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ANALYSIS / Are air strikes enough, or is a ground op needed in Gaza? By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff Tags: Second Lebanon War, Hamas  Two and a half years of a lull, six days of fighting, and we are almost back where we started. The dilemma faced by Israel's decision makers this week is not all that different from the one that hounded them (in some cases it's the same people) throughout most of the Second Lebanon War. To enter or not to enter? After the two reports published by the Winograd Committee (examining the civilian and military management of the 2006 war in Lebanon), and after a methodical, lengthy round of learning the lessons, the start of the campaign in Gaza seemed to show that the pre-flight checklist, so to speak, had been completed in full. The preparations were conducted in an orderly fashion. The Israel Defense Forces prepared for Operation Cast Lead for almost two years. The security cabinet, once it stopped accusing the army of not truly preparing itself, took its role seriously and held comprehensive discussions about available options. The integration of accurate intelligence, exacting strikes and tactical surprise produced a lethal opening air strike. But those who sought to apply the lessons of Winograd in their entirety appear to have overlooked a few critical elements, and those lacunae are liable to have an effect on the final result. Prof. Yehezkel Dror, the Winograd panel's organizational expert, may yet have to summon the security cabinet to rehash the material. Advertisement This week it became apparent once again that the personal element ("What will people say about me at the end of the war?" "How can I play up my part at the expense of my rival in the government/General Staff?") plays a tremendous role in the behavior of the decision makers and sometimes affects the decisions themselves; that the political competition raging in the midst of an election campaign will also influence developments; and that a military operation on this scale necessitates a preplanned and clear-cut exit strategy at the diplomatic level. All of these limitations also affect the Israeli handling of the dilemma at hand, which at the time of writing looks like it will be decided faster than the treading-of-water seen over 34 days of fighting in Lebanon. Shake off the dust The dilemma, in a nutshell, is this: Is the heavy pounding from the air enough, or will Hamas simply rise out of the ruins later, shake off the dust and declare, as Hezbollah did in 2006, that it succeeded in surviving against the army that purports to be the strongest in the Middle East? And if ground forces enter, will they inflict on Hamas sufficient damage to force the organization to moderate its demands in cease-fire talks, or will the operation get bogged down, slide into mass killing of Palestinian civilians, cost the IDF dearly in casualties and erode the internal consensus in Israel? The impression at this writing on Thursday is that Israel is going to launch a ground offensive quite soon. The decision will ostensibly be based on two cardinal reasons: the fact that the diplomatic initiatives are still incomplete (that's what happens when no one is in a hurry to prepare the ground for them), and the realization that without the movement of infantry and armored forces on Gazan soil, the Arabs will again be able to tell themselves that the Israelis are avoiding confrontation and making do with dropping one-ton bombs from 30,000 feet up. That, it is argued, is liable to lead to a disastrous outcome for Israel, particularly after the previous failure in Lebanon. After all, it was the chief of staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, who said a few months after his appointment that in the event of another war, his aim would be to ensure that "next time, at the end of the war, no will have to ask who won." Don't dare fail In the past few days, Israel received almost identical signals from several moderate Arab states, formulated in language very different from the public condemnations they have issued recently: Go in if you must, but don't dare fail, they said. Another missed opportunity in the face of the Iranian emissaries in the region will be untenable. Still, mainly for fear of an entanglement ending in heavy casualties, the IDF appears to be bent on a major land incursion, albeit a limited one. That also suits the character of the chief of staff. The satirical television program "A Wonderful Country" portrays him as a gung-ho inarticulate macho (and his refusal to give interviews doesn't allow him to rebut that image). But in reality, say colleagues and subordinates, Ashkenazi's most prominent trait, along with personal toughness and broad professional knowledge, is extraordinary caution in fielding troops. On the assumption that a ground operation is imminent, it is likely that he will want to fashion it in his spirit: large forces, little time. The defense minister, Ehud Barak, the key person in the decision-making process that led to the launching of the war, takes a similar view. The IDF is now looking for another surprise move in a narrow, complex theater, about 40 kilometers long and less than 15 kilometers wide. The major difficulty in the first stage will lie in breaching the heavily mined and booby-trapped zone Hamas has created, from the "perimeter" (a strip of a few hundred meters on the Palestinian side of the security fence) to areas west of that zone. The army is concerned about an attempt by Hamas to reprise the success Hezbollah had, first, in blowing up a Merkava tank that entered Lebanon on what turned out to be the first day of the war in 2006, in pursuit of the abductors of the two reserve soldiers, and then in destroying more tanks with antitank missiles. This defensive strip is passable, of course, but if a ground offensive is launched, crossing it is liable to entail casualties. Beyond that looms Gaza City, narrow and appallingly overcrowded. During Israel's absence, the city grew mainly upward, in a manner that will hamper the movement of a ground attacker. The IDF's great advantage, even during a ground operation, is in the air, where it has full control, with no serious threat posed to its craft. Air support for the ground forces, however, will be at very close quarters, approaching safety limits, as was also the case in Lebanon. Random conversations on Wednesday with officers on the Gaza border turned up a complex picture. The soldiers in the spearhead units want the operation very much (which is the way of combat troops, and rightly so). A company commander talked about the need "for the people on top to decide already, because we can't wait here forever." Battalion commanders were more cautious, aware of the difficulties the operation will involve. Easy and simple it won't be. Determination or insensitivity? Quite astonishingly, given all that the country underwent under Ehud Olmert's leadership in the last war, the prime minister sounds like he is barely wrestling with these dilemmas. It's hard to believe, but the man who was to have been kicked out of office following the interim Winograd report and then resigned (tardily) last summer is now leading the country into a second Israeli-initiated war - and is meanwhile enjoying public support. In Lebanon, Olmert objected to the use of ground forces almost until the last minute, and was finally dragged into the move against his will, under the pressure of the defense minister, Amir Peretz, and the chief of staff, Dan Halutz. This time Olmert seems to be less hesitant. It is to be hoped that this is due to determination and not insensitivity. On Tuesday Olmert visited Southern Command headquarters. To the senior officers who met with him he sounded determined but not gung-ho. Some of them, who were highly critical of his performance in the Lebanon conflict, were favorably impressed this time. Most of those present spoke in favor of continuing the operation, including a ground offensive. If you want to consolidate what we have achieved, you must not stop now, the officers told the prime minister. Olmert listened attentively. The officers believed he was with them. Not exactly a leader, given his peculiar political situation, but someone who is capable of continuing to conduct a complex operation. Still, these favorable impressions could be dashed if it turns out that the decision to attack on the ground was mistaken, and produces large numbers of casualties. The euphoria that marked the onset of the fighting in Lebanon in 2006 was not in evidence this week, but the prime minister, as is his wont on dramatic occasions like these, felt constrained to resort to a tone of light pathos. I salute you for the way you conducted the preparations for the operation, Olmert told GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Yoav Gallant. And he saluted him. That was a satisfying moment for Gallant. He was appointed to the post more than three years ago, immediately after the Gaza pullout, and since then has been fighting mostly with his hands tied. After the pullout, Israel adopted a policy of shutting its eyes completely to the ongoing firing of Qassams. Nor was much done to scuttle Hamas' more ambitious plans. Gilad Shalit was abducted in the period when the IDF was prohibited from crossing the border and operating even in the part of the Strip closest to Israel. Most of the combat means were operated from the Kirya Defense Ministry and General Staff compound in Tel Aviv - to the point where Gallant was sometimes surprised to discover from the media that Israel had assassinated a wanted individual in Gaza. Throughout this period Gallant consistently urged expansion of the fight against Hamas. Hardly anyone paid attention. His critics claimed that the general, a graduate of Ariel Sharon's bureau (he was the prime minister's military secretary), was simply preparing a defense for the next commission of inquiry. This week it emerged that Gallant made good use of the time. The opening move was prepared in the course of two years, in which the "bank of targets" was put together meticulously with the aid of the commander of the air force, Maj. Gen. Ido Nehoshtan, and his predecessor, Eliezer Shkedy. The former commander of the Gaza Division, Brig. Gen. Moshe Tamir (and his intelligence officer, Lt. Col. T.), made an important contribution, not least by developing the "hot point" method: There was systematic identification of the places from which rockets were launched, an understanding that these were permanent dugouts that Hamas built, and simultaneous attacks on them last Saturday. Most of the dugouts - the Gaza version of the Hezbollah "nature reserves" - were destroyed. This week there was some tension between the General Staff and Southern Command over who was running the war. The answer is that the air force is the leading contractor, Southern Command is managing the combat and the chief of staff holds the reins with regard to the sensitive issues. At the moment there is only a skirmish over who gets the credit, but Lebanon showed that it can turn pretty ugly. 'Our values' On Wednesday afternoon, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni visited a community center in Sderot. The foreign media waited patiently for the press conference she was to hold there. Barely two minutes after Livni's arrival, a "Color Red" alert was sounded, but the hall in which the meeting took place is considered secure and the alarm was greeted with some indifference. Livni didn't miss a single cliche, offering each of the points on the "message sheet" she has drawn up, with which she appeared on foreign TV stations during the week. "Hamas is a terrorist organization that is harming the life of the residents of Gaza and the life of the Israelis," "Hamas is an extremist organization" - and so forth. The foreign correspondents, who had been driving all over the south for a few days, fought to stay awake. Only one item drew their interest: IDF officers and Shin Bet security service personnel phoned 9,000 homes in Gaza to warn occupants to leave, because the homes were located close to Hamas command posts or to its arms caches, which might be bombed. "Even though this is an advance warning to Hamas," Livni said. "We did it because these are our values." She continued to ignore the urgent issue at that time - the French proposal for a 48-hour truce - until the question period began. Citing Israeli media, a CBS correspondent claimed that Israel was tending to accept the French offer. "Oh, really?" Livni said in response. She stated only that she would make her opinion known behind closed doors. The French proposal was in the meantime stricken from the agenda during a tense meeting of the Olmert-Livni-Barak kitchen cabinet on Tuesday evening. Olmert and Livni saw no great benefit in agreeing to an immediate cease-fire, even a limited one. Their fear was that Hamas would quickly exploit the time to reorganize and claim it had won the war. Its major condition was and remains the opening of the crossings for goods to enter the Gaza Strip. If they were not opened within 48 hours, Hamas would start firing rockets again. In the eyes of Hamas, an IDF ground operation, however great the risk, might present a certain advantage. Hamas has prepared itself for such an offensive over a lengthy period, under the close instruction of Iran and Hezbollah, and believes it has the capability to harass the Israeli troops and inflict heavy losses on them. According to the Hamas scenario, it would be possible to force Israel to beat a quick retreat, under the pressure of the losses and of the international community. In conversations with her staff, however, Livni raised a different idea: a return to the cease-fire situation without an agreement. This would not involve a tahadiyeh with Hamas or an enhanced truce, but an explicit threat by Israel (this time with the intention of realizing it) to respond actively every time it is attacked. The assumption is that with a deterrent balance of some 400 Palestinians killed, Gaza will hesitate before bringing another Israeli attack on itself. The disadvantage of this proposal is the difficulty in persuading Hamas to accept it. Even at the price of more casualties, it appears as though Hamas would at this time prefer to fighting rather than agree to an arrangement which will be construed, from its point of view, as an admission of failure. Ready in the rear Be'er Sheva this week absorbed its first rocket attack. So did Ashdod, Kiryat Malakhi and Gedera. It might not be pleasant to admit, but Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu and MK Yuval Steinitz were right, and twice: The IDF withdrawal from Gaza led to the firing of missiles into the heart of Israel, just as the evacuation of the IDF from the West Bank cities in the Oslo accords facilitated (until the Shin Bet got its act together and the separation fence was built) the entry of Palestinian suicide bombers into Israel. Hamas exploited the recent six month cease-fire not only to deepen its control of Gaza and build fortifications but also, more specifically, to smuggle in long-range Katyusha rockets, which considerably increased the number of Israelis vulnerable to them. Only a small strip, between Hadera and Gedera, did not suffer missile fire, though Hezbollah is today capable of firing missiles into Metropolitan Tel Aviv, in the event of another confrontation. The main reason that Israel has not fallen into the black funk that marked the Second Lebanon War is the small number of casualties this time. For the present, it appears as though Hamas has only a limited ability to inflict damage on the home front. Hezbollah apparently had 14,000 rockets at the start of the war in Lebanon. Hamas, by a rough estimate, has 3,000, at least 80 percent of them Qassams, whose accuracy is not great and which usually cause little damage. This is still a bothersome and psychologically scary state of affairs, but it is not one that poses a threat capable of breaking Israel's spirit, if the political and military echelons continue to manage the campaign properly. The home front appears to be the place where most of the lessons of Lebanon were learned. The intensive exercises conducted under the leadership of Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai are producing their first fruit. The local governments in the south are well prepared. Even those mayors of the big towns who were elected only two months ago - in Be'er Sheva, Ashdod and Ashkelon - managed to take part in a first exercise before the escalation. On Tuesday at midnight, when the Be'er Sheva Municipality was trying to decide whether to cancel classes the next day, Maj. Gen. Yair Golan, GOC Home Front Command, stopped the discussion and declared schools would be closed. The next morning, a Katyusha rocket slammed into a high school in the city. Home Front Command personnel are everywhere and busy undertaking missions to aid the population, as though their role consisted of nothing more than rescuing people heroically from rubble. At the moment, in the face of the limited threat from Hamas, that is enough. Bookmark to del.icio.us   Fallen hero Relatives mourn Maj. Roey Rosner, 27, killed Wednesday by Gaza militants. On the northern front Hezbollah denies responsibility for two rockets fired at Israel from Lebanon.   1.   GROUND OP !. 11:00  |  Orao Stranka. 03/01/09   2.   Causes cannot be killed 11:07  |  Natallie Durson 03/01/09   3.   PA attack 11:09  |  Macabee 03/01/09   4.   Israel needs to silence the rockets coming from Gaza 12:37  |  Mark B. 03/01/09   5.   "lacunae" Oy 16:05  |  Seth 03/01/09   6.   Lebanon2 all over again 18:47  |  Chris Linthwaite 03/01/09   7.   Civilian casualties. 18:50  |  Jean Van Daem 03/01/09   8.   “Who is going to be the perceived winner?” 18:55  |  Ilan 03/01/09   9.   As well you must know Mark B. 19:03  |  Mark Lincoln 03/01/09   10.   a ground operation needed in Gaza 19:09  |  Joe 03/01/09   11.   Ground OP see #1 19:10  |  Scott L. Havsy 03/01/09   12.   "It might not be pleasant to admit, but Likud leaders were right" 19:14  |  Boris 03/01/09   13.   Neither can anti-Semitism, Natallie # 2 19:47  |  Fortuna Benmayor 03/01/09   14.   It`s not about what Hamas says but what it does. 19:55  |  Fortuna Benmayor 03/01/09   15.   What is needed 19:58  |  Chris Travers 03/01/09   16.   Occupation is the only solution 20:06  |  Harold 03/01/09   17.   Re: 2 Causes cannot be killed 20:12  |  Michael 03/01/09   18.   The Main Lesson Of Lebanon II Is Missed Completely 20:31  |  Jeff Northridge 03/01/09   19.   do not fear inflicting casualties 20:52  |  Daniel 03/01/09

Read & React Red Cross: Israel breaking int'l law, letting children starve in Gaza Responses: 114 Two Lebanon rockets hit North; Hezbollah denies involvment Responses: 68 Yossi Melman: Excellent intel on Gaza shows Israel learned from Lebanon errors Responses: 21 Yoav Stern: Rocket fire on North may be realization of Iran threat Responses: 25 Gideon Lichfield: So, why isn't Israel winning the PR war? Responses: 74 More Headlines 23:04 Third IDF soldier killed in Gaza over past 24 hours 22:37 Draft UN Security Council resolution doesn't call for immediate Gaza truce 00:59 'This country exists because of people like him' 22:35 Israel to present complaint to UN over Lebanon rocket fire 21:49 Iran bans volunteer suicide bombers from traveling to Israel 23:11 WATCH: Olmert spokesman says Israel never sought war in Gaza 22:10 'I pray that he will watch over us, he died a hero' 22:38 At least two Lebanon rockets hit north Israel; Hezbollah denies involvment 18:26 7 IDF troops hurt, one seriously, in mortar strike on Negev 18:20 Get up to the minute coverage of the warfare in Gaza directly to your email 22:05 IDF Chief of Staff Ashkenazi tours Gaza battlefields 18:12 ANALYSIS / Rocket fire on North may be realization of Iran threat 19:57 UN says halting aid to Gaza, citing danger to staff from IDF 15:01 ANALYSIS / Excellent intel on Gaza shows Israel learned from its errors in Lebanon 19:07 Palestinians: 35 found dead in rubble of Gaza battle zone 17:07 Olmert: IDF has not yet achieved all its goals in Gaza offensive 20:35 WATCH: U.S. Senate voices strong support for Israel's Gaza battle against Hamas 18:53 Sarkozy: Halt to arms smuggling is key to Gaza cease-fire 16:08 Red Cross: Israel breaking int'l law, letting children starve in Gaza 20:28 Hamas executes collaborators and restricts Fatah movement 17:18 Palestinian shot dead after trying to blow up settlement gas station Previous Editions Select Day 08 jan 07 jan 06 jan 05 jan 04 jan 02 jan 01 jan 31 dec 30 dec 29 dec 28 dec 26 dec

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