The legitimate differences of opinion between the government and the army over the necessity of a large-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip have become part of an illegitimate battle for survival by those who conducted the second Lebanon war. In a situation where the chief of staff is fighting for his position, a state commission of inquiry is not yet out of the question and the Winograd Committee is at the height of its investigation, it is hard to distinguish manipulations from serious debate, or necessary moves from public relations.

A series of recent appointments in the Israel Defense Forces included commanders whose performance is now being investigated. Had these same men been appointed by a new chief of staff, it might have been possible to assume that their appointments were made on the basis of merit. But the haste with which they were appointed makes this seem like an attempt to "close the cases" and thereby silence criticism. The sense that the chief of staff stole a march by announcing the appointments without the defense minister's approval reflects a general lack of confidence in the considerations guiding those responsible for the war. The decision not to replace the chief of staff also seems like a default option, or like fear of opening a Pandora's box. The effusive praise that the prime minister publicly heaps on the chief of staff stems from his desire to paint the war as a victory, at a time when in reality, the various investigations have revealed command failures and, above all, evidence that many commanders, headed by the chief of staff, completely failed to understand that they were at war.

While IDF planes were circling above Beirut Monday morning, whether as a show of strength or for some essential military purpose, the chief of staff, defense minister and prime minister visited the northern border and spared no expression of satisfaction with the war's results. They spoke of the heroism, of the lessons learned, of the quiet in the North, of soul-searching and a thoroughgoing correction of errors. Even before these errors have been located, the relevant parties are already boasting of having corrected them. The criticisms being leveled by the investigators and by the reservists who appeared before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee are currently of interest mainly to the bereaved families. They are the ones demanding that someone take responsibility, as if this were the problem only of those who fell in battle and not of all Israeli citizens.

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The cabinet, in its new, more militant composition following the entry of Avigdor Lieberman, has been asked to approve an expanded IDF operation in Gaza when in practice, the operation is already underway, or has at least begun.

In this case as well, it is hard to rely on the leadership's judgments. Are there indeed essential security reasons for reoccupying the Philadelphi Route, or are commanders whose pride was hurt looking for a success, or at least a diversion, or to silence the critics by mobilizing a national consensus for a new operation?

These are grave accusations, which derive from that same lack of confidence - which could have been alleviated, at least partly, had the government replaced the chief of staff. Thus far, the message that arises from both the new appointments and the operation in Gaza is that the criticism is falling on deaf ears, and that everyone is searching for a way to escape responsibility, at a time and in a manner most convenient for him - regardless of whether this is good of the state.