It is no coincidence that in Jerusalem there is grave concern regarding recent developments in Beirut. Not only is the pressure by pro-Hezbollah and pro-Syrian demonstrators liable to cause the government of Fouad Siniora to collapse, but it may also spark a new civil war in Lebanon. If Siniora's government falls, the Sunni leader will be forced to make concessions in favor of Syria and its allies, and possibly undermine the sole major achievement of Israel in the second Lebanon war - namely, the arrangements made along the border.

In response to the criticism of Israel's political and military leadership for failures during the recent war, the answer of the Olmert government has been that the reality on the ground will be our judge. In spite of the many failings, the prime minister did have a convincing argument. At war's end, Hezbollah was removed from its positions along the border, and an international peacekeeping force was deployed in southern Lebanon. Israel's gains could have been made during the first week of fighting, which would have saved many lives. Nonetheless, the achievements were apparently real.

However, now the stability of Security Council Resolution 1701 is in question. If Hezbollah determines who will form the next government in Lebanon, and even if Siniora emerges from this standoff as a weaker prime minister, the extent of cooperation between the government in Beirut and the UN peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, will be undermined.

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Nearly four months after the cease-fire went into effect, the two abducted soldiers, for whom Israel went to war, are still not home - and ther e is not even a sign that they are alive. The smuggling of weapons from Syria to Hezbollah, according to Military Intelligence, has resumed and is proceeding at full steam. Southern Lebanon is being rebuilt with Iranian money and the Hezbollah guerrillas, who do not appear now in public wearing fatigues and carrying weapons, are moving about uninterrupted.

It is hard to imagine the European troops deployed in southern Lebanon staying there if Hassan Nasrallah signals that Hezbollah intends to target them, as it did French and American forces in 1983. All that is missing now is for Hezbollah to decide to resume holding its positions along the border, as a challenge to Olmert and Israel.

The recent developments are of less concern to the Winograd Commission, established by the government to investigate the decisions to go to war and the six years following the IDF's May 2000 pullout from southern Lebanon. Yesterday, the committee issued a puzzling announcement, thanking the High Court justices for their support last week in rejecting the petitions for the creation of a state commission of inquiry. The body's members expressed their satisfaction that neither the justices, nor the petitioners, questioned the honesty, qualifications or independence of the investigating body.

However, the panel's members would have been less satisfied were they to know about some of the impressions formed by officers that already appeared before them. Some of the latter have said that it is clear that the committee has already determined that Chief of Staff Dan Halutz is its prime target.

What emerges is the following: The army rushed to recommend war, without properly preparing itself or having an exit plan. The civilians fell under the spell of the confidence exhibited by the senior military command, and therefore the chief of staff will be the first to pay the price, in a renewed version of the Agranat Report, which followed the Yom Kippur War.