Never before has such a discordantly emotional reaction been voiced by high-ranking reserve officers as in the aftermath of the war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Throughout Israel's history there have been grim battles and war-time defeats that claimed many victims. Some of the army's failures in regional battles contributed in retrospect to system-wide victories. In 1948, for example, setbacks in the battles at Latrun, Gush Etzion and the Nebi Samuel convoy, which was carrying supplies to the besieged settlement bloc, saved Jerusalem during the war for the capital.

The long list of military reverses includes the Tel Mutila and Al-Hama battles in the early 1950s, the crushing of the Bar-Lev Line in 1973, and the Sultan Yacoub entanglement in 1982. Harsh internal criticism has at times been expressed in the aftermath of battles that went wrong, but it has been understood for the most part that things do not always go as planned in war, and that they are part of the larger story of a war that has never ended since the establishment of the State of Israel, and even earlier.

This time, there is a different feeling in the air, because of the rage and fury expressed in the criticism, and because it is directed first and foremost against Israel Defense Forces commanders.

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The reactions come from people who feel personally insulted. They speak as if their personal dignity was hurt, or that a cherished instrument they spent many years nurturing was carelessly destroyed. Who would believe that a certain reserve general known for his military successes but also for one particular defeat would ever say to a career-army general: "I suggest that you take off your uniform and resign"? Or that another general would angrily charge: "You people are part of the worst General Staff the IDF has ever had."

In this week's meeting between the generals and the chief of staff, some of the people there spoke with heavy emotion, prompting others present to worry that some may suffer heart attacks. The sense of rage was also reflected in the brutal language. One high-ranking officer defined the army's action as coitus interruptus.

It is hard to believe, but there are army officers who are sending emails to their friends that contain the sort of defamatory statements that would not embarrass a Hezbollah propagandist. This outpouring of anger may be helping those who feel so affronted to let off some needed steam, but it is not how you restore the public's confidence in the army.

A second meeting with the reserve generals might not even take place. At this week's meeting, GOC Northern Command Udi Adam, a high-ranking officer whose presence might have been important, did not appear. For whatever reason, nor was Major General Adam invited to attend even a single session of the security cabinet. Many reserve generals feel that Chief of Staff Dan Halutz would have a very hard time doing what needs to be done to rehabilitate the IDF. Given the sensitive situation in which he finds himself, it would not be at all easy for him to sack military commanders who clearly failed in their missions.

In the meantime, the investigation has fallen into the hands of politicians, members of the various subcommittees of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The interests of most of these politicians are focused first and foremost on placing the blame on other politicians. Numerous nations have faced a situation in which they have had to address the failures of their military leaders. The wisest and most experienced of these were the Romans, about whom the statesman and philosopher, Niccolo Machiavelli, wrote in his book "Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius:"

"The Romans were not only less ungrateful than other republics, but were also more lenient and considerate in the punishment of the generals of their armies. For if their misconduct was intentional, they punished them humanely; and if it was caused by ignorance, they not only did not punish them, but rewarded and honored them nevertheless. This mode of proceeding had been well considered by them; for they judged that it was of the greatest importance for those who commanded their armies to have their minds entirely free and unembarrassed by any anxiety other than how best to perform their duty, and therefore they did not wish to add fresh difficulties and dangers to a task in itself so difficult and perilous, being convinced that, if this were done, it would prevent any general from operating vigorously.

"As to errors [committed] through ignorance, there is no more striking example than that of Varro, through whose temerity the Romans were routed at Cannae by Hannibal, where that Republic was brought in danger of its liberty, none the less because it was ignorance and not malice, they not only did not castigate him, but honored him, and on his return to Rome, the whole Senatorial order went to meet him, [and] not being able to thank him for the battle, they thanked him for returning to Rome and for not having despaired of Roman affairs."

We Israelis would be wise not to treat our army officers with ingratitude, even if they erred and faltered.