Does the Israel Defense Forces' combat doctrine and structure have to change following the lessons of the Lebanon war? That question should be foremost in the minds of the army's senior command, irrespective of the need to probe the senior officers' management of the war. It would be a mistake to focus only on the army's operational failures, which were indeed grave, while ignoring the basic military thinking formulated in recent years - on whose basis the IDF went to war in Lebanon.

The main problem is that the IDF is facing a broad spectrum of threats, from the strategic Iranian threat on one side to the threat of guerrillas and terror on the other. In recent years it built the force with an emphasis only on the strategic threat. While the air force grew and acquired long-range operational capability, the ground forces degenerated, focusing on combating Palestinian terror. Reservists in the ground forces had not trained for a long time, and the assumption was that in any case the chances of a broad ground war were very low.

To a large extent, this is reminiscent of the concept the IDF developed between 1967 and 1973. The senior command believed then that the air force, which essentially defeated the Arab armies as the Six-Day War began, could answer almost single-handedly any threat from Egypt and Syria. The result was the neglect of the ground forces, along with the characteristic arrogance that disregarded the enemy's military capabilities.

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It is now necessary to change the allocation of resources between the air and ground forces. Quite a few senior officers, whose voices aren't heard among the general staff, believe the air force is too big and is not structured properly. The air force should continue being the main element in any war, including one against guerrilla forces, but there is no need to increase its size.

In any case, say those officers, Israel will not attack Iran with planes, so therefore the air force's investments in such long-range, manned air attacks can be reduced. The ground forces must be reorganized with an emphasis on increasing their size, quality and special operations units. Any logical scenario of future warfare shows that a large part of the war will be conducted by special operations forces and not by masses of armor. It may be time to consider creating a Special Operations Forces Command or corps. And it is time to return to a training plan that would keep the reservists at full operational capability.

The war in Lebanon was further proof that the era of mass armored battles is over. It is difficult to imagine a war in which the IDF makes use of its thousands of tanks. One need not give up armor, but the number of tanks should definitely be reduced. Instead of developing and producing the next generation of the Merkava, the current tanks should be provided with better protection. It exists, and all we need to do is to decide to equip them with it.

As for the Iranian threat, the emphasis should be on enhancing the navy's strategic capability, as is indeed being done with the acquisition of Dolphin submarines. The decision to acquire two more of those submarines from Germany was correct and is supposed to give Israel second-strike capability, in effect the only appropriate response if Iran achieves nuclear arms. All other investments in means of fighting Iran - especially for fighting Iran on its soil - are unnecessary.

The cries from the senior commanders over the defense budget cuts and their demands for tens of billions more shekels raise the concern that the response of the army to the war failures will be to increase the size of the overall force, and to buy more and more new, unnecessary weapons systems. The IDF's problem is not a lack of resources, but how they are allocated. Despite what the senior command is saying, the defense budget has not been cut by billions of shekels over the last decade. All the data can be found in the treasury's budget book, open to all on the treasury's Web site. The IDF invests billions of dollars in developing revolutionary, sophisticated weapons systems based on advanced technology, but the only problem is that they are unnecessary. All the development plans must be reexamined, and some must be canceled.

The IDF must examine ways to deal with rockets and short-range Katyushas. It is not clear whether the Nautilus laser system can solve this problem, but we should look into completing its development. The air force must continue developing its methods for "hunting" Katyusha launchers, while realizing that it may be impossible to deal with the threat entirely from the air.

All this is just initial thinking, of course. The IDF must devote the coming months to deep and piercing discussions of the lessons of the Lebanon war and come up with a new combat doctrine.