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Tamara Cofman Wittes
Saban Center Mideast expert on the Annapolis meeting and its meaning. Readers can send questions
An expert on Middle East affairs, Tamara Cofman Wittes focuses on U.S. efforts to promote democracy and the Arab-Israeli peace process. She has directed several Middle East research projects, including the Middle East Democracy and Development Project at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute (more bio here, even more bio here).
Cofman Wittes will help us understand what is going on in Annapolis this week. Readers can send questions to rosnersdomain@haaretz.co.il.
Dear Tamara,
These are three questions that I gathered from readers' emails. You can respond briefly to each:
1. After all that's been said and done, is it possible to achieve something within a year?
While a final status agreement in one year's time seems too much to hope for, it is certainly possible to use this year to good effect, in two ways. First, continuous and serious Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic engagement can help to restore a more cooperative relationship between Israel and the PA on the ground in the West Bank, especially security cooperation but also economic cooperation. This will begin to reverse the consequences of the past seven years' violence and mistrust, making a future of peaceful coexistence a more realistic possibility. Second, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators can begin to hash out possible resolutions to the core issues of the conflict: Jerusalem, borders, refugees, settlements. We always say that the broad outlines of a solution are already known - but the devil is in the details, and it is Israelis and Palestinians who will have to live with those details. With good faith and some good luck, too, the negotiators can set this process on a path that could achieve a final agreement in 2009.
2. What is the most problematic issue to solve (Jerusalem, borders, refugees etc)?
Of the final status issues, I think the refugee issue is probably the toughest, because it is the one on which the two sides have moved farther apart in the past seven years. On Jerusalem and borders, positions have converged, but Israelis today are more determined than ever not to accept even a small number of Palestinian refugees into Israel as part of a "right of return," while the intervening time and passing of a generation of 1948 refugees has also hardened the symbolic importance of the right of return for Palestinians. Symbolic issues are the ones where compromise is hardest; ultimately this issue can only be resolved as part of a bigger package, where gains on other issues will compensate for compromises on this issue.
3. Why were the Saudis so reluctant to shake Olmert's hand?
Again, symbolism and domestic politics. The Saudis want to make clear that normalization is something that comes AFTER peace agreements are achieved, not before - and a handshake is an act of symbolic recognition and acceptance of someone as a respectable interlocutor, an equal. Moreover, despite strong reasons of state driving the Saudis to Annapolis, their public opinion, like most of the Arab world?s, is still highly negative toward Israel and normalization (public opinion is also, however, supportive of diplomatic efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute). So the Saudi Foreign Minister is trying to walk the knife's edge between being seen to embrace the peace process and being seen to embrace the Israelis.
Dear Mr. Rosner,
My question for your guest is: now that the peace process was relaunched, what in your opinion will be the most difficult challenge for Israelis and what for Palestinians, assuming that they both genuinely want to see this through?
Thank you,
Barry Elvin,
Chicago
The most difficult obstacle to progress is the tremendous gap between the ambitious timeline set for the diplomatic process and the much longer timeline required to rebuild Palestinian security and governing institutions. Even if both sides are full of goodwill and determination, they will not be able to reach, much less implement, an agreement if the Palestinians cannot take on greater responsibility for security in the West Bank. It took Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad months of effort, and a lot of pleading iqth the IDF for permissions, to assemble and deploy a mere 300 security forces to the city of Nablus - imagine the challenge of rebuilding forces capable of enforcing the rule of law and preventing terrorism all across the West Bank.
For this obstacle to be overcome, the PA will need time and money, along with a demonstrated commitment to protecting Israel's security as well as its own. Israel will have to overcome its reluctance to give PA forces weapons, equipment, and room to test its wings. In the current environment of mistrust and constant threat from Hamas, that's a tall order indeed.
-Tamara
Dear Tamara,
Here is an easy question for you: What was Bush really saying today in Annapolis?
Best
Rosner
Dear Shmuel,
Bush's speech at Annapolis was a bare minimum for the occasion, devoid of any new content. He reiterated the rationale for holding a conference under such difficult circumstances, but refrained from presenting anything by way of American ideas on how to advance the negotiations from this point forward. He consistently used the word "they" to refer to the peacemakers, not "we" - signaling that he intends to keep his distance from the peace process, and not get down in the weeds like his predecessor Bill Clinton did in 2000. At the same time, the White House is eager to claim credit for a successful conference, with one account of the day suggesting that Bush intervened personally to get final agreement between Olmert and Abbas on the joint statement he read out at the conference's opening session.
I think the speech clarifies that for Bush, the key achievement was to have the summit, with Arab state participation - a coming-out party for the anti-Iranian coalition. What happens afterwards, between Israelis and Palestinians, is not his main concern.
Bush still has a vision of two states living side by side in peace, but the performance yesterday suggests that, as much as ever, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are still Condi Rice's show - she will get the blame if it fails, and he?ll be content with to take credit if by some chance it succeeds.
Tamara
Dear Tamara,
So now we know Syria is going to participate - but they aren't coming for the sake of the Palestinians, but rather to speak about the Golan Heights (or so they say).
You said that this will create a "useful tension in the alliance between Syria and Iran". But it will also raise the question of whether Israel should negotiate with the Syrians as they do with the Palestinians.
Is this something the US should encourage? Is this something Israel should do? Is this something the Palestinians will feel comfortable with?
Best
Rosner
Dear Shmuel,
There are good reasons for Israel to explore the possibility of renewed
peace negotiations with Syria right now, and the United States should
not get in the way. Syria may not be sincere in its desire for peace,
but talks can still yield important benefits for Israel and the region.
For Syria's government, the Golan Heights has historically been wielded
as a tool in domestic politics, to strengthen support for the regime or
to justify repression when support was thin. This is very true for
Bashar al-Assad, whether he is banging the war drums or waving the olive
branch. His current effort to renew negotiations may not be sincere in
the sense that he may not be ready to sign a full peace treaty with
Israel in exchange for territories his father lost in 1967. But it is
certainly sincere in the sense that he feels that talking to Israel will
win him more breathing space at home, where his economy is in trouble,
real estate prices in the cities are skyrocketing due to the influx of
Iraqis, tensions with Syrian Kurds and other "have-nots" are brewing,
and he is facing increasing isolation among his Arab brethren. These are
the pressures that drove him to send a representative to Annapolis and
they are driving him also to seek talks with Israel.
The question for Israel (and the US and Palestinians) is how a Syrian
track should relate to the current efforts on the Palestinian track. On
the one hand, Israeli-Syrian negotiations will put more pressure on the
forces of radicalism, including Hizballah and Hamas -- Syria's desire
for gains in the talks with Israel will constrain (somewhat) Hizballah's
and Hamas's tendency to violent attacks. This would do good for Israel,
and perhaps also for Lebanon. On the other hand, the two tracks were
viewed in 2000 as competing, and Barak's decision then to prioritize the
Syrian track was viewed in retrospect by some of the Americans as a
mistake that left too little time and energy for the Palestinian track
at the end of Clinton's term in office. Many fear a repeat in 2008. If a
Syrian track moves ahead, the US should insist that it moves
simultaneously with the Palestinian track, not in its place.
For the United States and the international community, there is also the
question of what Syria will expect from them in exchange for playing the
peace game with Israel. Specifically, Lebanese worry that their sovereignty, or at a minimum justice (through the Hariri tribunal) for
their murdered politicians, will be sacrificed by the international
community in the name of bringing Syria back into the world's good races. That might well be too high a price to pay. Syrian-Israeli talks
should be bilateral, and the United States will want to be more hands-off in these talks than was true in the past.
Dear Tamara,
As Americans - and Middle Easterners - get ready to follow the Annapolis meeting, what is it that they should be looking for?
In other words, what will be the 3-4 signs with which one can detect whether this ends up successfully?
Best
Rosner
Dear Shmuel:
The administration would have you believe that the mere fact of the meeting?s occurrence is itself a success, both because it signals the renewal of Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts after seven years of violence, and because it signals that, after being set back on its heels by the disaster in Iraq, America is taking the initiative in the region to bolster moderates against the post-Iraq rise of radicalism. And indeed the Annapolis summit serves these purposes ? but for how long? Here are some things to watch for to determine how much of a difference Annapolis will make in the longer term:
The degree of participation by Middle Eastern and Muslim states.
The fact that Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Saud al-Faisal, agreed to attend is significant, because it signals the Saudis' judgment that this is a substantive meeting and thereby engages the attention and support of a host of other, more cautious states. It also puts additional pressure on Syria. If Syria attends the summit in hopes of introducing the Golan Heights as a topic for discussion, that will create useful tension in the alliance between Syria and Iran. More broadly, especially for Israel, a wide assortment of Muslim states in Annapolis will signal the real possibility for a normalized existence in the Middle East once Israeli-Palestinian peace is achieved. This was an ingredient missing from the Camp David 2000 talks, and one that is crucial for success of a peace process.
The kind of follow-up efforts laid out at Annapolis for 'the day after.'
PM Olmert has indicated his intention to hold 'serious, intensive and continuous' negotiations, but the modalities have yet to be revealed - talks at what level, how frequent, discussing final status or just Road Map Phase One. Just as important are two types of international follow-up: aid, both monetary and material, to the Palestinian Authority and diplomatic follow-up by the United States and others with the ability to help the parties overcome their mistrust and bridge their gaps. There is currently talk of a follow-up conference in Moscow six months after Annapolis - if that is agreed to, then all parties will have agreed to creating pressure for some substantive progress between now and then, so that indicates seriousness as well.
How many substantive ideas President Bush and Secretary Rice inject into their role at the summit.
Israel and the PA have already had difficulties finding common ground on both process and substance for the post-Annapolis talks, and so far have been unable to agree on a joint statement to be released at the summit itself. So there is a question of whether the U.S. government should step in with its own ideas, and many view this as essential to progress. Bush or Rice might use their remarks in Annapolis to lay out American parameters on final status issues, or to suggest how the talks should proceed, how they view Road Map obligations being fulfilled alongside final status talks. But their strong tendency so far has been to avoid taking on this kind of active mediation role, and instead to speak in broad terms and let the parties fight things out on their own. They can get away with this hands-off role during the Annapolis meeting, but probably can't sustain it afterwards if they want to keep the negotiations alive.
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