Security Council Resolution 1701, which brought the second Lebanon War to an end, calls for the unconditional release of the two abducted soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. This is one of the resolution's declaratory, rather than operative, articles, and as such, it is still unclear how exactly it will be implemented. In practice, responsibility for the release of the kidnapped soldiers now rests with the government of Lebanon, but it is doubtful that Beirut will be able to carry out this responsibility without assistance. The kidnapped soldiers are not held by the government, and there are concerns that they may disappear.

In normal times, one would rely on Israel's government to act wisely and responsibly to gain the release of the soldiers held in Lebanon, as well of Gilad Shalit, who was kidnapped to the Gaza Strip. However, these are not normal days. There is a serious lack of confidence in the government, and even its supporters fear that it is now more focused on public relations than on making and implementing policy. Concern for the soldiers' well-being has also intensified because of the failed handling of the Ron Arad case, which taught the families that anyone who does not pressure the government is ignored. It is this sad conclusion that led thousands of protesters to Rabin Square last week.

In the past, pressure from families resulted in the release of hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners in exchange for the release of Elhanan Tennenbaum plus the corpses of three Israel Defense Forces soldiers kidnapped at Har Dov. When it comes to living captives, the effort and the price we are willing to pay must be greater, especially because it is important to send a clear message to the other side that it pays to treat captives with kid gloves. Public pressure for the release of living captives is sometimes viewed as excessive, and it seems that the country gets more upset over Israelis taken captive than it does over those who are killed. But the explanation for this lies in the fact that the captives' fate can still be changed, while the dead cannot be saved. Releasing prisoners in exchange for the abducted soldiers could also serve as a springboard for a change in policy, if, for example, it led to a cease-fire with Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

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Israel's deterrence will not be undermined by a prisoner exchange, because the massive IDF operation in response to the kidnapping proved that the abduction of soldiers guarantees an Israeli reaction. Moreover, deterrence is also based on the ethos that the state is willing to pay a heavy price for the release of captured soldiers and civilians, just as it is willing to make great efforts to save the injured. Undermining this aspect of Israel's strength would be extremely dangerous, because the motivation for living in this country and fighting in its defense rests on a contract of reciprocal loyalty between the state and its citizens.

The prime minister tasked Ofer Dekel with obtaining the return of the captives, but later, it was revealed that Ilan Biran "is keeping an eye on" Dekel's activities, and that Biran remains in overall charge of efforts to win the captives' release. This battle over authority is a bad sign, reminiscent of the handling of the Ron Arad case. The Arad case fell between the cracks because it was handled by several different actors. Sometimes too much activity in the wrong places can be disastrous. Concentrating the effort and acting swiftly are necessary conditions for success. Another condition is not worrying about national or personal pride while the fate of three soldiers lies in the balance.