This week, one of the satellite television channels aired a rerun of "Tzahal," a documentary film by director Claude Lanzmann about the Israel Defense Forces. The interviews that Lanzmann included in the film, which was made in the early 1990s, reflect an army and country that seem utterly different now, in these months after the second Lebanon war. Some of the speakers (Matan Vilnai, Avihu Ben-Nun, Avigdor "Yanush" Ben-Gal, David Grossman) are still present in the public landscape, but their texts have undergone a profound change.

Lanzmann's "Tzahal" is pervaded by the consciousness of a war for the country's very survival, of a far-reaching commitment on the part of the individual toward the state. The political disputes of that time (near the end of the first intifada, prior to the Oslo process) were already evident, but Lanzmann's interviewees still sound like voices from the same choir. Vilnai and Ben-Nun talk about the country's narrow and vulnerable "waistline" prior to the Six-Day War; Ben-Gal analyzes the IDF's combat doctrine, which calls for immediately shifting the battle to the enemy's territory, given Israel's small territory; Grossman, whose words now have an especially chilling impact following the death of his son Uri in the recent war, speaks about the 40 days of reserve duty that he served each year throughout the first Lebanon War, to which he was completely opposed.

One can't ignore the propagandistic aspect of some of the statements, which are given in response to questions posed by a French Jew whose previous film was called "Shoah." Still, it is quite remarkable to see how these terms have vanished from the debate, in the IDF and among the public, in the years that have passed since then. The existential anxiety on display in the film seemed anachronistic - at least until Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appeared on the scene. Moreover, the clear threat to personal security generated by Palestinian terror in the first two years of the second intifada (2000-2002) led to the opposite conclusion.

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The country's relatively rapid recovery, and the IDF and Shin Bet security service's big success in suppressing this threat, from Operation Defensive Shield onward, gave rise among the public to an exaggerated sense of security, based on the feeling that this was how the future wars faced by the IDF would look. The absence of a sense of an extreme threat - along with a sharpening of the discourse concerning the occupation in the territories - made the kind of talk heard in the movie about commitment and service the province of only certain ideological and social groups. These changes are significant in terms of understanding what occurred here this past summer.

As the IDF analyzes its failures in the last war, it is generally avoiding this sort of discussion. The analysis is of a much more professional and focused nature. But in the public statements of some senior IDF officials and of the retired generals who were appointed to investigate the war, echoes of a similar explanation may be heard: We forgot what a real war looks like, they say. Even the limited war that we waged against Hezbollah - which, despite its abilities, is still just a small guerrilla organization - was apparently too much for us. The war was conducted as a regular security action, influenced too much by lessons from the conflict with the Palestinians in the territories, and it did not generate the appropriate sense of urgency among the commanders and troops. The result: The IDF failed in its mission. It did not succeed in reducing the Katyusha threat, nor in shortening the duration of the fighting, which was eventually halted by external diplomatic intervention.

The army's internal investigation process is due to conclude by the end of the month, with the presentation of all the key reports to a General Staff forum. All in all, 40 different investigations are being conducted, including 10 dealing with key issues. As soon as the reports are presented, the IDF senior command staff (from the rank of colonel and up) will meet to discuss the findings. Subsequently, the army is due to embark on new training and preparations, looking ahead to next summer when the assessment is that the northern front may heat up again.

Territories vs. the North

Of the main investigations, the findings of six have already been presented or partially leaked to the media: Doron Almog's report on the abduction of the two soldiers; Udi Shani's report on the functioning of the General Staff; Amiram Levin's report on the Northern Command; Yoram Yair's report on the battles fought by Division 91 (under the command of Brigadier General Gal Hirsch); Avi Mizrahi's report on the deployment of the reserves; and Nir Maor's report on the rocket attack on the Israel Navy's Hanit missile ship.

From what has been made public thus far, the main findings can be summarized as follows:

1. The territories were more of a priority than the North. The six years of the intifada turned most of the IDF's attention to the territories, which were given priority over what was happening in the northern sector. The northern border was allocated fewer resources and troops, and was subject to less oversight by the General Staff. The primary directive was to prevent the opening of a second front in the North, and to ensure the peaceful continuation of tourism there. Reduced means and forces, combined with a certain complacency and failure to adhere to directives formulated by the field ranks in Division 91, made the abduction possible. Hezbollah also exploited Israel's policy, which allowed it to establish positions along the border and to strike at will.

In the wake of the abduction, when the army went to war, it was still thinking in terms that applied to the territories (of an ongoing security action against a weak enemy) and acted accordingly. Hezbollah's capabilities surprised the IDF and enabled the organization to strike at vulnerable points, such as through the use of anti-tank missiles against tanks and in its strikes at infantry forces. The troops, both in the regular army and especially in the reserves, were not properly trained for their missions, since the intifada had led to cutbacks in the training budget (and when exercises were done, they focused on preparations for fighting in the territories).

Major General Levin, in an interview on Channel 10: "The IDF was weakened in its power to fight. The protracted occupation in the territories has adversely affected training and exercises and combat techniques. It also had an effect mentally."

2. Aerial arrogance. The situation gave rise to a matching ideology. The weakness of the ground forces - which had not trained sufficiently and were accustomed to a simpler type of combat in the territories - were a contributing factor with respect to the priority given to using the air force. In the IDF plans, greater weight was given to the element of military might, at the expense of maneuvers. This outlook originated under the previous chief of staff, Moshe Ya'alon, and gained momentum under his successor Dan Halutz, who came from the air force. Levin describes this as "a faulty fighting concept that relies too much on precise weaponry, primarily from the air."

Generals in the current General Staff are even more blunt. The senior command, they say, erred in its "aerial arrogance" and placed excessive faith in the premise that the whole business in Lebanon could be brought to a swift end, solely by the use of air power. This attitude was central to the failures of the war. The Shani report says that Halutz unjustifiably stuck to the idea of deciding the battle from the air, and was reluctant to order a ground operation against the Katyushas - even when it became clear that the air force alone was not sufficient and that he persistently rejected the idea of embarking on a ground campaign.

3. Poor decisions at the top. The faulty conception of the war and the subsequent failure to fully grasp the situation in the field contributed to a series of poor decisions by the General Staff: It did not prepare for the possibility of a ground campaign in time; it rejected a call-up of reserve divisions (Halutz now acknowledges that he erred by not pressuring the government to approve such a call-up at an early stage); and it had the advance forces use the "salami method" - taking control of an area and then leaving it, without all actions being combined in a concentrated effort against Hezbollah. The gaps in understanding were also evident in the functioning of the navy. Navy Commander Dudu Ben-Bashat said afterward that, at the time, he'd considered the possibility that Hezbollah had an Iranian land-to-sea missile "wild and unrealistic." He admits that at the time of the strike on the missile ship, two and a half days after the abduction, the navy hadn't truly grasped yet that "this was war."

4. Mistakes in the field; problems related to values. These are being revealed at all levels. The General Staff, says Shani, did not operate as a supreme command and important decisions were made in smaller forums, rather than in "the pit," the Operations Division war room, as should have been done. Members of the General Staff violated the standard hierarchy when they gave advice and issued orders over the phone to division commanders and brigade commanders at the front - without this being properly recorded. Levin talks about a lack of assertiveness in the Northern Command, which eventually led to the command's failure, in his view, to carry out its mission: defending the northern communities.

The reports from Almog and Yair concerning Division 91 (which fought the lion's share of the battles) found serious gaps between planning and execution, and were also critical of new terminology that was used and at times not clearly understood by the lower ranks. Yair (and later the authors of other reports) harshly criticized faults he described as "value-related," and which affected all the divisions and many of the units: the lack of determined pursuit of a mission, insufficient determination, a failure to strive to make contact, and disregard for the decisive element of time in combat.

Like others, Yair is critical of the decision of many brigade commanders to remain behind in the war room rather than lead their men into battle. The ultimate consequence of all this, as described by Shani and Levin: The rocket fire continued until the final hour of the fighting, with the IDF incapable of curbing it.

Untouched areas

There is, of course, a large part of the picture that these reports barely touch on: namely, the wartime performance of the political echelon, which is supposed to be thoroughly investigated by the Winograd Commission. Most obvious is the political leadership's lack of defense experience. The people who made the decision to go to war on July 12 knew too little about the real situation of the IDF - about the cutbacks made in recent years and about the risks that were being taken. Another key issue has to do with the decision-making process throughout the operation: from the decision to continue with the war after the first week, up to the final, casualty-heavy failure to advance to the Litani.

The publication of the main points of the Shani report this week ought to have caused a big uproar. It's been many years since the chief of staff and the General Staff were so strongly criticized in an official military report, not to mention the fact that its author was a member of this forum during the war. This didn't happen. The report was received with something close to indifference. With such a plethora of reports and investigations, their individual impact is getting lost. Halutz, with admirable patience, is continuing to study the findings each week and to absorb criticism from the generals in the reserves - although the chief of staff is not willing to take everything that's being dished out. He has declined to adopt some of the conclusions drawn by Almog, Levin and Shani.

And yet, already at this stage, one could say that, all together, the reports make up a very harsh indictment of the functioning of the army and its chief of staff during the war. The failure is broad and cuts across ranks and commands. What we have here is a critical mass of conclusions and testimonies. When such is the case, at least as far as the IDF's functioning goes, there's no reason to wait for the Winograd Commission to weigh in. It appears that about two months ago when Halutz gave his army a "fair" grade for its conduct of the war, he was being overly generous.