Two interrelated issues sit at the center of Israel's expectations of Egypt: the release of abducted soldier Gilad Shalit, and closure of the gate for weapons and explosives smuggling into the Gaza Strip. If Egypt continues to talk meekly and act weakly, it may lead to an escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, which it would like to avoid. The escalation, which may also include a broad IDF ground operation in residential areas close to the Egyptian border, will also have a negative effect on relations between Jerusalem and Cairo.

The security annex of the peace treaty with Egypt states that Israel has the right to hold military forces, of specific type and numbers, along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, in the area of Rafah, and from the sea to Kerem Shalom. During the 2005 evacuation of the Gaza Strip, Israel essentially relinquished this right, transforming it into an expectation that the Palestinian Authority and Egypt would secure the border and the Philadelphi Route that runs alongside it.

This expectation was based on the assumption that both the Egyptian and Palestinian regimes would be willing and capable of preventing the transit of goods and people capable of both undermining the resolution of relations between Israel and the moderate government of Mahmoud Abbas and posing a threat to the security of the regime of Hosni Mubarak, who is on the defensive against the Muslim Brotherhood at home, and their Al Qaida supporters from beyond.

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This expectation proved to be a disappointment. Hamas took over the Palestinian Authority, and allowed other extremist factions and elements within its midst to act against Israel by launching Qassam rockets and digging tunnels so as to carry out attacks and kidnap Israelis.

Egypt, which guards the president and his centers of power well, is not making a sufficient effort to seal its border, which is breached along its walls and tunnels below.

The ongoing crisis since the creation of Ismail Haniyeh's government, which is bound by the external dictates of Khaled Meshal and his colleagues among Hamas' leadership in Damascus, has intensified since the June abduction of Shalit. Egypt tried to mediate between the kidnappers and their patrons, headed by Meshal, and Israel, but did not rush to apply its full weight in favor of moderates in the Arab and Muslim world.

Despite Egypt's concerns over the strengthening of extremists, it is behaving as if it is comfortable with a bleeding and anxious Israel. The price the Palestinians have paid to date stands at 300 dead, the vast majority being armed militants and participants in violent actions against Israel, but including some innocent civilians.

The Gaza Strip's economy is being destroyed, and its reconstruction depends on setting up a moderate government of Hamas and Fatah, but even such a move is being delayed until Shalit is released. Meanwhile, the rampant smuggling of rockets intended to strike at Israeli communities and missiles aimed against IDF tanks and aircraft continues. The smuggling is pushing the IDF to recommend an extensive operation in the Gaza Strip before the arms build-up reaches a scale similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The key to the crisis is in Cairo. Egypt must wake up and turn the key before the IDF rushes in and breaks the lock.