Camp David. Guests.

A week after Christmas 1990, which George and Barbara Bush celebrated at Camp David with the First Family - George, Jeb, Neil, Marvin and Dorothy - Bush Sr. wrote in a letter to them that he "loved the laughs" they shared over the holiday, but that he was quite pre-occupied at the time, on the eve of the Gulf War, and hoped he hadn't seemed "moody". "I tried not to", he said.

In the letter, which appears in a book by George H.W. Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, Bush Sr. wondered "how many lives might have been saved if appeasement had given way to force earlier in the '30s or '40s? How many Jews might have been spared the gas chambers, or many Polish patriots might be alive today?" And then Bush Sr. went on to say something eerily familiar: "I look at today's crisis as 'good vs. evil', yes, it is that clear... and sometimes in life you have to act as you think best - you can't compromise, you can't give in, even if your critics are loud and numerous."

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A former diplomat who is an expert on Israel-America relations used Bush Sr.'s letter this week to help explain the position of his son, U.S. President George W. Bush. Look at how similar Bush Sr.'s rhetoric is to that of Bush Jr., look at how similar their conclusions are, the former diplomat said. "Crisis, compromise and stubbornness are gauged only by the test of time." Bush Sr.'s stubbornness is seen as justified, but while he was deciding, he was subject to fierce criticism that is easy to forget now. The sitting president has already proven, and will prove in the future, that criticism does not destabilize him politically, the former diplomat said.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert hopes that such immunity will extend to him as well. After less than a year in office, accompanied by unflattering polls and a general feeling of crisis in the country, it's a little strange to talk about the "Olmert legacy." But even under these difficult circumstances, a clear and consistent direction can be seen in Olmert's policy. It has so far been primarily characterized by its striving toward agreement and coordination with the international community, especially the American administration, but also key European Union countries and Egypt and Jordan. Olmert is prepared to pay the price of domestic support as long as he is accepted by the White House, 10 Downing St. and the presidential palace in Cairo.

PM's Residence. Flowers.

It's hard to keep up with the pace of Olmert's meetings with world leaders - which recalls the seemingly never- ending trips of Ehud Barak, another prime minister who was not one of the Israeli public's favorite leaders. Last week Olmert visited Berlin and Rome. This week, even though he was pale and congested, he hopped over to Jordan for two hours and hosted his British and Norwegian colleagues in Jerusalem. Olmert will be flying to Beijing in 10 days, and his meeting with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas could take place next week.

Weak leaders tend to get involved in diplomacy, in which they appear as statesmen rather than politicians. That's why British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who will shortly be vacating his seat, comes here every three months. Olmert offers his guests feasts in his official residence in the Rehavia neighborhood of Jerusalem, where a huge red and white flower arrangement was placed Wednesday in honor of Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg.

At a press conference held outside the residence, Olmert introduced a new tactic: He is now insisting on responding to all questions in Hebrew so that his quotes will be broadcast on local radio and television stations. He answers foreign correspondents' questions in English and Hebrew, acting as his own translator.

This week, an American official politely suggested that Olmert not hide behind the back of the United States, after the prime minister defended his refusal to accept Syrian peace bids by saying, "We must not respond to the Syrian initiative while President Bush, Israel's most important ally, opposes all negotiations with Syria." Some Israeli officials said Olmert was portraying Bush as someone who refuses to accept peace.

Washington wasn't thrilled either, but although the Bush administration would rather not serve as Israel's fig leaf in the matter, it continues to maintain that there should be no talks with Syria.

Not coincidentally, Olmert backtracked and changed his line of argument. It's not Bush who's responsible for Olmert's refusal to conduct negotiations with Syrian President Bashar Assad, it's the fault of the four crimes of Damascus: its undermining of the Siniora government in Lebanon, the assistance it has rendered terrorism in Iraq, the protection it has given Hamas, and its alliance with Iran. At least two of these, however - saving Siniora and worrying about terror attacks in Iraq - are hardly Israel's top priority.

Twenty-five years ago, Olmert's mentor, Menachem Begin, told American ambassador Sam Lewis that Israel was no banana republic. The Arabs (Assad Sr.) were almost the same Arabs and the lake (the Kinneret) was the same lake - but what a change for the Israelis and the Americans: Then the United States opposed the law to annex the Golan Heights, which was passed quickly in the Knesset, and today it opposes returning the Golan. Then Begin got angry and defied America, and today Olmert is applauding and submitting to the American edict. All prime ministers - even those who clashed with the Americans, like Yitzhak Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu - recognized Israel's utter dependence on the United States, and ultimately did what the White House wanted. But Olmert, with the support of Shimon Peres, has transformed reliance on Bush into an ideology.

Pentagon. Holidays.

A sudden dose of summer hit the American capital this week, confusing the trees denuded of their leaves. In the winding labyrinth of the Pentagon, passersby wished each other "Happy holidays," encompassing Christmas, Hanukkah and Kwanzaa. A new tenant - U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates - was already installed in an office on the third floor. Iraq is now his headache, and on Wednesday he attempted to closely examine the way it looks to commanders in the field.

The phrase "After the holidays" is bandied about every time questions about American policy are put on the table. After the holidays, Bush will announce what he plans to do in Iraq. It seems that the United States will be sending in more forces for a limited time, but there is still a debate over whether the army can carry the burden and over the conditions associated with an additional force.

After the holidays is also when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will head over to the Middle East. She has already promised to burn a lot of fuel, but meanwhile the Palestinian front is going up in flames, and Rice will have a hard time formulating an organized plan before the smoke clears.

Meanwhile, the phone lines connecting Washington and Ramallah were busier than usual this week, although the American public had a hard time showing genuine interest in what's going on in the streets of Gaza. Iraq overshadows the American agenda and neutralized any other issue. White House briefings go on forever, and they are almost all dedicated to this one topic; in interviews, the president too speaks almost exclusively about Iraq.

Olmert's visit to the White House last month appears more understandable in light of the release of the Baker-Hamilton report on Iraq, which essentially recommended ignoring the last six years and returning to the peace process from the point at which it was stopped. Now it seems that Olmert, who heard and read the speculations about a turnabout in American policy, about international conferences and pressure on Israel, simply wanted to make sure that it wouldn't happen. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who went to Washington after the report came out, wanted to make sure the report was dead. Both of them came back satisfied.

But it wasn't Israeli opposition that pushed the Bush administration to bury the Baker-Hamilton report, which continues to be discussed at conferences run by research institutes and pro-Arab organizations trying to keep the message of the report alive. It was buried for two reasons, one related to ego and the other to worldview. Rice won't let James Baker run her life, and in any case, the reasons she gave for burying the report indicate - and not for the first time - the major change that American foreign policy has undergone in recent years: The belief that Israeli-Arab peace is above all - a belief that guided all American administrations at least since 1973 - has dissipated.

Robert Satloff, the executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote a well-argued op-ed for The Washington Post this week exhorting that the domino theory contending that all key Middle East issues "are inextricably linked" be forgotten. The way to Baghdad, he wrote, doesn't pass through Tehran, Damascus, Jerusalem or Gaza, but begins and ends in Iraq. "The problem with all these theories," he wrote, "is that after a generation of theorizing about Middle East dominoes, the evidence is piling up: The linkages simply don't exist."

Damascus. Maneuvering.

To Olmert's credit, it should be said that he has racked up success: "The world" is backing up his policy regarding Syria and the Palestinians, and has agreed to save the Israel Defense Forces from an extended stay in Lebanon. In the Syrian case, no one will tell Olmert he is mistaken, aside from a few Israelis and some of the country's veteran analysts. So what if Bush and Rice oppose negotiations with the hated Assad - they can always say that their behavior stems from some kind of messianic ideology. So what if French President Jacques Chirac, the hero of Lebanese independence, also opposes talks; he hates the Syrians.

But this week Blair also took Olmert's side, explaining that Syria is not a suitable partner because of its efforts to undermine Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Even the prime minister of Norway, which fervently opposes Israeli occupation of the territories, loudly justified the international isolation of the Hamas-led government, demanded that Hezbollah disarm and vehemently condemned Iran for destabilizing the region.

Olmert's Sde Boker speech - in which he proposed withdrawing from most of the West Bank, said he would stick to the repeatedly violated cease-fire in Gaza, promised to meet with Abbas, and even hinted at the release of jailed Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti (he said "the issue is not on the agenda," and not, "Barghouti is a terrorist who will rot in jail for the rest of his life") - is enough to keep Israel from being accused of responsibility for the political stalemate.

In any case, Israel's enemies are not so impressed by these speeches and declarations, and are continuing to supply effective weapons to counteract any political plans. Hamas stuck to its position, and refuses to recognize Israel despite the pressure and the isolation. Hezbollah remains armed and is threatening to destroy Lebanon. Syria is arming itself and pulling Hamas' strings. Iran is continuing with its nuclear project. Israel has not managed to influence any of them or to restrain them. But the battle Olmert is waging aims to win international support, not to subdue the enemy. And on the international front, Olmert has chalked up a fair amount of success.

On the domestic front as well, despite all the grumbling about him, Olmert doesn't have much of a reason to complain. His refusal to negotiate with Syria has not met serious opposition. Defense Minister Amir Peretz raised the issue in the government, but he was speaking half-heartedly. Peretz has no major political support, his public standing is in a deep rut, and he won't turn the Syrian issue into the reason for his divorce from Olmert. Livni, whose silence had raised questions about her position on the matter, has given the prime minister her full support. Livni is not ideologically opposed to talks with the Syrians, but she pressed Olmert to present an initiative regarding the Palestinians, and thinks that now is not the time to get sidetracked into negotiations that don't have much chance of success. Under such conditions, Olmert has no real reason to speak with Assad.