The findings of Major General (res.) Doron Almog's probe of the recent war in Lebanon, which have so far been only partially revealed, constitute additional evidence to bolster what has been discovered since the war about the condition of the Israel Defense Forces.

There is an unbridgeable gap between the threatening declarations the government is making toward Iran and the weakness the IDF is transmitting. One can always explain away mishaps and accidents as localized failures, but when they accumulate one on top of the other, they create a frightening view of the situation. Another inquiry and another inquiry and another investigation, committee and examination, and there is no leadership. If half the majors general in the General Staff think the chief of staff should go, it's not clear what the defense minister is waiting for. If Dan Halutz does not leave of his own volition, then Amir Peretz should recommend that the government send him off. It's impossible for an army like this "to scare Iran," as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert put it when he went to visit the United States.

Halutz's thick-skinned policy is not his own personal issue. If he has difficulty accepting responsibility, if he does not see a reason for the resignation of Brigadier General Gal Hirsch even after the person who investigated the abduction of soldiers on the Lebanese border recommended it, that's a sign that Halutz does not understand his job. Halutz understands the concept of backing people up in the narrowest sense, and makes sure to back up the commanders who failed, because of their heroic past. But he must initially give backing to the thousands of soldiers doing their compulsory service or reserve duty who are not close to the military elite. It is impossible to escape the cries of the company commanders, who were not fit for the task, did not receive orders and were not trained to defend the northern border. These are the people on whose behalf a new IDF commander must be appointed.

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What is the chief of staff responsible for, if not for the soldiers who carried out their reserve duty without being trained or briefed, without being operationally qualified? What is the chief of staff responsible for, if not for the artillery fire on Beit Hanun, after it was decided during the investigation of a previous incident that such fire is not appropriate for the nature of the area? Who is responsible for the fact that instructions prepared by the commander of the Galilee Division never reached the field, that the patrol of the northern border was conducted like a hike, or that the lessons of the 2000 abduction were not implemented, other than in the working papers of the division commander? Who is responsible for checking that plans are implemented and soldiers are trained and commands make their way from one rank to the next? Who is responsible for Hezbollah having better intelligence than us? Is the chief of staff responsible for anything in the army, or does he just represent the army at cabinet meetings and recommend going to war? Is it possible to treat seriously the suggestions of a chief of staff who doesn't know what's happening in the field?

Almog's findings shook the system, but not enough. Once again, talks have begun to find a compromise so the final report will be less severe and no senior official will have to go home or skip being promoted. And, meanwhile, the army is not being rehabilitated, because its rehabilitation depends on replacing the commander - not on finding compromises or writing new working papers.