Subscribe to Print Edition | Thu., August 06, 2009 Av 16, 5769 | | Israel Time: 22:46 (EST+7)
Haaretz israel news English
web haaretz.com
Haaretz Toolbar
Diplomacy
Defense Jewish World Opinion National
Print Edition
Car Rental
Books Haaretz Magazine Business Real Estate Maccabiah Travel Week's End Anglo File
Share |
IN DEPTH / Nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East
By Aluf Benn
Tags: Japan, Atom Bomb, Israel News 

Munya Mardor, a veteran of Israel's defense establishment, wrote in his memoirs: "The moral and political significance of armament with nuclear weapons is that countries that relinquish nuclear and hydrogen weapons are doing the equivalent of acknowledging that they are vassal states. This is apparently the status that will be the lot of countries that have only conventional weapons."

Mardor wrote those words 30 years ago, but they have not lost any of their validity today. Most of the global flashpoints in recent years have been connected directly or indirectly to nuclear proliferation and concern over losing control of it: Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran and Israel.

The United States developed the bomb so as to benefit from a "tie-breaking weapon" in World War II, and to ensure its crushing superiority in the world order that prevailed thereafter. The Soviet Union was hot on its heels, determined not to lag behind in the race, and to become a parallel power. The tremendous investment has proved itself: Even after the fall of the Soviet empire, Russia enjoys a position of international influence, thanks to its nuclear arsenal.
Advertisement
Britain and France, sinking and crumbling empires in the 1950s, equipped themselves with nuclear weapons in order to preserve a bit of their past glory, as well as to ensure their superior status vis-a-vis Germany and Italy in the Europe that was being rebuilt. China's bomb firmly established that country's place among the five great powers. The threat China posed to the Soviet Union tempted the Americans to get closer to the former, with the hope of breaking the tie in the Cold War.

India was the last to join the nuclear club, out of pretensions to being accepted as an equal among the powers, even though it is not a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. After the nuclear test conducted by India in 1998, the Americans hastened to impose sanctions on that country, but changed their mind a short time later and established a strategic treaty with it, after years of tension. India without the bomb interested them less than an India that could deter the Chinese.

The small countries saw nuclear weapons as compensation for conventional strategic inferiority vis-a-vis their enemies, as protection for the regime from attack by a major power, and also as a reasonable economic solution to an arms race in which it was otherwise difficult for them to compete. With all the complexity of building a nuclear infrastructure, it is still cheaper than maintaining a large army and developing conventional weaponry that is becoming ever more sophisticated.

When David Ben-Gurion decided on the establishment of the reactor in Dimona in the 1950s, Shimon Peres diaapprovingly quoted Levi Eshkol, who was finance minister at the time, and who opposed the project on the grounds that, "here we distribute one egg a day, and they want atomic energy."

However, according to Avner Cohen, the leading historian of the Israeli nuclear program, Ben-Gurion lived in fear of an Arab attack that would wipe out Israel, and he saw the nuclear option as the Jewish state's insurance policy against a rainy day. After the Indians carried out a "civilian nuclear blast" in 1974 (many years before the actual military test), the leader of impecunious Pakistan declared: "We will eat grass [but we'll get the bomb]." North Korea produced nuclear weapons at a time when its citizens were starving to death.

In all of those cases, the huge investment paid off. The more progress Israel made on its nuclear project, the kinder America was to it, agreeing to help with arms, money and diplomatic support. In return, in 1969, Israel committed itself to a policy of "ambiguity": It would not reveal its potential or carry out a nuclear test. This policy's genesis was even earlier, and is today still one of the fundamentals of Israel-U.S. relations. The logic is clear: The Israelis are known as anxious and nervous, so lest they be tempted into using a doomsday weapon in the conflict with their Arab neighbors, they should be made to feel secure and calm.

Pakistan and North Korea have not benefited from the sort of American aid Israel has received, but they do enjoy exceptional attention as compared to other countries of similar size. The fear that the Pakistani bomb will fall into the hands of Islamic extremists is a cause of deep anxiety in Washington, and spurring America to strengthen the regime in Islamabad against collapse. North Korea obtained its dubious status as the disturbed child of the international community only thanks to its nuclear development and its missiles, which it has tested if only in order to remind the world of its existence. Without the plutonium and the missiles, who would pay any attention to such a closed and hungry state?

Goodies from America

In recent years it has become clear that it is not necessary to complete a nuclear project in order to win recognition and goodies from America. It can suffice to demonstrate progress and determination. Muammar Gadhafi, Libya's ruler, succeeded in shaking off years of isolation after the progress he had made in his nuclear program was revealed, and he had agreed to give it up. An opposite example was apartheid-era South Africa, which developed and built seven atomic bombs, while keeping their existence secret. The regime collapsed before it was able to derive any benefit from its nuclear project.

The more the Iranians have insisted on continuing to enrich uranium, in defiance of a Security Council demand that it stop, the more attention and acknowledgment they have won. The United States contented itself with a boycott of Iran for many years, and it was only when the Iranians had accumulated a sufficient quantity of enriched uranium that they won an acceleration of the "dialogue" from President Obama. Cleverly, they have delayed their response, while in the meantime they continue to develop their nuclear capability.

The increasing tension surrounding the Iranian nuclear project makes clear another lesson of the nuclear age, which applies mainly to the Middle East: The fact of the existence of a nuclear program and installations in a given country in itself undermines regional stability, and can lead that country's neighbors into the temptation to attack those installations and remove the threat before it is realized. At the start of 1966 Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser warned publicly that if Israel were to develop nuclear-weapons capability, the Arab states would be forced to launch a preventive war to "eliminate immediately everything that makes it possible for Israel to produce an atomic bomb."

Despite their threats, the Egyptians did not actually dare to start a preventive war, and Dimona was not attacked. In Israel, there was great anxiety about an attack on the reactor. In his recent book "The Israel Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defense Policy 1963-67," about the lead-up to the Six-Day War, Ami Gluska wrote that Israel did not have a parallel and legitimate strategic answer to the destruction of the reactor. He noted that planes that are destroyed can be replaced, and that one can exact a high price if one's territory is occupied, but the loss of the reactor would be one for which there is no compensation. He cited the chief of staff at the time, Yitzhak Rabin, as saying that if the Egyptians bomb Dimona and we want to go to war, we would get an ultimatum [not to respond] from the whole world.

During the waiting period prior to the Six-Day War, the Egyptian air force made two photographic forays over Dimona. According to Gluska, the fear that this was the "coming attraction" to a war served as an important, although not the deciding catalyst for Israel's preemptive attack. In retrospect, it has emerged that the reactor was indeed a major target in Egypt's attack plans that were not carried out.

According to Avner Cohen, in his book "Israel and the Bomb": "On the eve of the 1967 war all the components of Israel's nuclear weapons were in place," although it did not yet have the weapon itself and it was only during the tense days of waiting, with an accelerated effort, that the capability became operational. He says that just before the war, Israel "improvised" two fissionable devices that could be dropped. He quotes from Mardor's memoirs a description of the construction of "a fateful weapons system" and the placement of it on battle alert before the Six-Day War.

Israel's decisive victory in that war lessened the danger of a surprise Egyptian attack on Dimona. Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, told senior Israeli officials during his visit to Jerusalem, in 1977, that the Israeli bomb had pushed him toward the peace process. In the years that followed, Israel adopted for itself Nasser's ideas about a preventive war and made it clear that it would not allow a neighboring enemy country to acquire nuclear weapons. That was prime minister Menachem Begin's justification for bombing the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981: "We will not allow our enemies to develop weapons of mass destruction against our people." His declaration, which since then has been called the "Begin Doctrine," has become firmly established since then as a key element in Israel's security doctrine.

Israel was not the first country to bomb a reactor in the Middle East. It was preceded by Iran, which attacked the same Iraqi reactor in October of 1980, at the start of the Iran-Iraq War. However, Iran's pilots did not succeed in destroying the installation, which the Israeli air force demolished the following spring. To this day, there is controversy about the wisdom of that operation. Its critics point to the secret effort Iraq made in the subsequent years to enrich uranium, an effort it was close to fulfilling when Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and brought America and the Gulf War down on himself.

The Gulf War of 1991 gave Saddam an opportunity to retaliate: Along with the missiles he fired at Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan and Haifa, a missile with a concrete warhead was fired at the reactor in Dimona. The missile missed its target, but Saddam made it clear that the account had not been settled.

After the Gulf War, Iraq's secret nuclear program was discovered and dismantled by UN inspectors. Since 1993, the knowledge that the Iranians too were striving for nuclear weapons has been at the top of Israel's strategic agenda. It led to the consolidation of the "Rabin doctrine," which was later also supported by Ehud Barak (now defense minister), and holds that it is important to complete the "peace circle" in the region before Iran attains its goal. The basic assumption was that if Israel is at peace with its neighbors, the Iranians' motivation to launch a nuclear war of annihilation will decrease. Another assumption was that it would be easier to achieve peace before the Iranian bomb leads to general radicalization in the region.

During the past 15 years, Israel has been trying to arouse the international community to act to stop the Iranian effort, hinting at a possible military action if the world does nothing. In September 2007, the air force bombed a secret installation in Syria. According to the U.S. administration, the site housed a nuclear reactor for the production of plutonium that was built with help from North Korea and was nearing completion. A senior American official related that Israel had made it clear to the United States that the Syrian project was "an existential threat," and for that reason Israel bombed it. According to various reports, the prime minister at the time, Ehud Olmert, again invoked the Begin doctrine, but unlike his predecessors he refrained from claiming responsibility for the action and chose to maintain a low profile in order to avoid escalation. His gamble succeeded: Syria denied that it had built a reactor, it did not retaliate, and a few months later even renewed the peace talks with Israel.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's return to power led to verbal escalation between Israel and Iran: Netanyahu warned that an Iranian nuclear bomb would lead to "a second Holocaust," and promised to do everything in his power to stop it. The Iranians retaliated with the threat that if they are attacked, they will hit nuclear installations in Israel. The Obama administration is trying to consolidate an "axis of moderates" that are afraid of Iran around an Israeli-Arab peace process, with the worry in mind that Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia could follow in Iran's footsteps. Also in this cauldron are the relations between the major powers, the U.S. and Russia, in the context of the Russian opposition to the deployment in Eastern Europe of defense systems against Iranian missiles.

The obvious conclusion from this tangle is that 64 years after it first appeared with a bright blast, nuclear weaponry is the moving force behind international diplomacy. The nightmare of a nuclear war of annihilation between the powers that would lead to the destruction of the human race may seem far off. However, the desire for power that is inherent in nuclear weapons is impelling some states to challenge the world order and is encouraging others to launch preventive wars and to advance diplomatic actions - weapons inspection accords, threats of sanctions and even peace between Israel and the Palestinians - in an attempt to maintain the nuclear status quo. This is the basis for understanding the diplomatic processes in today's Middle East.

Related articles:
  • U.S. briefs Israel on new Iran nuke sanctions
  • Iran: If Israel attacks us, we'll hit its nuclear sites
  • Syria: No more UN visits to alleged nuclear site
    • PROMOTION: Mamilla Hotel
    Bookmark to del.icio.us  
     
    Victory for Clinton
    Clinton's success in Korea could teach Obama something about diplomacy.
    Facebook protest
    Hackers turn homophobic facebook page into pro-gay forum.
      1.   intersting but not the case today 10:37  |  VIPER 01/08/09
      2.   So? 11:36  |  Peter 01/08/09
      3.   Hey Viper you`re eloquent. I understand and agree. 16:47  |  Lou Medel 01/08/09
      4.   #3, LOU MEDEL, thankyou 03:41  |  VIPER 02/08/09
    Special Offers
    Advertisement
    hotel Jerusalem
    David Citadel Hotel, come stay at the finest of Jerusalem hotels.
    Master's Program in Desert Studies
    An innovative, multidisciplinary, international program specialized in Desert Research
    Dead Sea Cosmetics .Summer Specials
    Velvet Hand Cream just $14.90
    Handmade In Tel Aviv
    Itay Noy, Timepiece Maker
    ISRAEL ARMY SURPLUS STORE
    IDF insignia,Uniforms, Paladium Boots Watches, Israel Army T-shirts & Collectibles
    Dead Sea Salt Beauty and skin care
    From the Dead Sea Coupon cofe Haaretz for 10% off!
    Eldan Rent a Car
    Israel's leading car rental company offers you a 20% discount on online reservations
    Junkyard
    Junk a car - get free towing nationwide and a tax-deductible receipt
    More Headlines
    22:13 Israel envoy: Netanyahu row with Obama causes strategic damage
    21:59 Poll: More Israelis prefer Livni as prime minister
    13:58 IDF reportedly training for pointed attack on Hezbollah
    17:59 Gay leaders to Netanyahu: Your ministers incite against us
    22:46 ANALYSIS: West has no choice but to deal with smug Ahmadinejad
    15:34 Top Palestinian officials rule Israel to blame for Arafat death
    21:50 Report: 'Sex and the City' star embroiled in West Bank controversy
    19:45 Sadat family outraged over U.S. film with dog named 'Anwar Sadat'
    00:15 WATCH: Daily news round-up from Israel
    14:27 Israel waging war of nerves against Iran and Hezbollah
    20:05 IAF officers charged in violent hazing of cadets
    13:02 U.K. Labourite: Muslim councilor shunned me for being Jewish
    12:38 Rights group: Hamas guilty of Gaza war crimes
    18:50 WHO: Swine flu vaccine to be ready by September
    13:02 U.S. Republicans in Israel: We are `troubled` by Obama policy
    Home | TV | Print Edition | Diplomacy | Opinion | Arts & Leisure | Sports | Jewish World | Site rules |
    | Israel 2009 election results | Makom: Engaging on Israel
    | Search engine marketing
    Haaretz.com, the online edition of Haaretz Newspaper in Israel, offers real-time breaking news, opinions and analysis from Israel and the Middle East. Haaretz.com provides extensive and in-depth coverage of Israel, the Jewish World and the Middle East, including defense, diplomacy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the peace process, Israeli politics, Jerusalem affairs, international relations, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli business world and Jewish life in Israel and the Diaspora.
    © Copyright  Haaretz. All rights reserved