The war against terrorist organizations that are armed with missiles and rockets - capable of hitting tanks, planes and groups of soldiers - is new to Israel. It is a war more ballistic than territorial in nature, and is not limited merely to the front. The terrorist organizations have religious and not merely nationalist aspirations, and they prefer to hit the civilian population before trying to gain control of territories. According to their beliefs, killing people is more effective than gaining control of territory. The war is not conducted by an organized army but rather by decentralized units (sometimes mere individuals) that are capable of hiding in the midst of the civilian population and using it as a shield, on an ever-moving battlefield. The terrorist activists are not attached to a political framework and exist like parasites in a country that does not belong to them, like an army within an army. They can don their uniforms or remove them at will. As a consequence, the difference between the confrontation line and the home front has diminished greatly.

The media reports about battles formulate public opinion. This is a battlefield that is teeming with TV crews, and the presentations of the war have no less influence than the actual war itself. The media have an effect both inside the country and abroad on the legitimacy accorded to the war and on the soldiers' morale and civilian public opinion. No military campaign should be planned without assigning a suitable place for the media on the battlefield because there is no great value in explaining things after they have happened. The scene portrayed by television cameras at the time of the action is what counts.

The weapons at our disposal were suitable for fighting a different army, not for warfare of this kind. After all, there is no point to a warplane or helicopter worth millions of dollars looking for a single terrorist or a small group of terrorists, at a high risk; nor is there any point for a tank to search among rocky hideouts or in reinforced refuges for a handful of camouflaged terrorists armed with night-vision equipment and anti-tank missiles. The home front, too, is not ready for a war of this new nature. It is not sufficiently protected, and the population is concentrated in a limited area where the country's vital production plants are also located, thus providing the missiles with an easy target. In a war of this kind, the population must be dispersed over as large an area as possible, and properly protected buildings must be set up that can be used for civilian purposes in times of peace.

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And just as it is difficult to differentiate between the confrontation line and the home front from the territorial point of view, on the side that is being attacked, one must differentiate among the population in the areas from which the attack is coming, between the control of a government over the population and the control of terrorist organizations that do not abide by its authority. Pressure must be brought to bear on that government but there is no way to escape hitting at the activists.

Weapons are not forever

What lessons are to be learned for the future from these changes? It must be understood that there is no deterrent weapon that lasts forever. Deterrence changes together with the changes that take place on the battlefield. David's sling was enough to deter in one battle only - since then everything has altered. Israel must continue to maintain a suitable weapons system (planes, infantry, paratroopers, armored corps and naval vessels) in case it is attacked by regular armies. But it must prepare a strategic deterrent, arms and an organizational structure that are suited to holding back an attack by terrorist organizations armed with missiles and modern equipment - terrorist organizations that are equipped with modern means of communications and missiles against tanks, planes and naval vessels.

In a war of this type, it is necessary to have the use of a completely new kind of technology, such as nanotechnology - a new dimension, and not merely enhancement of existing technologies. A terrorist activist may be deterred if he knows that he could encounter new means that make it possible to detect him, even among a large crowd; that his hidden weapons could be found by invisible means. The defense system should use tools that are operated from a distance, robots and intelligence of a kind not yet known.

There already exists in Israel today an excellent group of scientists, capable of developing weapons systems and innovative means of detection and protection, which create a capability of individually hitting the enemy and of personal protection for the side defending itself. At one time, I had the privilege to introduce new weapons systems into the Israel Defense Forces that gave Israel the deterrent capacity it still enjoys today, that is to say, a capability that remained in force for some 50 years. I am convinced that it is possible to do so again, and for a long time.

The technological revolution then came at the initiative of the Defense Ministry and formed the basis for the Israeli high-tech industry of today. The people of the new generation of defense technology can today lay a foundation that will be felt, too, in civilian aspects of life: health, transport, communications, environment, agriculture, water and energy.

One regime, one gun

Israel's territorial deployment must bring about a decentralization of the population. It must also assist in the creation of one regime in the territories of neighboring countries. The entry of the United Nations forces, including European forces, and their deployment together with the Lebanese Army in South Lebanon are changes which could produce strategic advantages.

The Lebanese government, like the Palestinian Authority, lost control of its land and its armed forces. Both of them ceased being an address for peace or security in the territories that were supposed to be under their responsibility. Israel should support the struggle of Fuad Siniora's government to be the sole territorial and military authority in his country, and to support the struggle of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) for the existence of "one regime and one gun" within the framework of Palestinian control. Deterrence is aimed at preventing wars, but the objective remains the achievement of a full peace. With all our criticism of Palestinian terror and the terror that comes from Lebanon, it is not a substitute for the efforts to achieve peace. Peace with every country in the region, and also with all the countries in the Middle East. In war, as in peace, the objectives have not changed. The ways have changed.

The general call for "territories in return for peace" was successful in two cases - Egypt and Jordan - and failed in two other instances - Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority. We returned to Lebanon all its territory, in accordance with the Security Council resolution, but we did not get full peace. We withdrew unilaterally from the Gaza Strip but it nevertheless continued to serve as a base for shelling Israel. Now that the UN forces are deploying, the hope has been created that the other side of the equation will be filled: full peace with Lebanon. Siniora has publicly called for peace, and Israel's response must be positive, public and unequivocal: Yes to peace with Lebanon.

True, there is a Syrian question mark looming alongside Lebanon. The present Syrian policy is characterized by fluctuations in its mood. The call emanating from Damascus, that Israel must first and foremost accept all its conditions and only then will it be ready to meet at the negotiating table, is a ridiculous proposal. We must tell Syria that, if it wants peace, it must come to the negotiating table openly, directly and without an ultimatum. That is what happened with Egypt. That is what happened with Jordan. That is how the negotiations with the Palestinians began, and that is also how we started with Lebanon. Although in both instances there were ups and downs, the possibility still exists. Syria has refused all the time.

With regard to the Palestinians, it was not a lack of willingness on the part of Israel but rather the lack of unity among them which stopped the peace process. Those Palestinians who want peace lack the power to further it, and those who do not want a final-status solution, have the ability to prevent it. This is what led to the situation where tragedy took the place of policy.

The divisiveness among the Palestinians has brought Israel face to face with a situation that is not simple. The continuation of the policy of unilateral disengagement has lost its attraction for the Israeli public, in view of the consequences of the withdrawal from Gaza. I can not now envisage that there will be a majority that will support unilateral withdrawal from the West Bank . We have expressed readiness to enter into negotiations with the Palestinians on the basis of the road map, but so far Hamas has prevented the Palestinians from doing so. Israel will continue to propose that we sit down at the negotiating table despite the refusal on the part of Hamas.

Peace in return for privatization

There is an additional option - a three-sided effort that will include Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians. An option that will open with the economic side, parallel to the political side. Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians have already agreed to turn the entire border strip between the Red Sea and the Yarmouk River into an economic corridor for cooperation that will include industrial plants, tourism and agriculture. In addition, it will make it possible to bring water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. It must be remembered that most of the changes that took place in the world since the Second World War were the results of economic transitions rather than military interventions.

The three partners, however, do not have sufficient means to implement the program. But the global capital that is searching out new markets and new opportunities, even if they carry a risk, has the tendency to venture into regional development of this kind. It is, therefore, possible to privatize part of the peace and not merely parts of the economy. We should therefore propose to the Palestinians diplomatic negotiations on the sole basis acceptable in the world and to the sides - the road map. Simultaneously a three-sided economic region must be set up that will assist in relieving the yoke of financial distress (which is a component of the diplomatic problem).

In our time there is no longer a concept such as "a people that shall dwell alone." Science and technology have made every country part of a region and part of the globe. This does not mean that one must abrogate national identity, but it is possible to grant a parallel, much richer opportunity to the process of peace and its blessings. It is not the past that is pressing now - the past can not be changed. What is pressing is the future - and this we can change.