"Only the return of the abducted soldiers will stop the operation."

"Israel will wage the war against Hezbollah as long as it takes in order to return the abducted soldiers and implement Resolution 1559 in full and to apply the blueprint contained in the G-8 resolution: the unconditional return of the abducted soldiers, the dismantlement of Hezbollah and the cessation of the missile threat against Israel, the deployment of the Lebanese army along the border with Israel and the application of Lebanese government sovereignty over all parts of the country." - (Prime Minister Ehud Olmert presenting the goals of the war in Lebanon, July 18 and July 19, 2006)

"Resolution 1701 constitutes one of Israel's important achievements in the international arena. If implemented in full, our situation on the northern border will be immeasurably better than it was on July 12." - (Olmert summing up the results of the war two weeks after the cease-fire, August 28, 2006)

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The second Lebanon war was different from the first. This time the Israel Defense Forces enjoyed broad international support, which enabled Israel to extend the fighting without concern that the "political stopwatch" would halt the activity of the planes and the tanks. But the IDF did not succeed in ending the war with a military victory or in determining what the right exit would be. To that end, an intensive diplomatic process was necessary, which led to UN Security Council Resolution 1701. However, that process required Israel to backtrack from most of the goals it posited at the start of the hostilities - above all the release of the soldiers Eldad Regev and Udi Goldwasser, whose abduction by Hezbollah on July 12 sparked the confrontation - and the complete dismantling of Hezbollah.

Instead of these demands, which appeared out of reach, Israel sought the deployment in Lebanon of a strong international force which that help preserve quiet and prevent arms from reaching Hezbollah. This was a strategic shift in Israel's longstanding policy that "we will defend ourselves with our own forces" and "we will maintain the IDF's freedom of action." A reconstruction of the decision-making process shows that the turnabout in the Israeli approach occurred after about 10 days of fighting, when the top ranks of the country's political and security establishment reached an understanding on the desirable "exit strategy." The decision was made in the shadow of the fighting and did not generate any special political or media interest. It was preceded by a dispute between Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who proposed stopping the operation a few days after it began, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who wanted to give the IDF more time.

Olmert maintains that the controversial decision to expand the ground operation tipped the scales in the Security Council and led to a change in the emerging resolution in Israel's favor. The view at UN headquarters in New York is different: none of the foreign diplomats and ambassadors who were interviewed for this article mentioned the expansion of the Israeli operation as a factor that influenced the final resolution.

July 13: Formulating an 'exit strategy'

On the evening of July 12, the cabinet met in special session to decide on Israel's reaction to the capture of the soldiers and the firing of Katyusha rockets into the north of the country that morning. The atmosphere was dramatic. It was clear to everyone that it would be impossible to show restraint less than three weeks after Hamas's abduction of Gilad Shalit and the intensified firing of Qassam rockets into southern Israel.

Livni arrived at the meeting after an internal discussion in the Foreign Ministry, which began with the Shalit issue and the crisis in the south. It had ended with the ministry's director general, Aaron Abramovich, being handed a note and announcing, his face pale: "We have Hannibal in the north" - the abduction code. "It was clear to everyone that we had moved from the stage of a specific event to a strategic discussion," one of the participants in the meeting related. He added that in retrospect, it became apparent that the media hysteria over the return of Shalit had made Nasrallah envious and encouraged him to carry out the abduction in the north.

"We should remove the return of the abductees from the lexicon, because that is not a realistic goal," Livni told the cabinet. She recommended focusing on the demand that Lebanon implement Security Council Resolution 1559, which had been only partially applied with Syria's departure from the country in 2005.

"Short, fast, without civilian casualties and without a ground operation," Livni proposed, "and tomorrow morning we'll see whether we have to continue with it."

After the cabinet meeting, the "forum of seven," headed by Olmert, convened to authorize the destruction of Hezbollah's long-range rockets. Livni emerged from the forum with the understanding that the army needed "tonight and a little bit more" to complete the operation, and that it would be over by the middle of the next day.

The next day, July 13, the Foreign Ministry understood that the IDF had entered the war without a realistic military exit point and that the National Security Council was not playing a meaningful role. The ministry decided to look for a diplomatic exit point toward which to guide the government. Abramovich asked his deputy for political affairs, Yossi Gal, to coordinate a secret ministry team that would work out the "exit strategy" from the crisis.

That very day, the ideas that would ultimately underlie the cease-fire were worked out. The team's working assumptions were that the military operation would not bring about the release of the abductees or the disarming of Hezbollah, and that the IDF would not remain in Lebanon for a prolonged period. The emerging solution was to send a strong international force to Lebanon to reinforce the Lebanese army and help it suppress Hezbollah.

On July 14 the team presented a first draft of exit strategy principles to Livni, and two days later submitted a more detailed document, which included a first draft for a Security Council resolution. The document stated that the military operation would be able to weaken Hezbollah, but that political agreements were needed to ensure long-term achievements. The authors warned that if Israel did not take the initiative, the international community was liable to reach agreements with Lebanon without Israeli input. The first point in the document, and in all the accompanying papers, was the return of the abducted soldiers. "Although we all knew, without talking about it, that with all our good will, the abductees were not the central goal," a senior Foreign Ministry official said, "but we all felt the need to lead with the demand for the immediate and unconditional return of the abductees."

The other principles of the document were:

- The adoption of a new "formative" Security Council resolution to supersede Resolution 1559.

- The Lebanese army would deploy in the south and be bolstered by an international peacekeeping force that would operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and be allowed to open fire if necessary.

- Demilitarization of the area between Israel's border and the Litani River.

- The disarming of Hezbollah to be carried out in an orderly plan with a supervisory mechanism.

- Israel and Lebanon to maintain a political-security coordinating mechanism.

- International aid to Lebanon in accordance with the progress made in implementing Resolution 1559 (disarming Hezbollah).

- The UN to impose an arms embargo on the nongovernmental militias in Lebanon.

The document recommended that the initiative be promoted by the U.S. and France, without "Israeli fingerprints," to avert international opposition. But before going international, the Foreign Ministry had to market the plan domestically, to the prime minister and the IDF - and that turned out to be an equally high hurdle.

July 16: The Olmert -Livni rift

Already on the evening of July 13, as Livni made the rounds of the television studios, she began hearing about a protracted operation with additional goals. She wanted to end the military action and launch the diplomatic process after the successful bombing of Nasrallah's long-range missiles. But Olmert thought that the IDF needed a few more days in order to hit a few more targets.

On Friday, July 14 Olmert convened the forum of seven to authorize the bombing of the Dahiya neighborhood in Beirut, including Hezbollah headquarters and Nasrallah's home. The participants were told that in reaction, Hezbollah would fire missiles at Haifa. Livni and Public Seucrity Minister Avi Dichter opposed the move, but it was approved and the war was expanded.

Livni met with Olmert on July 16 and presented the "diplomatic exit" concept. Olmert was not enthusiastic; he wanted to give the army "more time." At that moment, a rift was created between the two which has not been mended to this day. Livni realized that she was in a minority, that the war had broad public and political support. She stopped giving interviews and adopted a low profile, but continued trying to convert Olmert to the diplomatic concept.

That evening, Olmert was informed that Channel 2 had reported that the Foreign Ministry was considering the possibility of having an international force stationed in Lebanon. The idea that Israel would place its trust in such a force was considered almost heretical. The PM's Bureau was furious at the leak and the Foreign Ministry launched a witch hunt to find the culprit. Livni and Abramovich were concerned that publicizing the idea before it had been seriously presented to Olmert would bury it.

On July 18, Olmert met with a group of Foreign Ministry diplomats who were about to take up ambassadorial posts abroad. In reference to a possible multinational force, he told them, "It makes for a good headline, but our experience shows that it is without foundation. There is already a multinational force in Lebanon and we see what they are doing. I want to be cautious on this issue, and I think it's too early to discuss it."

Olmert's bureau issued his remarks as a press communique. The message was clear: Olmert was trashing his foreign minister's ideas. Sources in his bureau told reporters that Israel would insist on the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and oppose any other force.

Livni, though, kept trying to meet with Olmert to promote the idea; she was put off with various excuses. The PM's Bureau asked the defense establishment for an opinion about an international force before formulating its position. The head of the political-security unit in the Defense Ministry, Major General (res.) Amos Gilad, backed the view that the desirable exit from the war was the removal of Hezbollah from southern Lebanon and the entry of an "effective" multinational force.

The feeling in Jerusalem was that the world was with us, perhaps for the first time in any Israeli war. On July 16, the G-8 passed a resolution that adopted Israel's war aims and placed the blame for the crisis on Hezbollah. The PM's Bureau viewed the G-8 statement as an extraordinary political achievement. It had been preceded by intensive contacts held by Olmert's chief of staff, Yoram Turbowicz, and his political adviser, Shalom Turgeman, with the White House, the Elysee Palace and 10 Downing Street. The network of ties between the bureaus of the leaders, which was formed during the period of Ariel Sharon, proved itself in the crisis.

On July 17, the head of the General Staff strategic planning unit, Brigadier General Udi Dekel, began to hold discussions on ending the crisis. Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and Defense Minister Amir Peretz had held consultations about whether Israel had already run the gamut of the war, on the assumption that no ground operation was wanted. But the G-8 resolution persuaded the top political and military echelon that the international community was allowing Israel to achieve more goals militarily. The IDF began to consider the idea of an international force, which was part of the G-8 statement, and formed the impression that it would constitute a good basis for new security arrangements in Lebanon. A quiet approach was made to NATO about whether the organization would agree to send its Rapid Deployment Force to Lebanon. The idea was rejected because of opposition by France, which wanted to lead the international force itself.

On July 23 Olmert met with Livni and told her he was adopting the international force plan. The Foreign Ministry document - "Changing the Rules of the Game in Lebanon" - was adopted as the basis of the Israeli approach. This development did not heal the rift between Livni and Olmert and did not resolve the crucial question of the appropriate date to end the war. Olmert and the army wanted more time; Livni believed that the war's continuation was not contributing anything to Israel. But a coordinated Israeli position was formulated on the exit strategy question.

From then until the end of the war, an interministerial team led by Turbowicz conducted the political contacts. The team met every day and each of its members was in contact with his liaison people in the international community. The decision that was made on July 23 was not divorced from international developments. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was on her way to the region in order to work out a cease-fire and a new political order in Lebanon.

July 29: Between Shaba Farms and Kana village

In the first days of the war, U.S. attention focused on saving the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, Washington's protege. The U.S. administration thought that Israel's response to Hezbollah's provocation was justified, but wanted Israel to concentrate on attacking Nasrallah and his forces, not to bomb Lebanese civilian infrastructure. This, they warned, would weaken the Siniora government. They were especially opposed to bombing the electricity grid, noting that "Hezbollah is equipped with generators and will be able to go on fighting." They rejected the air force's destruction of bridges north of Beirut in order to prevent arms from reaching Hezbollah and told Israel, "If you wanted to block the road, you could have hit it in specific places and not flattened bridges, which will take years to rebuild."

U.S. officials dismiss as "total nonsense" the reports that Washington expected Israel to annihilate Hezbollah and was badly disappointed when this goal failed to be achieved. At a certain point Washington reached the conclusion that Hezbollah had already absorbed most of the damage Israel could inflict on it, so there was no point in prolonging the war. At the same time, the Americans thought from the first that Israel would have to carry out a ground operation in Lebanon and would not be able to make do with only an air offensive.

Siniora persuaded Rice that the major achievement from his point of view would be for Israel to evacuate Shaba Farms on the slopes of Mount Hermon. He suggested that Israel leave the area and turn it over to the UN until the clarification of its legal owner - Syria or Lebanon. He told Rice that this would deprive Hezbollah of one of its major pretexts for military activity and facilitate its transformation into an unarmed political organization. Enthused, Rice tried to sell the idea to Olmert on July 29, at the start of her visit. Olmert rejected the idea, calling it a dangerous precedent. "Israel was attacked and its sovereignty was infringed, and now it is being asked to give land to the aggressor?" he said. Livni and Peretz were also not happy with the idea and Rice understood that she would have to give Siniora a negative reply.

The Shaba Farms dispute did not hold up progress in drafting a "paper of understandings" that Rice wanted to draw up with the concurrence of both Lebanon and Israel. On Sunday, July 30, she was about to leave for Beirut to sum up the plan and take it to the UN the next day. Then disaster struck. While she was meeting with Peretz a report arrived stating that the Israeli Air Force had killed dozens of Lebanese in the bombing of the village of Kana. The Lebanese asked Rice to keep her distance from Beirut and her cease-fire plan was shelved. Olmert now says that the "tragedy at Kana" delayed the end of the war by 10 days.

July 30: The French seize command

In the wake of these developments, the French draft for a Security Council resolution rose to the head of the agenda. Jerusalem didn't like the original French document (see box) and was certain that the French were reflecting the Lebanese position in the face of the Israeli position, which enjoyed U.S. support. Moreover, officials in Jerusalem suspected that France was presenting a tougher approach than the true Lebanese position. Messages reached Israel to the effect that Siniora was speaking in two voices: domestically, he was against upgrading UNIFIL, the veteran UN force in southern Lebanon, but outwardly he was encouraging the international community not to miss the opportunity to rein in Nasrallah.

In the meantime, negotiations were under way between the Turbowicz team and three U.S. officials: C. David Welch, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs; Jonathan Schwartz, a legal adviser; and ambassador to Israel Richard Jones. Welch and Schwartz shuttled between Jerusalem and Beirut several times. The PM's Bureau was also in telephone contact with the Elysee Palace in Paris. Contrary to the French stand, Israel insisted that Hezbollah be cited in the UN resolution as being responsible for the crisis, in order to strengthen the demand for disarming it. The French initially tried to "balance" the text by mentioning Israel's "disproportionate reaction," but this phrase vanished from the final version. The Israeli demand to impose an arms embargo on Hezbollah was accepted, but only in part: it was decided to supervise the flow of arms into Lebanon, but Israel's demand to punish countries that would violate the embargo - a clear hint at Syria and Iran - was rejected. Also rejected was an Israeli proposal for the international force in Lebanon to operate in the same format as UNSCOM, which was stationed in Iraq, to ascertain that the Lebanese army was disarming Hezbollah according to a pre-agreed plan.

An interesting argument developed in Israel over the powers of the international force: Would it be able to use force to implement the Security Council resolution, according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or have only observer status, as set forth in Chapter VI? The Foreign Ministry at first opted for Chapter VII. The IDF was divided on the question: some wanted a force "with teeth," while others were concerned that this would reduce Israel's freedom of action in response to terrorism from Lebanon.

The American legal expert Anne Bayefsky, who specializes in international institutions and was visiting Israel at the time, called her friend MK Natan Sharansky (Likud) and explained to him the shortcomings of Chapter VII. Sharansky passed on the message to Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, who was on a publicity mission in London. He called Olmert and cautioned him against the dangerous precedent of an international force with enforcement capability.

Lebanon was also against a force based on Chapter VII, preferring to be seen as having invited the UN troops to its territory to beef up UNIFIL. Everyone found convenient the compromise according to which the formulations of Chapter VII would be used, but without citing it explicitly. On Saturday, August 5, six days after the Kana bombing, the U.S. and French ambassadors to the UN published an agreed draft resolution that was based on the French idea of dividing the process in two: first a cease-fire and then the dispatch of an international force and a discussion of the Shaba Farms issue. Jerusalem feared that the cease-fire would divert international attention from Lebanon to other flashpoints. Turbowicz: "The resolution must be a menu fixe and not a buffet" - in other words, all must happen simultaneously, not in stages.

The discussions on the resolution went on for another week, and in the meantime Israel contemplated sending three divisions into Lebanon in order to clear Hezbollah out of the area south of the Litani, in an effort to stop the rain of Katyushas on the north of the country. Peretz pushed for the operation; Olmert hesitated. On Wednesday, August 9, the security cabinet approved the operation, but Olmert delayed it to give the diplomatic efforts another chance.

That evening the Israeli team exerted heavy pressure to improve the draft text, through an ultimatum to expand the military operation. The last draft, which was worked out with the Middle East unit of the State Department on Thursday evening, proved satisfactory to the Israeli team.

The next day Livni intended to travel to New York to take part in the crucial meeting of the Security Council. However, late that night, when she called Olmert to discuss the trip, he instructed her to stay home, arguing that her presence at the UN would generate needless pressure on Israel. The message was clear: this was Livni's punishment for the independent stance she demonstrated in the war. With the war winding down, the battle for credit was about to begin. "Why should people say that Olmert made war and Livni brought peace?" sources in the PM's Bureau said.

August 11: Decision day

A phone call awakened Livni before dawn on Friday, August 11. On the line was her director general, Abramovich, who told her about a problem: the latest draft constituted a retreat from the understandings obtained with Welch the evening before. A few hours later, Turbowicz's team met to analyze the document.

The conclusion was that Israel could not accept the new wording. Olmert related later that that morning he had decided to expand the ground operation as means to exert pressure to improve the resolution. "When we saw the draft we understood that our hope of postponing the military operation was over," say sources in the PM's Bureau. Peretz, who held a lengthy meeting with Olmert that afternoon, says that he persuaded the prime minister to launch the operation.

According to a senior Foreign Ministry official, "The Friday morning draft was painted in the tricolor" - referring to the French flag. In a telephone call in the afternoon, Livni told Rice, "We can't live with this." She was outraged by a footnote that Israel would entrust Shaba Farms to the UN ("the Siniora plan"); she was upset by the non-binding wording about the strengthening of UNIFIL, with no assurance of a "strong mandate" and without supervision over the Syria-Lebanon border, to block arms smuggling, and she was seething over the linkage between the release of the Israeli abductees and the release of the Lebanese prisoners in Israel in a general clause.

In the following hours Turbowicz held several phone calls with U.S. National Security Adviser Steve Hadley, and Livni spoke with Rice, who was on her way to the UN. Israel announced that it was expanding its ground operation.

Olmert says now that he has no doubt that his decision tipped the scales in the Security Council. "Only then did the Americans bring the full weight of their strength to bear, so that the resolution would be as we wished," says a senior official in the PM's Office, "and the French understood that they had no more room for maneuver." The wording was amended so that Israel could claim it had achieved its goals: a reinforced UNIFIL, supervision in the ports and on the Syria-Lebanon border, a vague and nonbinding mention of Shaba Farms, and the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon parallel to the arrival of the Lebanese army and the international force.

At 9 P.M. on Friday, Israel time, the text was completed and put to the vote six hours later. Resolution 1701 was passed unanimously. One small matter remained for the Israeli political team: to reach an agreement with the Americans on the time the cease-fire would take effect. The IDF asked the political leadership for 96 hours to complete the mission. Following the UN vote, another round of Turbowicz-Hadley and Livni-Rice phone calls began. The Israelis explained that it was difficult to stop the IDF midway and that there was concern Hezbollah would not accept the cease-fire. At 5 A.M. Saturday, an understanding was reached that the cease-fire would take effect at 8 A.M. on Monday, August 14. That development concluded the diplomacy, and Welch and Schwartz, who spent the war in the region, flew back to Washington on Saturday morning. In Israel, all those involved began to prepare their version of the events.

In the 60 hours that elapsed between the decision to expand the operation in Lebanon and the start of the cease-fire, 34 soldiers were killed.

Rice gives the word

The G-8 announcement calling for the release of the soldiers who were abducted to Gaza and Lebanon encouraged Olmert to present their release as a major goal and to declare that the war would not end until they were back home. The security cabinet, which met on July 19 to approve the war's political goals, placed at the head of the list "the unconditional release of the abducted soldiers and their return to Israel." Why, then, did this demand disappear when the time came to translate the Israeli goals into a political settlement?

A senior diplomatic source reveals for the first time that "in one of her visits to the region during the war, [U.S. Secretary of State] Rice made it clear to us that if we were thinking of continuing the war until the return of the abductees, the Americans would not be able to support this. They told us that they too had to cope with such abductions in many places around the world, including Iraq, and that we would have to make do with declarations and would not be able to make the cease-fire conditional on the release of the abductees."

Jerusalem understood this, and from that moment the Israeli effort focused on introducing the call for the release of the abductees into the Security Council resolution and torpedoing the French attempt to create a parallel between the return of the abducted soldiers and the release of the Lebanese prisoners held by Israel. "We explained that it is impossible to compare soldiers who were abducted from our territory, to Lebanese who were tried and convicted in a proper judicial procedure," says a senior Israeli official.

Finally, Prime Minister Olmert decided to forgo the release of the abductees as a condition for ending the war. In an interview with Haaretz on the eve of Rosh Hashanah, he explained that once Israel's other demands were accepted, it was impossible to continue the war and risk the lives of dozens of soldiers until the two abductees were returned.