Major General (res.) Yoram Yair harshly criticized Division 91 yesterday for failures during combat in the recent Lebanon war and accused the entire Israel Defense Forces - from the General Staff on down - of seeing the fighting as a security exercise instead of as a war.

Yesterday, when revealing the findings of an investigation that he headed into Division 91's activities to the General Staff, Yair claimed that the war did not have defined goals. He criticized the cuts that had been made in army training and preparation, and said the IDF had become accustomed to carrying out security exercises in the territories and did not change its approach in time for the war.

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Yair presented only some of the findings related to Division 91, headed by Brigadier General Gal Hirsch; later in the week he is to present the General Staff with conclusions regarding the combat in Bint Jbail, where eight IDF soldiers were killed.

The abduction of IDF soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev is being investigated by Major General (res.) Doron Almog.

Over the coming week, the General Staff will receive the findings of several additional inquests, including one concerning the rocket that hit the navy's missile ship Hanit.

The findings presented by Yair point to a systemic problem in the IDF that is not limited to any single military division. To a large extent, he reiterated opinions that have been expressed in the news media starting from the third week of the war. However, here - for the first time - they were being expressed by an official IDF source.

Among Yair's primary conclusions:

b The IDF did not conduct the war as a military operation with defined goals and objectives and did not resolutely or speedily try to achieve a set aim.

b The army did not relate to the battles in Lebanon as part of a war, despite the opinions of senior officers.

b Division 91 had a problem defining missions, and they were not sufficiently clarified to the lower ranks. There were frequent changes in objectives, which made it difficult for the troops and created the impression that confusion reined among the top brass.

b The division used jargon that differed from the overall military language, leading units that had not trained with the division before the war to misunderstand the commander's intentions.

b The fighting was not conducted in a consistent manner. Troops entered and exited certain areas only to return to them later on. Many units were removed for long breaks in Israel, causing delays in carrying out the missions.

b The deployment of most of the commanders was "seriously flawed." Most of the brigade commanders decided, for example, to stay in the operations rooms on the Lebanese border and did not accompany their troops into the field, which made it harder for the soldiers to understand the situation and to carry out their missions there.

b The troops did not receive much logistical help, which kept them from advancing.

b Hirsch planned many battles, but the division did not always carry out the plans or stick to the timetable.