It's impossible not to be shocked by the conclusions drawn by the military task force investigating the senior commanders of Division 91, one of the Israel Defense Forces' most important divisions, and the way in which they ran this summer's Lebanon war. And it's impossible not to worry about how they were found to have brought failure upon themselves.

The irony is that beyond Hezbollah's role in causing the IDF's defeat, the army defeated itself with inefficiency and chaos caused through its logistics and operations. All told, it's a sad tale of a confused division during wartime.

It turns out that for 16 years, the IDF had not offered a course for division commanders. Following the war, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz ordered that such a course be given once again. Perhaps this lack of education contributed to the task force's findings that the senior officers were more military administrators than combat commanders who used military gibberish that other units had difficulty understanding.

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The multiple serious malfunctions that took place - such as those following Hezbollah's abduction of soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev on July 12 - do not just turn up suddenly, but develop over time. All at once, the IDF looks like it's limping along.

Those looking for one key factor leading to the IDF's failures cannot escape the conclusion that the constant need to maintain security in the territories plays a negative role for any advanced army, turning the IDF into a type of large police force. The investigation of Division 91 turned up an army looking for reasons not to attack, whether due to a casualty here and there, a problem with the gas supply for a tank, or a bulldozer in its way.

The trend in the IDF today is not to raise even a hint of suspicion that the army is hiding anything in its investigations. Therefore, it decided to publicize most of the task force's findings, while exercising caution regarding sensitive security issues. There certainly will be enemies who rejoice at news of the IDF's shortcomings, but only the future will tell what this approach will do to Israel's deterrence ability.

A more important question is whether these failures can be fixed. Most of the critics say that's possible. The IDF is now approaching the important stage of drawing conclusions from the inquiries, and we must assume that the army will carry out this phase the right way. What is not yet clear is whether the IDF and its senior commanders will also be able to straighten what has been deformed and head in a new direction.