.S. commanders. The Shi'a and Sunni Arabs of Iraq have their own reasons for being suspicious of Turkish involvement. The Arab world has generally proven wary of Turkey because of its imperial past in the Middle East, and there is generally no love lost between them. Arab nationalists continue to view Turkey with suspicion because of its close ties with the West, NATO and the United States. The Shi'a had a bitter history under Ottoman rule, and the Sunni Arabs view the Turks, or in fact any non-Arab Muslims, as upstarts when it comes to Islam. As for the radical Islamists - including Wahabi Saudi Arabia and theocratic Iran - in the best-case scenario they regard Turkish secularism and flirtations with the West as a passing episode; at worst, they view Turkey as an apostate country whose demise is pending.

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It is true that Turkey is now ruled by an Islamist party. And for the optimists this is a shining example of the possible coexistence of Islam with democratic values. Will it not then, the argument follows, serve as a model of emulation for other parts of the Middle East? Will a European rebuff of Turkish efforts to join the EU not doom the chances of democracy spreading to the rest of the region? While there is a domestic power struggle in Turkey, the Turkish commitment to democratic values should not be confused with a broader trend, or absence thereof, in the Muslim world. The Islamist party in Turkey operates within a political and legal context that is different from any other part of the Middle East. The boundaries of this context, while constantly challenged, are fixed to the Western ideal of separation of church and state. Furthermore, the secular branches of the Turkish state, the presidency and the military, supervise and discipline any radical diversions from the secular constitution - sometimes to the detriment of democracy itself.

This is not the first time that the West placed high hopes on Turkey's ability to serve as a model. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, great efforts were made to influence the Turkic states of Central Asia. The instability and uncertainty that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the strategic importance of Central Asia, in terms of both the energy resources there as well as the presence of nuclear arms, lent great urgency to ensuring that the region was not "lost" to elements hostile to the West. And yet, although Turkey could claim ethnic and religious affinity to the region, the efforts led to naught. Not only did Turkish-style democracy not gain a foothold, but domestic political realities in the Central Asian republics resulted in new arrangements with Moscow, and in some cases, direct dealings with Washington.

To a great extent, Turkey is considered to be so far out of the Middle East by the Arab Muslims, that a European rebuff to its EU aspirations would have minimal, if any impact on the region. This is so because the view in the Muslim world of the European Union being a "Christian club" is fixed - in part because there is general inability to conceive of a political entity as being separated from its religious and cultural heritage. As such, most Arab Muslims see a rejection of Turkey as inevitable - perhaps even justifiable - because in their eyes a Muslim country has no place in a Christian club, no more than a European country with a large Muslim minority has in seeking membership in the Islamic Organization Conference. For Arab Muslims, a rejection of Turkey would not be an affront; it would not make them more or less radical, more or less friendly to the West.

In short, Turkey and its future are not high on the agenda of the peoples of the Arab Middle East - and this is one element in the case of those advocating its membership in the EU that should be abandoned. Any discussion on possible Turkish accession to the EU should be based on rational assessments and not on wishful thinking.