The civil war between Hamas and Fatah appears to be a fait accompli in Gaza and to a large extent in the West Bank, too. The proof lies not only in the violent clashes, killings, burnings of offices and property, and stormy demonstrations, but also in the blunt style used by both sides.

Palestinian politics saw this type of violence and style in the past, in 1982-1983, for example, at the end of the Lebanon War, when a group of Fatah veterans rebelled against Yasser Arafat. But since then, there hasn't been any evidence of such phenomena. Appellations such as "traitors," "foreign agents" and "thieves" are now heard from all sides and aimed at leading figures.

For example, one Hamas spokesman in Gaza referred to Mohammed Dahlan publicly as "Al-Mad'u Dahlan," which translates literally as, "the one referred to as Dahlan." The use of this sort of term in Palestinian politics is, however, usually reserved for collaborators - the worst of them. Such a reference to Dahlan implies that he can and should be executed. And, indeed, senior Fatah officials already announced at the end of last week that if Hamas people harm their activists, the response would be a bloodbath involving the Hamas leadership.

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In preparing for the civil war, Fatah is in an inferior position as compared to Hamas. Certainly this is the case in Gaza. And it is primarily the case with respect to the internal organizational level. Fatah's leadership institutions are not functioning. The branches are falling apart and Fatah's secretary general, Farouk Kaddoumi, is cooperating openly with Khaled Meshal in Damascus. But he is not the only one. On Saturday, the well-known Palestinian caricaturist, Omayya Joha, published in Al-Hayat al-Jadida - the official Fatah organ whose editors in chief are part of the movement's leadership - a drawing welcoming Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh back to Gaza after his recent trip. If they are printing greetings to Haniyeh, that is another sign of the lack of organization and discipline in Fatah.

On the streets of the West Bank and Gaza, it is possible to meet many people who say openly: We take money from Fatah and vote Hamas. And who are the members of the Popular Resistance Committees" in Gaza if not Fatah operatives who in practice work for Hamas? The Fatah movement is weak due to lack of organization, corruption and the death of its chairman, Yasser Arafat, who left a leadership void that is tough to fill. But the truth must be acknowledged, and it is that most of Fatah's weakness stems from the fact that its diplomatic agenda has failed. The political process that started with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and perhaps even earlier, with the Palestine Liberation Organization Council in Algiers in 1988, which recognized Israel, was led by the top Fatah leadership and reached a dead end. Not now, but six years ago when the bloody clashes started. Since then, the tendency has been clear: Fatah is on the retreat.

The blame lies with Fatah leaders who did not have the foresight to set up a proper administration in Gaza and the West Bank, who did not maintain law and order even in security issues related to Israel. But Israeli governments share a sizable portion of the blame for what happened in the years of the Oslo process. The Oslo Accords were perceived by Israel as a license to expand the settlements in the West Bank and to build new neighborhoods in eastern Jerusalem. The facts are known: The number of residents in the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem doubled during the 1990s. Hamas gained strength not necessarily because the Palestinians have become more religious, but because West Bank residents woke up in the morning and out of their windows, in front of their eyes, they saw more and more fences and roadblocks, and more bypass roads. "I get up in the morning and see my death approaching," wrote a resident of a village near Ramallah.

Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahoud Abbas' success in dealing with Hamas is dependent, therefore, not only on him. Nor is it dependent on American intervention, as some Israelis who welcomed the Baker-Hamilton report think. "President Clinton at Camp David in 2000 was the height of American involvement and we saw what happened," the Palestinian journalist Khader Khader wrote recently. In other words, if the government of Israel does not manage to forge a breakthrough via a diplomatic channel, Abbas and Fatah don't have a chance.