The threat of inquiry committees does not necessarily improve the decision-makers' decisions. They may be wary of embarking on dangerous adventures, but will also refrain from making necessary moves, thus creating new dangers.

The details released so far about the way the war was managed indicate that this - refraining from necessary action - was the leaders' main failure. They actually began well: The very fact that they went to war in reaction to Hezbollah's kidnapping of two soldiers disrupted Hassan Nasrallah's "calculations" about the cowardice of Israeli politicians. But then they got into trouble. Instead of adjusting means to ends, they announced a pretentious goal (disarming Hezbollah), but authorized only small-scale means (aerial bombardments).

Had they set a more modest goal to begin with (a significant blow to Hezbollah), perhaps an aerial strike would have sufficed. But instead of admitting that they were wrong, they compounded the error: As it became apparent that defeating Hezbollah required a ground attack, they caved in to the mounting criticism and sent in the troops.

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Once again, however, they did not persist in their mission. After they started the ground offensive, it was clear that it would take time. But when criticism mounted about the war's long duration and cost, they caved in again. And the result is that instead of praising the leaders for "caving in" to them, the critics are blasting them again - for their zigzagging, and for the ensuing failure.

Both the decision-makers and the media that are castigating them should learn their lessons. The leaders should understand that they must not give in to media spin and the fear of inquiry commissions. Only if they do what the nation needs rather than what "the nation wants," as David Ben-Gurion did in his day, will they win its support. And the critics must understand that a violent, hysterical discourse, which declares victories and failures based on the number of fatalities on any given day, only increases the danger of strategic errors - and these really could lead to failure.

The practice of setting up inquiry committees increases the risk of failure by putting us in another catch-22: If a committee ousts the present leaders, their successors will be paralyzed by fear of the next committee and will not make the necessary moves. But if the incumbent leaders remain in office, they, too, will be paralyzed by fear of further failure.

Therefore, there are two options: Either inquiry committees should be tasked solely with making structural recommendations, and only those who fail to implement such recommendations in the future should be punished, or alternatively, if a committee investigates leaders personally, it should assign blame based only on their conduct, not on their results.

The problem is that the public has lost all confidence in the politicians' motives (and rightly so). Therefore, it will not accept any shirking of responsibility; it will see this as one more reason to despair of politicians, or of democracy in general.

Therefore, Ehud Olmert, Amir Peretz and Dan Halutz must resign, even without an inquiry commission - in order to enable the creation of panels that will not deal with individual culpability. They need not go home; they can simply move to other positions, on the assumption that they could run for any governmental position in the future, just as Ariel Sharon did.

They must not fear taking such a step. Only those who display leadership by volunteering to resign today, like Major General Udi Adam, can ask for the public's confidence again in the future.

In contrast, those who cling to their positions of power today may hold on for a while longer, but they will be ending their public careers. In this case, too, they should remember Ben-Gurion's lesson: A leader who puts the public interest first need not fear resignation. The nation will call him back.