In her fascinating book, "The March of Folly," historian Barbara Tuchman exposes the blunders made by leaders with exaggerated self-confidence and rigid thinking. In this season of soul-searching, an evaluation of these elements is a worthwhile exercise, not necessarily through an examination of the second Lebanon war, but of a more distant event instead - the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

The justification now for an investigation of the foolish behavior of Golda Meir's government then - a government that refused to begin negotiations with then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat a year before the war - is the Syrian proposal to open peace talks. This overture was rejected by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, as it was by Ariel Sharon before him.

The rigid mentality of Golda's government stemmed from its exaggerated self-confidence, and from the idea that the strategic depth of the Sinai Peninsula was better than peace. Sadat approached Israel in 1972 - then, too, through the foreign press (an Austrian newspaper) - and said as follows: "We are prepared for peace with Israel. If Israel rejects us, I will mobilize a million soldiers and go to war."

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Golda dismissed Sadat's words with characteristic scorn: "They are not even able to cross the [Suez] Canal."

And then defense minister Moshe Dayan explained the strategic importance of the Sinai in his famous statement: "Better Sharm el-Sheikh without peace than peace without Sharm el-Sheikh."

The prime minister and the defense minister made a historic blunder, and failed to put the Egyptians' desire for peace to the test. True to his promise, Sadat went to war a year later. The Golda-Dayan conception crumbled, and 2,700 Israeli soldiers paid for the arrogance and the stupidity with their lives.

It took a courageous prime minister like Menachem Begin to be willing to give up Sinai to achieve peace and security on the Egyptian front. The peace with Egypt is one of the most important strategic legacies Begin bequeathed us. Syrian President Bashar Assad recently repeated his offer to begin peace negotiations with Israel. Olmert's response was identical to the one Sadat got from Golda - only, Sharm el-Sheikh as the justification for the rigidity has been replaced by the Golan Heights.

What is the Syrian president supposed to think when he hears Olmert declare that the Golan "will remain in Israeli hands forever?" Perhaps he will be tempted to follow Sadat's lead and initiate a limited military campaign that will cost us dearly.

The leadership explains its inflexibility with the slogan: "Syria has not changed." This judgment ignores important developments, the most significant of which was the Arab League's decision (endorsed by Syria) in Beirut, supporting full peace and normalization of relations with Israel in return for the territories it has captured.

Also new is Syria's willingness to begin talks without preconditions. Until now, it was always Israel that made that demand of its neighbors. Now that Syria has agreed, the government of Israel introduces preconditions.

It is enough to listen to the rationalizations of the Olmert government to realize its rigidity of thinking. One is "solidarity of friends" - the United States doesn't talk to Syria, so nor will we. But the U.S. does not talk to Syria because we are not talking to Syria, and not the other way around.

The second rationalization is that Syria is militarily weak and diplomatically isolated, so why should we give it legitimacy? In fact, it is precisely Syria's weakness that is the reason for making peace with that country at this time.

True, the Golan is a strategic asset, and relinquishing it is not without risk; but the courageous step of renewing negotiations with Syria carries major strategic possibilities as well - avoiding a war with Syria, eliminating Hezbollah, ending Syrian support for terrorist organizations, isolating Iran, stabilizing the cease-fire in Lebanon, reinforcing Israel's strategic position in the Middle East, and diverting resources for domestic needs.

A peace process with Syria will draw Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians and other Arab and Muslim countries into a new dynamic of reconciliation with Israel. An assessment of the opportunities balanced against the risks justifies the renewal of negotiations with Syria.

Danny Yatom is a major-general in the reserves, former Mossad chief and Labor MK; Dr. Moshe Amirav is the head of Public Policy Studies at Beit Berl College, and a Kadima MK.