What lesson has Hamas drawn after the Israeli government unconditionally accepted the cease-fire in the Gaza Strip? The best way to get out of trouble is to use force, and if needed, even more force. By no means should substantive concessions be made on matters of principle that are anchored in the Koran (for example, recognition of any non-Muslim regime on the holy ground of Palestine), even if the ensuing misery is considerable. Nevertheless, tactical steps may be taken to ease the international pressure on Hamas (so long as these steps strengthen the organization), while keeping in mind that the use of force is vital even in negotiations.

And so it is that even as Hamas finds itself under pressure due to the economic siege and to IDF operations - which have caused heavy losses - the firing of Qassams at Sderot and the Negev has only increased. Similarly, negotiations to free Gilad Shalit have become more tense. Hamas even refuses to allow him to be seen by the Red Cross (as does Hezbollah), and demands that Israel release the murderers of cabinet minister Rehavam Ze'evi in exchange for the abducted soldier.

If this is the lesson Hamas has drawn, why doesn't the organization act similarly in the West Bank? Hamas intends to use this ambiguous cease-fire to secure victory in the PA elections.

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It forfeits any government jobs, while striving to enhance its control of the Authority. For Hamas, it is important to have a cease-fire that does not include laying down arms in the Palestinian territories and for its military strength to continue growing apace without a diplomatic or military agreement with Israel.

That is a reasonable scenario. When Hamas gets a bit stronger, it will replicate its efforts in Judea and Samaria in order to win a cease-fire on its own terms. The timing will not be determined by Mahmoud Abbas or a unity government but rather by the military wing of Hamas. This will be determined predominantly in Damascus, and with Iran's influence.

What happened on the Israeli side? One influential factor was the defense establishment's failure to subdue the problem of the Qassam rockets.

This, in my view, was a greater defeat than the outcome of the Lebanon War. Ehud Olmert understood that he had to put an end to the mounting crisis in Sderot, which compounded the crisis in the aftermath of the war in Lebanon. The cease-fire is, then, rescuing both the Palestinian and the Israelis from their respective pressures. This is yet another - albeit limited - military conflict in which the stronger side, Israel, is currently unable to realize its full strength.

It would be incorrect to say that the IDF is against a cease-fire in the Gaza Strip. The IDF raised the issue of how to act once a Qassam launching crew is detected prior to a rocket launch, or while running away after a launch. In the army's opinion, striking at the cell is pure self-defense.

But the prime minister, with the backing of Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, has disqualified this as an option.

For Olmert, this constitutes a big political risk. If a rocket falls and causes bloodshed, the blame will be placed on him. Even the Egyptians have said that Israel's restraint in the face of continued rocket fire should be limited to ten days or so. This represents a substantial shift in the positions of Israel's leaders, Olmert and Livni, formerly of the Likud leadership. At the same time, obvious cracks are forming in Olmert's previous directive, which opposed cooperation with a Palestinian government that includes Hamas cabinet ministers.

What are the chances that the cease-fire will hold? One need only look at Fatah - Abbas' own organization - which occasionally launches a Qassam at Israel.

This in itself is proof of the instability impairing the Palestinian side. Hamas expects that the international community will roll back the pressure it is currently exerting, and recognize the group without its having to recognize Israel and adopt prior agreements. Meaning that funds will be transferred to Hamas even if it doesn't forfeit its ideology of liquidating Israel.

Israel, meanwhile, is hoping for a fragmentation of Hamas, in which the pragmatic wing gives up the idea of destroying Israel, as the PLO once did.

But chances of a prolonged cease-fire are slighter as long as the Philadelphi route remains porous to arms smuggling, and so long as the Egyptians prefer not to initiate any large-scale operations against the Palestinians.