Steven Spiegel

Steven L. Spiegel, Professor of Political Science at UCLA, is one of the leading experts on American policy in the Middle East. He is presently at work on a book on American intervention in the region. Professor Spiegel serves as Director of the Center for Middle East Development at UCLA.

Spiegel is also a National Scholar of the Israel Policy Forum, providing policy direction and expertise, and also writes frequent analyses of the latest developments in Arab-Israeli relations. Spiegel served as the senior foreign policy advisor to former Senator Paul Tsongas and later as a Middle East advisor to then Governor Bill Clinton. His book The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (University of Chicago Press, 1985) won the 1986 National Jewish Book Award.
More bio here and here. We will discuss the Israeli Arab peace process. Readers can send question to rosnersdomain@haaretz.co.il.


Dear Prof Spiegel,

In light of recent developments, how do you think should Syria be treated by Israel and the US?

Thank you

Yonatan,
Jerusalem

Yonatan,

There are several preliminary points relevant to this question. President Bashar Assad has been announcing for several years now that he is ready to negotiate with Israel. Yes, he has not been prepared to make a Sadat-like gesture or even an Arafat-like move to appear in public with an Israeli leader. Indeed, he has done nothing to reassure the Israeli public that he is serious. Instead. he has left the impression that he is playing with Israel so that he can deflect attention from the ongoing probes of his government?s involvement in assassinations against anti-Syrian Lebanese political leaders. And he has appeared to be seeking to improve his position vis a vis the United States that was so damaged as a result of Syria's support of anti-coalition forces in Iraq. But even so, for decades Israel claimed that it was prepared to talk with any Arab leader ready to talk to Israel. Assad may not be the most trustworthy character, but I do not understand why he should not be fully tested publicly as well as privately. There have been reports at times of efforts by Prime Minister Olmert trying to do just that through discrete channels. I have no idea whether they are accurate, but it is not possible to fully test the waters unless and until there is a public process that has been initiated, even if that public process masks secret discussions. The current talks with the Palestinians is a case in point.

Of course, Israel has not been a free agent in this matter, given the opposition of the United States government to its dealing with Syria through most of the recent period. I have never understood the Bush administration?s position on this matter. Yes, the Syrian government pursues disturbing policies in permitting insurgents to cross its border into Iraq. It has aided the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. It has housed the headquarters of Hamas in Damascus. It has maintained and even intensified a close relationship with Iran. Its high ranking personnel are suspected of ordering the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. And it has blown hot and cold between the diplomatic and military options vis a vis Israel. But not talking to Syria has not helped the United States on any of these matters. Syria is not a friendly country to either the United States or Israel. But this is diplomacy, not courtship.

When sanctioning states for what we regard as bad behavior, there always must be a way out of the punishment if regimes alter their conduct. The Bush administration has maintained a consistent policy toward Damascus, so that it was possible for Syrians to conclude (and many did) that no matter how they behaved and regardless of how many positive signals they sent there would be no change in Washington. That is not a perception that we should want rogue regimes to have. As I argued earlier in the week, the Bush administration acted differently with Libya and North Korea, and the results were far more satisfying. We have not had as nuanced a policy toward Syria, and the consequences have been predictably disappointing.

The very mention of North Korea brings us to recent developments. It appears from reports outside Israel, especially in the United States, that on September 6 Israel bombed a partly constructed nuclear reactor in Syria that appears to have been supplied by North Korea, and that this reactor if completed could eventually have led to a serious capacity for Syria to develop nuclear weapons. We do not know if these reports are true, but it does appear likely that Israel bombed something in Syria?even President Assad has said it was a building ?related to the military? but he insisted it was "not used". There are several issues raised here: Was North Korea involved? Are these reports accurate? Even if the reports are substantially correct, was the attack on a fledgling nuclear site warranted?

We do not have sufficient public information to answer these questions. But we do know that the Israelis behaved cleverly (some would say unusually) in not talking about their activity, that most of the leaks came from the US, that no country in the Arab world criticized Israel for the action. It also appears that despite much idle chatter about an imminent Syrian-Israeli war this summer and concomitant military buildups on both sides, the only military action was the limited Israeli attack.

In the light of these recent activities, this is precisely the time for both countries to talk to Syria. Because of the mysterious attack, the Israeli and American positions have been strengthened. Neither the Syrians nor the Israelis want a war. That is clear, because they could have had one over the last several months if they so chose. Syria has made its point that it will not go on forever waiting to talk. Israel has set red lines beyond which Syria cannot go unscathed, and has made it clear that despite all the problems it faces with the Palestinians, it will not permit Syria to try for an ?October 1973? type surprise attack. Israel?s apparent success, and the nature in which the attack has been handled, means that Israel?s deterrent posture has been bolstered. Therefore, this is precisely the right time to offer to talk because Israel appears stronger, and no immediate Lebanese-Israeli or Syrian-Israeli crisis is emerging at the moment.

The international conference concept, so far devoted exclusively to the Palestinians, could clearly be expanded. It would obviously be overload to think that the Syrian question with all its manifestations (Golan, Shaaba farms, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraq, Iran) could be raised during the initial international conference, now scheduled for late next month. But it would not do any harm for the United States, with Israel?s acquiescence, to announce that the Syrian issue will be taken up either at the second or latest third conference that is to be scheduled. In this way, the Syrians would know that their issues will indeed be raised. In order to prevent Damascus from trying to improve their bargaining power by causing serious problems during the wait, it would also be advisable to inform them through private channels that should crises emerge in the region on issues where they have considerable leverage (Hezbollah, Hamas, as examples) the scheduling of their issue would be delayed. On the other hand, quiet on these issues would be followed by both Israeli and American involvement with Damascus should it choose to participate actively and responsibly in the international conference series. And, Washington should make it clear, should the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations collapse, that will in no way affect the schedule for Israeli-Syrian talks unless Damascus was seen as having been responsible for this failure. In this way, the Syrians would be treated respectfully, but firmly, in the run-up to including them in the new diplomatic venture now being prepared in Washington. This is the approach the United States and Israel should use toward Syria in the light of recent developments.

Dear Prof. Spiegel.

Thank you for your enlightening remarks.

My question: do you find it crucial to have the Saudis coming to the Annapolis meeting and why?

Again, thank you

Borris Agodov

Dear Mr. Agodov,

Whether or not it is crucial for the Saudis to attend the Annapolis meeting depends on how the conference is framed. Let me explain.

If the administration envisions the meeting as a one-shot event, wherein a breakthrough is required to move to a new stage, then Saudi participation would indeed be critical. In this conception of the meeting, the two sides get together, Declaration of Principles in hand. Their Statement is filled with explicit major concessions by both the Israelis and Palestinians on the central issues, especially Jerusalem, borders, and refugees. The framework of a final settlement is set out, with the clear expectation that the conference will be followed by implementing meetings that lead to a final settlement between the two sides. Hopefully, this process would be better than the model of the first Camp David. The latter produced a document delineating the framework between Egypt and Israel, which was followed by almost six months of negotiations that almost failed several times, but did in the end yield a peace treaty between Cairo and Jerusalem. In this scenario, the agreement between Israelis and Palestinians would exist prior to the meeting, would deal with core issues, the various parties would know that beforehand, and the conference would serve as a celebration of the important agreement that had been reached and a ?kickoff party? for the negotiations on final details that would be occurring in the months that would follow the gathering. In this kind of a meeting President Bush and his administration would be announcing that they intended to work on achieving a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in their remaining time in office, and this achievement would be their top priority.

Under these conditions it would be totally disingenuous for the Saudis not to attend. They authored the bulk of the Arab Peace Initiative that offered Israel normalization of relations with Arab states for final agreements with the Arab states, which in essence means Syria and the Palestinians (Syria would presumably bring along the Lebanese). With this kind of breakthrough, if the Saudis did not attend the meeting, it would necessarily and understandably give Israelis pause concerning whether or not the promises in the Arab Peace Initiative would be kept. The failure of the Saudis to attend would immediately spoil the party, and represent a roadblock to further progress. It is important here to remember that what the Israelis really need is confidence building measures, beyond trusting whether promises will be kept. For the Israelis, the Saudi Plan potentially offered a new "spirit" in which Arab states would begin to relate to Israel as a legitimate member of the region. A Saudi boycott of this kind of conference would signal an opposing attitude.

But this is not a problem. On the one hand, the Saudis appear to be ready to attend the type of meeting outlined above, but on the other it seems now inconceivable that the Annapolis meeting next month will actually record this kind of achievements. Rather, the international conference, if and when it occurs, will represent a much more elementary Statement of Understandings between the two sides in which at best they set out an agenda of the kinds of issues they will address in the future. Yes, the Palestinians want more, and would it seems prefer the kind of agreement outlined above. The challenge for Secretary Rice is to get them to attend a conference preceded by only general agreement since the Israelis are hesitant, fearful of making concessions to a Palestinian government that they believe cannot produce and hobbled by a weak and internally divided government of their own. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Olmert and Deputy Prime Minister Haim Ramon have spoken recently of a willingness to explore or even accept a divided Jerusalem, and it is not inconceivable that some compromise could be reached before or around the meeting on a Declaration of Principles of some kind. I wrote earlier this week about a "pain/gain" tradeoff in which each side conceded one major issue as the basis for holding a meeting. For example, and only that, the Israelis could accept the principle of a Jerusalem in which Arab areas were part of the Palestinian state?s capital and the Palestinians could accept the principle that refugees would return only to the future Palestinian state. That would certainly be enough to hold a conference.

But how would the Saudis fit in with either of these frameworks? If the Declaration of Principles is tepid and vague, an agenda of what has to be addressed without moving the parties significantly further than they are now, then the Saudis are not going to attend and it is even problematic as to whether the United States should expend political capital at this time to get them to do so. As we argued in the IPF Study Group report to which I have referred all week, it is far better to hold a series of meetings than to place all the pressure on just one.

"The United States should announce that this meeting will be only the first in a series intended to promote agreements as they are reached between the parties with the assistance of outsiders such as the United States, while keeping the door open for wider attendance at later meetings. The advantage of a series of meetings is that it reduces the burden of expectations falling on the planned fall gathering by providing relief from the notion that this one meeting will determine whether there is movement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, at least during the duration of this American administration."

If the Israelis and Palestinians have no major achievements to show for their efforts, and the meeting and its vague Statement of Understandings is simply a preliminary showpiece to move the process forward, then getting the Palestinians to attend will itself be an achievement. In that case, the meeting would be designed to prepare for the next round, when it would be hoped that through American sponsorship more would be achieved that would bring additional Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia. This is the way we put it in the report.

"The Saudi presence at the first meeting would be a critical impetus to the new process, but we are unlikely to know until the last minute whether the Saudis will indeed engage. (It is worth noting that Saudi representation at the Madrid conference in October 1991 only occurred at the very last moment.) The administration should not allow the failure of any particular Arab country (beyond Palestine) to attend to be defined as the success or failure of the meeting, even as it seeks to engage as many states as possible."

The Saudis by their presence could make a major difference, and a dramatic one, in demonstrating their commitment to the process, in reassuring Israel that they are serious about normalization in the future, in persuading other Arab states to come.

So far, we have dealt with the two easy cases: If it?s a meeting in which there is little to show, the Saudis could help, but they have already indicated they won't and we cannot make them do it. If it's a meeting with a major Israeli-Palestinian preliminary agreement on the table, they should come and they would be crucial; if they hesitate, the United States should make every effort to insist that they appear.

But what if the Declaration of Principles amounts to a partial agreement between the two parties, in which in essence each side has conceded at least one major point (my example was Jerusalem for refugees). In this case, the meeting could proceed without the Saudis and even succeed without them, but it would be much harder, and the burden on the Bush Administration that much greater. The Saudi role at a meeting would be crucial to moving the process further by empowering the Palestinians and encouraging the Israeli government and its public. Appearing in front of the TV cameras sitting with their Israeli counterparts, the Saudi presence would tantalize all engaged. They would in essence be saying: "OK, Israelis and Palestinians, this is what you can have if you complete your task. You can have a regional setting in which we all sit together to resolve differences and move forward. Go to it; get more done, and at our next meeting Inshallah we will be celebrating more concessions and more movement toward the Middle East envisioned in the Arab Peace Initiative."

The standard Saudi position seems to be that they are not going to take the risk of sitting with Israelis in public without the core issues already decided, but it is not clear that they understand how important their gradual escalation of contact with Israelis would be. It seems to me that over the last several years the Palestinians have relinquished their ability to bring peace, because most Israelis no longer believe they can keep their agreements, even control their population. In the current context, Israelis may take risks, but they will do so to rid themselves of the Palestinians, not to embrace them. So who can provide the vision, the imagination, the concrete steps to encourage the Israeli government and public on in the process? The only ones left are the Arab governments, and the critical party left without serious public contact with Israel is Saudi Arabia. Without the Saudi Peace Initiative, we would probably not be talking about an international meeting or a series of meetings. But without Saudi steps to normalization, toward creating a new "spirit" in the Arab-Israeli relationship as I called it earlier, we might not succeed in any situation after the disappointments of the last several years. And, in this regard, Saudi participation at an appropriate, but early point, in the process is indeed crucial.

Dear Mr. Rosner,

I know this might sound crazy, but this is my question to Prof. Spiegel: Why do we need to waste time of American diplomats on making peace with the Israelis and Palestinians? It didn't help us with the Arab world, it didn't achieve peace, and clearly the sides are not ready to compromise. I think it was Rudy Giuliani who said that we should just leave it alone, and I don't see a reason not to follow this good advise (except for the bad habit we have to meddle in other people's business').

Can you enlighten me?

Thank you.

B.S. Jacobson
Miami, Florida

Dear B.S. Jacobson,

You propose that we should just let the Palestinian-Israeli dispute simmer along, listening to what you claim to be Rudy Guiliani's advice "that we should just leave it alone." I would argue that Guiliani is listening to someone else's advice: George W. Bush. There are few if any analysts who do not agree that George Bush has been the most passive President on the Arab-Israeli issue of any since the 1967 war. So we don't have to imagine what following Guiliani's advice would bring us; we know already, and it's a disaster. Even George W. Bush appears not to believe in it any more. His Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, said yesterday after meeting with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that President Bush has decided that the success of the upcoming international conference on the Israeli-Palestinian issue will be his first priority. Considering his other problems, especially Iraq, that?s quite a statement.

What have been the consequences of America's passive policy during this decade that might have or should have caused President Bush to change his mind? On the one hand, Israelis on the rhetorical level have received unprecedented words of encouragement, support, and sympathy as Israelis suffered through the worst and most lethal terrorist attacks against their civilian population in history. On the other hand, those attacks resulted in unprecedented deaths and injuries from cafes and busses exploding. In the summer war with Hezbollah in 2006 Katushya rockets rained down on northern Israel , incapacitating the area for weeks. The Gaza withdrawal resulted in almost constant attacks on Sderot and its environs. And the strategic position of Iran has steadily grown as a consequence of the war in Iraq and its movement toward a nuclear arsenal. Many of Israel's problems in this decade can be blamed on the failure to stem the steady rise of Iran?s position. I doubt that many Israelis would prefer their present strategic situation to conditions when Mr. Bush took over in Washington (even though the intifada had begun, it was still far less lethal).

The Palestinians' circumstances have also declined. The results of Camp David, Yasser Arafat's rejection of the Clinton Parameters, and the intifada have led to a dramatic reduction in support for Palestine, even in Europe. Their economy is in shambles, their polity now bitterly divided between two competing foes in Gaza and the West Bank, their leadership in seeming disrepair, their society reeling from the consequences of years of checkpoints and tough measures imposed by the Israelis to prevent suicide bombers from entering Israel. Certainly, the Palestinians have not gained from American passivity.

But none of these results seem to bother our questioner, who seems troubled even by the relatively limited engagement (by comparison with other administrations) we see now from the Bush administration, and asks why we should care. For the United States, the Arab-Israeli dispute is critical to our position in the region. We have interests in the Middle East: protecting the security of Israel, assuring the free flow of oil, maintaining friendly regimes - in a previous era against the prospect of pro-Soviet breakthroughs, and now against a coalition of anti-American, extremist, and violent movements and countries. We also have dire problems epitomized by Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, among others. And of course we are ever imbued with the effort to thwart terrorism, a strategic goal which has not benefited from the war in Iraq or from the administration?s tarrying in the vineyard of the promotion of democracy?neither of which appears to have done anything to limit the threat.

As we have seen the last several years, when our activities related to the Arab-Israeli dispute are dormant, the opponents of the US are strengthened, and our friends are weakened. Thus, American foreign policy suffered when the Bush administration failed to follow-up effectively on the Road Map, or when it failed to explore what President Bashar Assad of Syria meant when he said repeatedly he wanted to talk to Israel (and then the administration tried to discourage Israelis from doing so as well), or when for five long years it failed to follow through on the Arab Peace Initiative wherein the Arab countries voted to normalize relations with Israel when the conflict was settled.

Our questioner says that promoting peace "didn't help us with the Arab world." That's simply not true. With all of our problems in the area, from Iraq to Iran, and from Hezbollah to Hamas, it would be easier to gain support for American initiatives and policies were we to be seen as actively pursuing a viable policy between Arabs and Israelis. It's not that Arab leaders expect us to turn against Israel; they know by now that that is not going to happen. But they have a reasonable expectation of American engagement in the process because the US is the leading state in the region, though our position has clearly declined in this decade. Since 2000 no American official or expert can travel in the region without hearing one common refrain from Arab and Israeli alike: why isn't the United States more actively engaged in promoting Israel-Arab accommodation? In the Arab world, in particular, Washington is judged effective when it is involved, and untrustworthy when it is not.

The question says that "clearly the sides are not ready to compromise". Really? We know that the publics are; the polls consistently tell us that 60-70% of the Israeli and Palestinian publics are ready for a deal, and want the conflict over. Obviously, they differ on terms, but that's what their leaders are supposed to accomplish. Admittedly, Olmert and Abbas compete in their weakness, but it is also true that positive results in their negotiations could help resurrect their political positions at home if Israelis and Palestinians experience improvements in their private lives. And, we know, from both their behavior and statements, that both Olmert and Abbas are ready to move this process forward.

Our questioner says that efforts in the past "didn't achieve peace." That is a bizarre remark. If your car doesn't start, do you give up? If your air conditioner breaks down, do you just suffer? There were mistakes made during the period of the last two American Presidencies on all sides and by all parties, but seen in historical perspective the Arab-Israeli relationship is not the same as it once was. Israel has peace treaties (though cold relations, but formal diplomatic relations nonetheless) with two of its Arab neighbors, and contacts - some even open - with several others. The Arab League has reversed the Khartoum Conference of 1967 (no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace) and some Arab states may sit openly with Israel at one of the international conferences to occur over the next several months. We need to learn from the lessons of the past, and move on, not simply give up because we failed in the past.

Finally, let us be blunt. There is a subtle underlying message to this question that it is important to raise in closing. The question seems to imply that Israel is better off with the status quo, without the efforts of American diplomats, and without what the writer calls "the bad habit" of American meddling. Not only is this accusation unfair to the record of the US (despite the terrible mistakes of this decade), but it is very dangerous. The greatest threat to the future of Israel is the status quo, and the Bush administration has not helped with its passivity over the last several years. As we have seen only too clearly during this period, there can be no stasis in the unstable Middle East: conditions will only get better or worse; they never stay the same.

American "meddling" is accompanied by assistance for Israel, protection, enhanced deterrence, a proto alliance. It is Israel that gains, no less than the United States, when Washington is pursuing the peace process and when it is held in higher repute by Israel's Arab neighbors. American efforts, when they occur, are hardly a "waste of time"; they are critical to our own security and to the future strength of the state of Israel, and we should never forget it.

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