Senior Northern Command and Division 91 officers were not privy to essential intelligence information regarding Hezbollah's deployment prior to the second Lebanon War.

The intelligence, which was available to the Israel Defense Forces, included accurate information about the locations of Hezbollah bunkers and positions, as well as the internal structure of such positions.

The officers were aware that such information existed, but were prevented by the Intelligence Directorate's Committee on Source Security, claiming that the information was secret. Military Intelligence decided that the information would only be made available in the event of a war.

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Officers' demands to gain access to information on routine security preparations that could counter Hezbollah raids inside the border fence were also rejected, and led to repeated and heated arguments among various units.

The information on Hezbollah positions was also withheld from the units during the war itself. Although there was a plan to transfer the data, which was stored in sealed boxes, to relevant units during a war, it was not carried out in time.

The initial boxes of intelligence reached the division command only a week after the initial encounter between an elite IDF unit and Hezbollah guerrillas inside a bunker (on July 19). But even then, it was difficult to adapt the intelligence to the immediate needs of the unit fighting there.