The Israel Defense Forces General Staff received on Monday yet another report criticizing the army's performance in the second Lebanon war. This time, it was written by one of its own, Major General Udi Shani, who retired from active service about a month ago.

Shani was highly critical of the conduct of Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and of the Northern Command during the war. Halutz responded to the findings as he has done on several occasions recently, arguing vehemently with Shani and rejecting some of the conclusions.

Shani was assigned to investigate the overall understanding of the war at the command levels, and also the performance of the "seam" between the General Staff and Northern Command.

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His conclusions overlap with those of officers investigating other aspects of the war, including Major Generals Amiram Levine, Yoram Yair and Doron Almog.

But unlike the other in-house investigations, Shani's team focused on the senior echelons, and this is the first time criticism is leveled by a member of the General Staff who served during the war, though his role in its conduct was minimal.

The report concludes that Chief of Staff Dan Halutz failed to formulate an orderly operational plan for the war, did not present a plan to the government and did not give the forces a fixed timetable for carrying out their operations. The fact that the forces were not given clear missions with a timetable made it difficult for them to make any substantive gains. In addition, the report says, orders were not worded clearly.

Instead, "a campaign aiming at effect," rather than substance, was carried out under the assumption that pressuring the Lebanese would bring about the desired results without having to carry out significant ground operations.

According to the report, Halutz opposed a ground operation for dealing with the threat of the Katyusha rockets and recommended ideas that had already failed to bring about change during the early stages of the war.

Shani is convinced that Halutz stuck, unjustifiably, to the idea of utilizing air power as the ultimate solution.

The report's authors also conclude that the necessary hierarchy between the General Staff, the Northern Command and the units operating beneath them broke down. In many cases, commands of Major Generals in the General Staff were issued on the telephone to division and brigade commanders in the field, bypassing Northern Command and lacking proper documentation.

A key conclusion is that the IDF failed to minimize and stop the firing of Katyushas before the cease-fire went into effect. Essentially, the main gains in the war were achieved within the first 10 days of the fighting and it was possible to end the war following the battle at Maroun Al-Ras and prior to deploying large ground forces in Bint Jbail.

The report determined that the General Staff did not conduct itself as a headquarters in time of war, failing to use the command center of the General Staff, also known as the "pit." Also, most decisions were made among a small number of generals.

Another report was presented on Monday by Major General Avi Mizrahi, head of logistics at the General Staff, addressing the subject of the reserves. Mizrahi has concluded that the reservist units were not sufficiently prepared for war.

Mizrahi is also recommending some minor amendments to the law on reservists: raising the retirement age for officers, increasing the maximum number of days served by reservists, and holding frequent training sessions for reservist units.

The Chief of Staff accepted the conclusions and recommendations of the Mizrahi probe.