WASHINGTON - U.S. forces are deployed today in 150 countries, out of 193. That is an instructive statistic that was mentioned this week by a U.S. official who wanted to assess the possible influence of the Baker-Hamilton Commission on American policy. "So at most, we'll leave one of them," he said with a somewhat bitter smile. He knows, everyone knows that in the end the U.S. will leave Iraq, bruised and battered. Unless President George W. Bush decides otherwise.

"Our president," remarked that same official, has already proven in the past that he "is made of tough stuff." He has not always fulfilled the expectations of journalists and other people in the know.

Bush is seeing Baker's smile and it drives him crazy, said an acquaintance of the president. Don't believe the nice words, the polite smiles, nor the longstanding relationship between Baker and Bush's father, whom Baker accompanied as early as the 1980 presidential race when Bush Sr. lost to Ronald Reagan.

	Advertisement

"Bush doesn't like it when people tell him what to do," said the acquaintance. "Anyone who wants to have an influence has to whisper quietly into his ear, not humiliate him in public; look at [Vice President] Dick Cheney."

And truth be told, what happened to Bush this week was no less than a made-for TV humiliation. You failed, the commission composed of Baker, Hamilton and the other members told the president. This is what has to be done in order to get out, if that's even possible. And they also said: You have no choice - adopt all the conclusions. If this commission made one mistake, it lies in this paragraph, and in the fact that it made no fewer than 79 recommendations.

Had it made only four recommendations, and Bush had rejected two, he would have been harshly criticized for rejecting half the recommendations. If he rejects 39 out of what there is now, he can still claim that he carried out 40 recommendations, a considerable number.

The Middle East. A mission

The recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission can be weighed on all sorts of scales, and opinion is also divided regarding Baker himself. "I don't think he's against Israel," said a senior Israeli official who has met Baker quite a number of times. "It's clear that Baker had it in for Israel," said another official of the same rank, in the same government ministry.

Anyone who rummages through Baker's history will find him that at several junctures, he acted against the Israeli government. But the question remains: Is it Israel that he doesn't like, or is the policy of the governments against which he acted. Baker was one of the main figures who urged Ronald Reagan to insist on selling the AWACS surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s. He also had a good reason: Then prime minister Menachem Begin had leveled public criticism, in Washington, against the transaction that the president wanted. In a power struggle of this type, Baker thought, Reagan should not be allowed to lose.

The more familiar conflict, the one with the Yitzhak Shamir government over the settlements and the loan guarantees, is also not difficult to explain. And regarding the famous expletive, "F--- the Jews, they don't vote for us anyway," this was blown out of proportion. Aggressive people like Baker sometimes say things behind closed doors that do not accord with the rules of good manners and ceremony.

But a tradition is already developing. Baker always has good reasons, but he will always be found on the other side of the intersection. He was looking for Iraq and found Israel. He could have chosen differently, since if tomorrow a lasting peace should prevail between Israel and the Palestinians, the U.S. forces would still be stuck under terrorist fire in Iraq.

But the issue raised by Baker in the report for whose content he is chiefly responsible, and in which he is the conductor and the player on most of the instruments, does in fact deserve an examination - and then a reexamination. The Bush administration will not be the first to deliberate over it. To what extent is the Israeli-Arab conflict central to the Middle Eastern imbroglio?

In discussions conducted by senior administration officials in Arab capitals, even in recent weeks, they heard the old familiar refrain: Take care of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, demonstrate involvement, promote the handling of it. Some of them believe that the time has really come to act - or at least to look as though they are trying to do more. Two days ago, when the report was published, the names of potential "envoys" were once again tossed into the air, experienced "mediators" who will embark on flying visits among capitals and leaders. Most of the suggestions are unrealistic. That is the way to create an atmosphere of progress, even if it isn't very useful. Perhaps Baker himself? Perhaps Colin Powell? Perhaps Bill Clinton?

Baker would probably be glad to accept this job, but it is doubtful whether U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would agree to something that would turn her from a bellwether into an apprentice. Powell, as was already proved when he served as Secretary of State, and as an Israeli who worked with him a great deal remarks, "doesn't understand a thing about the Middle East."

And what about Clinton? A U.S. State Department official who was asked about it burst out laughing. First of all, he does not believe that Bush would appoint his predecessor. Second, he doesn't think that Hillary Clinton will allow her husband to take such a sensitive job on the eve of presidential elections in which she plans to run. And moreover, the official asked, "Isn't Clinton the guy who already mediated and failed?"

The White House. Ranking

This is not the first time that James Baker is urging an American president to withdraw U.S. forces from a Middle Eastern country. In 1983, after 240 U.S. Marines were killed in a lethal explosion in Lebanon, he was among the leaders of those urging Ronald Reagan to fold up the flag and withdraw. Secretary of State George Schultz and Reagan himself were opposed. But the coalition they were facing, including Baker, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and members of Congress, had the upper hand in the end.

Reagan, like George W. Bush today, considered such withdrawal a capitulation to terror - but was forced to accept reality. The pill was sweetened by the victory of the Americans in Grenada, which managed to sweep away the harsh impression left by events in the Middle East, and gave Reagan smooth sailing toward the 1984 presidential elections, without being haunted by the ghosts of those killed in Lebanon.

"In hindsight," wrote Reagan's biographer Lou Cannon, "this withdrawal seems inevitable." Perhaps people will write the same in the future about the difficult decisions Bush will be making in the coming months. Cannon himself this week was mentioned in an article by another historian, Douglas Brinkley, the one who wrote the history of Jimmy Carter's presidency - one of five historians who tried to predict for The Washington Post "What will history say?" about Bush. An ambitious and somewhat silly assignment.

Brinkley, the abovementioned historian, wrote in his article about a dinner with Cannon, during which they talked about Bush. Cannon warned him about making a premature judgment. What if Osama bin Laden is suddenly caught? What if North Korea suddenly decides to abandon its nuclear program? Brinkley, like most of his colleagues who participated in the newspaper project, was nevertheless unable to resist the temptation. Bush, he wrote, reminds him of Herbert Hoover, who did not react as he should have to the profound economic recession that paralyzed America in the early 1930s.

What's the connection? Hoover did too little after the recession, Bush did too much after 9/11. At least that's what Brinkley thinks.

The Saban Center. A seminar

Anyone who wants to count the blows absorbed by Israel this week in Washington has to begin with the resignation of the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton. That was only a few days ago, and already ages ago. Since then - the hearing of the incoming Secretary of Defense, who cannot promise Israel that Iran will not attack, followed by the Baker-Hamilton report that presents Israel as more of a problem than a partner.

A group of influential Israelis and Americans will be participating, starting today, in the annual forum of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, which this year is discussing "America and Israel Confronting a Middle East in Turmoil." Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni will address the forum, as will Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Minister of Strategic Threats Avigdor Lieberman and chief of Military Intelligence Amos Yadlin. But the real stars will be Bill and Hillary Clinton.

In spite of the increasing talk and the somewhat childish enthusiasm about the possibility that rising star Senator Barack Obama will decide to run for the Democratic nomination as well, Hillary Clinton continues for the time being to lead confidently among her party's electorate, and she is also closing the gap against leading Republican candidate John McCain in the general surveys. However, she is still far from victory, and every joint appearance with her husband only emphasizes the difficulties awaiting her.

Chuck Todd, editor of The Hotline (Washington's daily news briefing on U.S. politics) wrote about Clinton's chances last week in a skeptical tone, comparing her and her husband to the legendary baseball player Joe DiMaggio and his brother, Dom DiMaggio, also an outstanding player, who didn't succeed in entering the Baseball Hall of Fame mainly because his father's shadow clouded his achievements.

The panel in which Hillary Clinton will participate, "U.S. Strategy in the Middle East: What Works, What Doesn't," is of particular importance mainly in light of the Baker-Hamilton report and its recommendations, which return U.S. policy to the days of Madrid-style regional summits and talks with anyone possible. If Clinton thinks that a regional summit is a good idea, maybe she will try to implement it in the future. By doing so she will be presenting a position that differs from that of the new Israeli ambassador Sallai Meridor - and of the Israeli government, which this week decided that the bilateral route is the proper one for those who are "serious" about the peace process.

The Washington Institute. An ambassador

The story about the meeting of former Israeli ambassador David Ivry with Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi of California has already become a legend. The events of recent weeks restored Ivry to life for two reasons: first, Pelosi has become the senior Democratic legislator de facto, and is about to become the first woman to head the U.S. House of Representatives. And second, the new Israeli ambassador, Meridor, reported for work in Washington. Anyone looking for ways to compare him with his predecessors always begins with a story about Ivry - from there, everything becomes much clearer.

Ivry came to Washington with an invincible background: commander of the Israel Air Force, deputy chief of staff, director general of the Defense Ministry. "The ultimate emissary to the Pentagon," snickered a former senior official in the U.S. administration this week. Here, Ivry is not considered a model of tremendous success as an ambassador. And here is the story about Ivry and Pelosi, a liberal legislator from the West Coast.

Pelosi invited Ivry to her office for a meeting, or maybe he invited himself. Before they began to discuss current issues, they spent a minute on the usual small talk. Pelosi pointed to the wall, to show Ivry the picture hanging there. A difficult picture. The Chinese demonstrators of Tiananmen Square, and the tanks approaching them on their way to the brutal crushing of one of the most important demonstrations of the 20th century.

Ivry glanced at the picture, and as a veteran military man who had difficulty overcoming an old habit, uttered only one short sentence, which left Pelosi in shock: "That's a T-72."

Meridor will probably not experience such mishaps. He is more polished, more communicative than Ivry. This week, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he successfully got through his first public appearance. Afterward, some of the audience stood around trying to guess what kind of an ambassador he will be. Following is a selection of diagnoses we heard from them: He may be less "nice" than his predecessor, Danny Ayalon, and it's not certain that he will excel at the "CNN test" like him, but he will be better than Ayalon in discussions with senior administration officials, who will listen to his assessments seriously. Someone suggested that Meridor would be an ambassador in the style of Itamar Rabinovich - a fluent if not outstanding speaker, and a respected statesman. That is an interesting possibility, which depends on one unknown that has still not been made clear: Rabinovich had a real portfolio, and received exceptional powers from then prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. He also worked with the Clinton administration, whose relations with Rabin were among the closest ever between a U.S. president and an Israeli prime minister - perhaps the closest. (The stories about the wonderful friendship between former prime minister Ariel Sharon and President George W. Bush are no more than a popular legend for natives and friends.)

Meridor is dependent more than anything else on how Prime Minister Ehud Olmert wants to conduct his relations with Washington, and how Washington wants to conduct its relations with Israel. This week it was the second question that was the greater unknown.