The head of an Israel Defense Forces inquiry into the abduction of IDF soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser by Hezbollah on July 12 said Sunday the army could have prevented the abductions.

Major General (res.) Doron Almog, who headed the commission, presented the inquiry's findings Sunday evening.

According to Almog, the army failed to properly apply the lessons learned from the killing and abduction of the bodies of three IDF soldiers on the Lebanese border in October 2000.

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Almog outlined the failures of the Galilee Division, headed by Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, who resigned in the wake of the criticism Sunday morning.

Hirsch refused to rescind his resignation, despite IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz's request that he reconsider. Defense Minister Amir Peretz has accepted Hirsch's resignation.

Almog said there was a significant gap between division's written regulations and orders, and how they were implemented by troops operating along the northern border.

According to Almog, the division had an operational plan for dealing with the threat that Hezbollah would capture soldiers, which "was an excellent plan that could have prevented the abduction." The plan was not implemented, however, due to the disconnect between Hirsch and his field commanders.

The plan called for limiting the movement of IDF troops along the border fence to a minimum, and also highlighted several weak points along the fence where the risk of abduction was higher. The soldiers were abducted at one of these points.

According to the plan, troop movement at the weak points was to be done with backup, be covered by nearby troops, and be carried out only with the approval of senior field commanders. In reality, said Almog, these orders were not implemented.

Speaking on a personal note, Almog said Hirsch had served under him in the past and that they have an excellent relationship.

Almog said he spoke with Hirsch last week, because he wanted to pass along the inquiry's findings personally before Hirsch would be informed about them from Halutz. Almog told Hirsch that, given the commission's findings, he could not remain in the IDF.

IDF chief rejects criticism of General Staff's functioning
Halutz on Sunday rejected some of the conclusions formulated by the commission of inquiry regarding the functioning of the General Staff during the war.

The commission presented its findings to the army's General Staff forum Sunday morning.

During the meeting, which lasted over five hours, Halutz said some of the criticisms Almog voiced on the chief of staff's conduct during the war were baseless.

Almog leveled criticism at the policy of restraint employed by the army in recent years, which he said failed to operate against the establishment of Hezbollah positions on Lebanon's border with Israel.

According to participants in the deliberations, a heated argument took place between Halutz and Almog.

Hirsch hinted in his letter of resignation to Halutz that his superiors should take responsibility for failures made during the conduct of the war.

Hirsch's immediate superior, Northern Front Commander Udi Adam, resigned in September, causing speculation that the comments may be aimed at Halutz himself.

"I believe that placing divisional commanders at the focus of the investigation of the fighting was a grave error," Hirsch wrote in his resignation letter, a copy of which was obtained by Haaretz.

"It pains me that divisional commanders were subjected to public [scrutiny] in an unacceptable manner - it's not right to treat senior military commanders in that fashion."

According to Hirsch, "I believe that it would be right to conclude that concrete responsibility for the errors, the missteps, and the failures, falls not only on the forward units and their commanders - there is responsibility that truly should be taken by senior echelons."

Almog, who is expected to present his findings later Sunday to Defense Minister Amir Peretz, said recently that he insisted that Hirsch be dismissed from the IDF over his responsibility for the abduction.

However, at least five major generals told Halutz they objected to dismissing Hirsch, and suggested merely removing him from field command.

In his resignation letter, Hirsch said he had acted appropriately before and during the war, and that he has decided to leave the army because of the anguish caused to his family by recent events.

Halutz had indicated previously that he intended to promote Hirsch to a more senior post.

In the aftermath of the war, there have been wide public calls for the resignations of a number of Hirsch's superiors, including Halutz, Peretz, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

The resignation follows Adam's replacement in September. During the war, in a step viewed as indicating a lack of confidence in Adam's leadership, Halutz sent his deputy, Major General Moshe Kaplinsky, to oversee the command in the north.

Almog's team focused on the events leading to the abduction of the soldiers, and the functioning of officers from the divisional commanders upward. It found severe faults on all levels.

Hirsch contested Almog's findings, which stated that Hirsch did not ensure that his instructions were carried out and that there was a discrepancy between planning moves and their implementation. For example, the reserve battalion, two of whose soldiers were captured by Hezbollah, had not exercised an abduction scenario as required when it entered the region.

The team also examined the intelligence at the disposal of the division and the Northern Command on the eve of the capture. The partial intelligence tip about the abduction, the team claimed, had not been analyzed and passed on in time.

The team's findings indicated that the troops should have been placed on higher alert after IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit's abduction near the Gaza Strip on June 25.