Olmert. A holding action

Something about Prime Minister Ehud Olmert changed after the war in Lebanon. His behavior has slowed down and become less decisive. The man who once threatened the Palestinians and the Lebanese with "painful retaliation" is now cautious about making blatant assertions that are liable to boomerang. The leader who presented a far-reaching program for determining the borders of the country, and decided within two hours to embark on a war in Lebanon, is now trying mainly to buy time.

In recent weeks Olmert has been busy repelling two types of pressures: for war and for peace. Major General Yoav Galant, the head of the Israel Defense Forces Southern Command, and Yuval Diskin, chief of the Shin Bet security services, want to send the IDF off to a wide-ranging operation in the Gaza Strip, in an attempt to check the increasing military strength of the Palestinians and to repress the system of manufacturing and launching Qassam rockets. Olmert was not enthusiastic about this idea even before the kidnapping of soldier Gilad Shalit and the war in the North, and even now he prefers to let out some rope each time in favor of a gradual escalation, instead of embarking on "Operation Defensive Shield II." Olmert is relying on the opposition of Chief of Staff Dan Halutz to a war in Gaza, and on the lack of enthusiasm in the government and among the public for an operation of this type.

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On the political front the prime minister is conducting a holding action against his ministers, who are surprising him every day with plans and initiatives, as well as against the Americans and the Europeans, who are eager to do something vis-a-vis Israel and the Palestinians. He is confronting U.S. pressure to "strengthen" Palestinian Authority Chair Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), and is avoiding making a gesture toward or arranging a meeting with him.

The result is that President George W. Bush is planning to visit Jordan without hopping over to Israel or seeing Olmert and Abbas. The prime minister prefers to absorb the diplomatic snub, with the leader of the country most friendly to Israel coming to the region and ignoring him, as long as Israel is not required to give something to the Palestinians. He rebuffed the Italians when he told Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi that "we are making progress with Abu Mazen, and don't interfere."

It's not clear what, if anything, Olmert is waiting for. This week he once again proved his impressive abilities as a politician, when he maneuvered Defense Minister Amir Peretz to the brink of dismissal. Peretz made a mistake when he gambled on a vain attempt at a cease-fire in Gaza, and became entangled in contradictory versions. (His bureau issued a false statement to the press about his conversation with Abbas, according to which "Peretz demanded that he exercise his authority and stop the Qassams." A few hours later the story changed, and the conversation was presented as a request by Abbas for an Israeli cease-fire. The earlier fabrication was explained as "an attempt to help Abu Mazen, so that he would be able to present Hamas with Peretz's ultimatum").

But Olmert's successes as chairman of his own private coalition are not helping his leadership. The public, according to every survey and living-room discussion, wants a leadership that will give it direction and hope in the face of the strengthening of Iran, the shower of Qassams and the general sense of depression. For now, Olmert, Mr. "No," who made many unimportant public appearances this week, is having difficulty providing that leadership.

Strategy. Inferiority

The war and its outcome have led to soul-searching not only among Israel's leaders, but among those who are involved in strategic and political thinking as well. This week, the Re'ut Institute for public policy, a nongovernment think tank headed by Gidi Grinstein, completed a policy document entitled "Terror is an existential threat," which proposes a rethinking of Israel's national strategy. Its principal message is that instead of accepting terror as a nuisance that requires a "local military response," we should see it as part of the "resistance front" that is creating an existential threat to Israel.

The "resistance front" includes Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, other terror organizations, sparsely governed regions like Sinai, and European leftist organizations. These entities are operating as a loose and not necessarily coordinated network, but their goal is identical: to destroy Israel and to establish in its place an Arab-Islamic state in Palestine. This front is decentralized and evasive, recognizes Israeli military superiority and undermines it with political tools. The front is opposed to ending the occupation in the territories, for fear of turning the conflict into a bargaining session over borders; therefore it aims to entrap Israel in wars of attrition that will erode its strength. The decline of U.S. influence in the region has also weakened Israel vis-a-vis the resistance front.

Reut's conclusion is cause for concern: "The resistance front has succeeded in causing Israel to suffer from strategic inferiority." In other words, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hamas leader Khaled Meshal and Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah have cracked the Israeli code and found an answer that neutralizes Israeli military superiority. The IDF can batter Lebanon and the Palestinians repeatedly, but Israel will only become weaker.

The policy document demonstrates how the Israeli security concept, which relies on military might, is not relevant in the face of the new threats. In assessing the danger, the authors accept the logic of opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been warning for the past 20 years that terror is the existential threat to Israel and the West, and is now calling for a national effort against Iran and its allies. But the recommendations are the opposite of Netanyahu's. Netanyahu wants to exercise more force and not to budge a single millimeter in the territories. The Re'ut Institute proposes strengthening the diplomatic component of the security concept, building alliances with moderate countries in the region on the basis of the Arab peace initiatives, and trying to turn the conflict with the Palestinians into negotiations over the border - a transparent reference to an additional withdrawal and the evacuation of settlements in the West Bank.

Meridor. A decision

To Olmert's credit it should be said that he is also aware of the need to adapt Israeli strategy to reality. In recent weeks the prime minister met with Dan Meridor, who headed the a team that examined Israel's security concept. The two overcame their mutual resentments and conducted a practical discussion on the group's conclusions. Olmert plans to bring the new concept up for the approval of the cabinet, and to establish committees to handle its realization. If he does, it will be a daring step: His predecessors refrained from formulating an official and binding security concept, and allowed the defense establishment to decide for itself on its goals.

The Meridor report, which was submitted to the previous defense minister Shaul Mofaz shortly before the end of his term, described Iran as an existential threat to Israel, and warned that Arab countries will try to achieve nuclear capability in response to the Iranian bomb. In addition to the nuclear threat, Meridor and his colleagues warned of the threat of terror, whose deterrence is difficult and problematic when it operates from "vacuum" regions lacking a government (as is now happening in Gaza). His recommendations included maintaining "nuclear vagueness," strengthening the IDF's firepower at the expense of mobility, and turning the National Security Council into a central government body. Another recommendation has already evaporated in the wake of the war in the North: the gradual reduction of the defense budget.

Now it remains to be seen whether Olmert will take the recommendations seriously and use the Meridor report as a jumping-off point for formulating a new strategy and finding a new direction. That could even provide him with a good excuse for replacing the defense leadership.