The many disputes that characterize Palestinian politics gave way to a consensus on one issue this week: by the end of next week the Palestinian public will know whether Hamas and Fatah are heading for a confrontation in the form of a civil war, or for reconciliation in the form of an agreement to establish a unity government. Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) will have to decide whether to deploy his forces in the Gaza Strip to demonstrate his sovereignty, thus risking a general flare-up, or to hold back again and lose the little trust in him that remains in the Palestinian public. If, however, Hamas rejects the new Egyptian initiative for a unity government, it could find itself, with a referendum that will force Abu Mazen on it, and bloodshed in the streets of Gaza.

On Sunday, the first day of the Id al-Fitr holiday, the Israel Defense Forces acted in Beit Hanun in the northern Gaza Strip, and Gaza was in flames again - seven killed, dozens of wounded and a call for Palestinian unity in face of the Israeli enemy. The IDF's refraining from military actions during the subsequent two days caused the talk of unity in the ranks to be forgotten quickly.

The focus is now moving to Cairo, to one of the most critical visits for the future of the Gaza Strip: Khaled Meshal and/or a delegation on his behalf are slated to arrive for a meeting with the head of Egyptian intelligence, Omar Suleiman, and Abu Mazen's people. Syrian representatives will also be at the talks. For the Egyptians, the optimistic scenario for the mini-summit they have organized is: Meshal will come to the talks, and this will mean that there is positive progress, a deal for the release of Gilad Shalit will be within reach and the clash between the organizations will be postponed. The pessimistic scenario: Meshal will not come; he will send a few representatives who will drag things out, and Shalit's release will be delayed again. The implications of the second scenario are clear. Gaza will enter a vortex of blood: battles between Fatah and Hamas parallel to Israeli actions, especially around the Philadelphi Route in the Rafah area.

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The inhabitants of the Rafah refugee camp, in the area known as Block O, are not especially upset by Israeli threats of a military action near the Philadelphi Route. Opposite the inhabitants' homes stands the ugly stone wall that separates Egypt from Gaza. Many houses are in ruins, riddled by bullets and shells from IDF attacks.

Mahmoud al-Najar, 22, does not attribute too much importance to the tunnels that are being excavated here. "There aren't a lot of tunnels in the neighborhood. Only two weeks ago preventive security uncovered one and blocked it," he says. The IDF, which rushes to talk about an underground city in Rafah, has not bothered to reveal to the Israeli public that during the past month, the Palestinian security forces have sealed three tunnels.

Mahmoud's friend Yusuf Abu Mor, 18, is also not too interested in the Israeli declarations that are threatening to bring the IDF tanks back here. He has just heard about the killing of the seven Palestinians in Beit Hanun. "Who killed them? Al yahud or al arab [the Jews or the Arabs]?" he asks.

"What's the matter with you, man?" Mahmoud answers him. "Clearly the Jews."

"How should I know? Only yesterday I heard that Hamas killed someone from preventive security," explains Yusuf.

This hell of half-demolished houses about to collapse looks like a paradise for smugglers and those who run the tunnels. Every abandoned house holds potential for developing a tunnel through which many shipments of arms could flow to the Gaza Strip, and thousands of dollars to its proprietor. The cost of construction is minimal and the big profits are a sure thing.

Among the dozens of ruins rises a structure that looks totally new, but turns out to be renovated. This is the Dhu al-Nureen Mosque, which is decked with many Hamas flags. Despite the economic siege, the organization has found the money needed for rehabilitating the mosque. At its entrance there are many pictures of shaheeds - martyrs - and a few children who are trying to convince the Haaretz reporters to buy a toy rifle from them.

Inside the mosque sits a group of bearded young men; the children relate that these are Hamas people. One of them, Abu al-Abed, who looks like the leader of the group, tells us that the mujahideen, the fighters of the holy war, are preparing surprises for the Israelis if they decide to act here. "We are not afraid. If the Israelis would like to come in, they are welcome. We are expecting them and we will make this place into their cemetery," he explains with utter assurance.

The indifference to a possible Israeli action stems in part from the knowledge that even if Israel retakes control of Philadelphi, the tunnel proprietors will not be unemployed. Their work may be damaged, but they operated in Rafah during the days when the IDF was in control of the camp and during the year when the PA tried to act in the area. They will remain even after the Israeli soldiers are once again moving along the border route.

Choice targets

On Tuesday, armed men from one of the large clans abducted Associated Press photographer Emilio Morenatti, a Spanish citizen. Fortunately for Morenatti, he was released within less than 24 hours. The clan that abducted him in fact specializes in vehicle theft and extorting ransom. The foreign journalists have in recent months become the target of choice for every armed man frustrated by the fact that he hasn't received his salary or a promotion.

With no relation to that incident, on the same evening the Al Jazeera network broadcast a documentary film about the security chaos in the territories. A number of heads of armed clans were interviewed for the film. One of them, Talat al-Sha'ar from Rafah, related without a glimmer of remorse how he kidnapped journalists and Red Cross representatives because the PA had not paid him money as it had promised. Sha'ar did not reject the possibility that he would kidnap senior PA people in order to preserve his family's economic interests. Another person interviewed for the film was Mumtaz Durmush, who is considered the head of one of the large armed clans. He explained proudly that he had executed the head of military intelligence, Moussa Arafat, about a year ago because he had harmed the interests of the Palestinian people. The heads of the clans/gangs can move securely around the Gaza Strip in the knowledge that the PA will not try to arrest them. The law-enforcement system has long been bankrupt, while the operative force of Hamas - which was intended to restore public order - is busy warring against the other security forces that are identified with Fatah, not dealing with the citizen's welfare. Sha'ar and Durmush, like others, are simply taking advantage of the vacuum of governance that has been left by the struggles among the organizations in order to become the real decision-makers in the Gaza Strip.

"If Israel is planning to occupy Gaza," remarks a Palestinian commentator cynically, "it should get to know these people very well. They will be their partners in the coming years. The Ottomans, the British and the Egyptians did business with them, and maybe you will need them too."

The IDF

The Israeli security establishment is watching the internal Palestinian friction with almost academic interest. At the moment, Israel is not giving any signs of significant interest in dialogue with the Palestinians. A contribution to strengthening Fatah at the expense of Hamas? We've been there, done that, and nothing came of it. A plan for opening the Gaza Strip crossing points? A big yawn. Defense Minister Amir Peretz can continue to scatter promises of easements for the Gazan population. In actuality, the crossing points to the Gaza Strip are closed much of the time (and at the beginning of the week the Shin Bet security service thwarted an attempt to smuggle regulation explosives, destined for Tul Karm, through the Karni crossing point).

The new commander of the Gaza Brigade, Brigadier General Moshe (Chico) Tamir, regarded with astonishment the practice that had crystallized before his time in the sector, whereby Palestinian police were asked to dismantle explosive charges that were discovered to the west of the system fence - and immediately eliminated it. At Central Command, some of the senior commanders are openly questioning the longstanding thesis that removing security pressure from the inhabitants of the West Bank will reduce their support for terror. They see this as an anachronistic idea, an unnecessary remnant of the Oslo days.

The only thing that Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin agree on these days is the pointlessness of relying on the PA and Fatah to be the ones who will succeed in overcoming Hamas and doing the dirty work for Israel. The IDF is gradually ratcheting up its offensive action in the Gaza Strip - and usually encounters indifference on the part of the international community.

Still, an Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip is not a decree of fate. Halutz is relating skeptically to firm proposals along these lines that Major General (res.) Yomtov Samia brought up this week in the media for renewed permanent control of the Philadelphi Route. Most of the special units are still not training - neither in advance of an action in Gaza nor for possible hostilities in Lebanon. They are continuing to engage in arrests of wanted men in Nablus and Qabatiya. A senior officer in the General Staff says that currently there are three possibilities with respect to the Gaza Strip: Postponing the end (small-scale operations, with a focus on Philadelphi); a medium-sized operation that will cut off Rafah for a considerable period and separate it from the rest of the Gaza Strip; or prolonged preparations, culminating in an even larger operation, which will be conditional on receiving public legitimization (which usually depends on the number of Israeli casualties from terror actions from the Gaza Strip).