At any given moment, when the bloodletting between the Palestinians and us appears to be lulling, opening possibilities for a political agreement, the "choruses of intimidation" begin to sound about the "existential threat" to the state of Israel.

These choruses can be divided into three main groups. First there are the settlers, for whom an agreement spells existential danger and an ideological-theological rift. Then there is anyone who would lose socio-economic status if an agreement were to be signed. These are cynical politicians and military personnel, the military industries and any others somehow connected to the war machine and the industry of occupation. They include "experts" and respected analysts who built their careers on explaining how the conflict cannot be solved, and the monstrosity of our enemies in the face of our purity.

There is no dialogue with these two groups, and there cannot be any. But one must systematically reveal what is behind their "patriotic" claims, which can so readily be used to whip the public into a frenzy. Indeed, it is the duty of military personnel, strategists and intelligence officers to warn, with professional integrity, of impending diplomatic steps that involve some form of security risk. These individuals must outline, alongside the statesmen, "the worst-case scenario," and make the decision makers aware of it. (It is doubtful this was done before the decision to begin the last war.)

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However, the duty of the third group, the statesmen, is totally different. They indeed must bear in mind security considerations, but they decide whether to further their policy - if indeed they have a policy - even if it involves taking risks, while weighing these against their plan's chances of success. No scenario presented by these three groups that would involve a change in Israeli policy toward the Palestinians mentions a strategic existential threat to Israel. We must remember that any diplomatic move, particularly in the complex Israeli-Palestinian situation, involves some risk for both sides. Contrary to accepted thought, a non-policy is also fraught with dangers, and certainly does not offer a chance for change.

The most recent example of this is the nonrecognition of the results of the democratic elections in the Palestinian Authority (which were forced on the Palestinians by the United States and Israel), and the Israeli, American and European refusal to recognize the Hamas regime - a direct result of these countries' anti-Islamist and anti-Arab obsession.

Hamas genuinely earned the hatred and the reservations. Its guerrilla warfare against Israel, particularly its use of suicide bombers to target civilians indiscriminately, is a war crime in every respect. But the relevant question is not how to eradicate Hamas - which is impossible - but rather how to stop the dirty warfare on both sides and to work toward a settlement. Despite Hamas' ties with outside bodies, it is basically a movement that formed within the local reality: the incessant occupation (even after the evacuation of Gush Katif, of course), the Palestinians' economic and social situation, and in particular the inability of the Fatah-led PA to fix these problems and its own corruption. We must remember that Hamas is not merely a terrorist organization but also a socio-political movement that seeks to rule in an independent Palestinian state. It knows well that without an agreement with Israel, this would not be possible.

Hamas' leaders know there is no chance of destroying Israel and that the continued fighting merely prolongs the suffering of the Palestinian people to whom they are committed. Most are pragmatists, professionals and people of integrity who realize that the sole political card left in their hands - after Fatah wasted it almost completely - is non-recognition of Israel. They will surely give it up for a substantial quid pro quo, such as the adoption of the Clinton plan or the Arab initiative as the basis for negotiation.

This analysis of the conflict should stand as an alternative to that accepted in Israel and abroad. Adopting it would indeed entail some of the known risks, but they would be accompanied by a window of opportunity for change. Disregarding this analysis and failing to draw conclusions from it entails an even greater risk - making the conflict insoluble in our generation, with all the inherent results.