Abraham Ben-Tzvi

Professor Abraham (Avi) Ben-Tzvi, an expert on Israel-U.S. relations, has a new book out (in Hebrew) on the U.S. in the international arena since 1945 - in which a significant portion is dedicated to the American policy toward Israel. This will also be the main topic of our discussion.

Ben-Tzvi is well known in Israel as he is a frequent guest on many TV and Radio talk shows. He has taught at the University of Chicago, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Cornell University and Georgetown University, among others, and has published numerous books and articles on international relations, including "The American Approach to Superpower Collaboration in the Middle East, 1973-1986"; "The United States and Israel, The Limits of the Special Relationship"; and "Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance. He is now working at the University of Haifa.

Ben-Tzvi is also a member of The Israel Factor: Ranking The Presidential Candidates panel. Readers can send questions to rosnersdomain@haaretz.co.il.

Dear Avi

Since this will be my last question, let's try to have some fun. Can you rate for me the American Presidents and explain who's the best, who's the worst (for Israel of course) and why?

Best

Rosner

Dear Shmuel:

Although the question as to who were the most and least supportive of Israel among American presidents is ultimately a subjective one and derives from one's political and ideological beliefs (such as one's advocacy of American pressure on Israel as a means of securing its withdrawal from the west Bank), it is possible to identify a few objective indicators for assessing the basic approach of America's presidents toward Israel and the extent to which certain coercive measures used by them toward it reflected innate animosity or a desire "to save Israel from itself."

On the basis of an examination of a broad complex of such indicators over time, it appears that the extreme of strong and unbounded personal support over time in defiance of strong bureaucratic opposition is occupied by Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson, whose basic approach toward Israel was permeated with empathy and sympathy and reflected his conviction that there existed a basic similarity between the U.S. and Israel in terms of the national ethos and history (i.e., the pioneering spirit and the frontier mentality), overruled the far less supportive Department of State on numerous occasions on issues related to political support and the provision of American arms to Israel.

Not only did Israel become during the Johnson era the recipient of new and sophisticated weapons system (such as the Skyhawk bomber), but it received -unlike the situation in, during and in the aftermath of the 1956 War- strong support for its peace position in the aftermath of the Six-Day War of June 1967. On the whole, it was during the Johnson presidency that the special relationship between Washington and Jerusalem became fully institutionalized and were further augmented by a perception of Israel as a reliable strategic asset of the U.S.

And while other presidents, including Reagan, Clinton and Bush (the present president), would also reflect, in some of their actions and policies, the basic premises of the special relationship, Johnson's contribution to the development and consolidation of the partnership was particularly significant and revolutionary since he operated during a period in which strategic cooperation with Israel was still minimal, and in which the Department of State still recommended largely in a pro-Arab course.

As to the least supportive president, although both Eisenhower and Bush (the father) were occasionally highly critical of Israel, with Presidnt Eisenhower resorting to strong coercive measures vis-a-vis the Ben-Gurion Government in 1956 and 1957,it is president Carter whose overall attitude toward Israel, particularly during his first year in the White House, reflected a strong pro-Palestinian bias and an unabated desire to recognize the PLO(and directly negotiate with it) despite the PLO's relentless and unwavering commitment to indiscriminate violence and terrorist activities against Israel and its civilian population.

Furthermore, despite the formal American commitment to Israel from 1975 not to recognize the PLO unless it endorsed Resolution 242, namely, Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries, Carter did his utmost to bypass this constraint and to begin direct negotiations with the PLO on the basis of the organization's acceptance of an "amended" Resolution 242, which would recognize "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people". It was only after the PLO refused to endorse even this updated and amended text that Carter temporarily acquiesced.

Against this backdrop, it is clear that Carter's support of the Camp David accords of 1978 amounted to a fallback position. His original objective was omprehensive peace which, in his view, had to involve the PLO.

Dear Avi

In light of what you said so far, I would like to try and turn our attention to the other side of the U.S.-Israel equation, namely Israel. One might argue that American support became such a corner stone for Israel's strategy, that it really cripples the Israeli government from doing things that are in Israel's national interest - because of America.

Two examples: exporting defense related products to China and negotiating with Syria.

So is it really better for Israel now than it was with administrations not as friendly?

Best
Rosner

Dear Shmuel:

Here is my answer to another core question:

The debate as to whether Israel should maintain some distance from the U.S. faded into oblivion in 1950, when the Ben-Gurion Government decided to support the Truman Administration and the U.N. in Korea (this decision, however, was not reciprocated by the Truman Administration). Despite the fact that Israel was occasionally faced with administrations (such as the Eisenhower, Ford and Carter Administrations) that were highly critical of its policies and contemplated - or exerted - strong pressures intended to bring about change in the direction of Israel's policy on key strategic and territorial issues, its dependence on the U.S. since the early 1960s became so complete that it could not even marginally shift, in subsequent years, the course and direction of its foreign policy orientation.

Indeed, after the brief honeymoon with the Soviet Union during the period immediately following its independence came to an end, and after the strategic partnership with France ended in the early 1960s, Israel was simply left without a supportive big power and hence came to increasingly look upon Washington as the only remaining option for the provision of economic and military assistance as well as for political support.

As soon as a window of opportunity was opened for Israel, in the summer of 1962, to purchase American arms(the Hawk missile), it moved apace in the direction of becoming an American client and ally. In other words, the fact that in 1962 Israel - which was now looked upon in Washington as a strategic asset-became the recipient of American arms, while no other viable alternatives to the "American option" existed, provided the impetus for its political leadership to seek to solidify the newly established bond with the U.S.

Consequently, although the Israeli Government would later face administrations whose agenda and order of priorities were incompatible with Israel's, it did not have any strategic alternative and thus repeatedly opted to use its political and social resources and infrastructure of support on the domestic American front in order to soften the administration's course rather than to "defect" and break the rules of the game within the American-Israeli framework.

As long as the U.S., despite occasional coercive initiatives and severe controversies with Israel, remained an arms supplier and the provider of an attractive economic package to successive Israeli Governments, Israel remained totally and irrevocably committed to its course of remaining inside the American sphere of influence rather than seeking to rock the boat by attempting to predicate its foreign and fefence posture upon different premises.

Dear Avi

In your response to my first question you referred briefly to "organizations and lobbies" - and mentioned, somewhat critically, "the tendency in the recent public discourse? to focus almost exclusively" on their influence as the source of American support. I want to go back to this subject - as this is something on which a lot of ink has been spilled lately - and to ask you to asses the significance of the "lobby" to the "special relationships". In your book you say that AIPAC is powerful enough as to limit the room for maneuver of any administration on issues related to Israel.

So - do you agree with the many critics who say that the pro-Israel lobby undermines the policy that would benefit America?

Rosner

Dear Shmuel:

This is indeed a core issue in the American-Israeli context, but one which is fraught with myth and misunderstanding. In essence, I view the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington as the institutional manifestation of the "special relationship" and not as an independent entity, with an agenda of its own. Thus, notwithstanding its organizational strength and resources, its effectiveness and success in constraining the administration from embarking on anti-Israeli measures, the origins of the lobby's power and influence originated in the fact that the policies it advocated were invariably fully compatible with the preferences of most Americans.

Contrary to the myth that the lobby frequently forced the administration to adopt courses of action which contradicted the American national interest, it actually refrained from any effort to redirect the general course and overall direction of American, confining itself to the American-Israeli framework and, in this delimited context, to issues over which there existed a broad level of consensus in American public opinion.

In other words, the lobby traditionally amplified and reinforced the dominant proclivities and preferences of the American public on such questions as the level of American support for Israel, but refrained from involving itself in issues which were the subject of deep domestic cleavage and controversy. It never "pushed" the U.S. toward war or intervention (even if such courses were viewed as potentially beneficial to Israel) but, instead, quintessentially represented and organized the values and beliefs which formed the very core of the special relationship, translating them from the level of the amorphous to a more concrete and tangible political level.

Dear Avi

You write that "in the administration's thinking, Israel has been perceived as a central strategic asset in the region and as a crucial bulwark in the confrontation against the forces of radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism." However, some people will argue that support for Israel is a burden on America's Middle East policy, as it enrages the Arab states. Do you think such an opinion might become the predominant opinion among American policy makers in the coming years?

Best

Rosner

Dear Shmuel:

Here is my response to this very central question: Since the 1960s,when Israel came to be perceived by successive American administrations as a strategic asset in the Middle East, American policy was characterized by a duality: on the one hand, The U.S. gradually became a major arms supplier of Israel while the level of strategic cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem was periodically upgraded. On the other hand, American diplomacy was careful not to alienate such moderate Middle Eastern powers as Saudi Arabia and Egypt and thus maintained some distance from Israel, particularly during periods of crisis and war.

In times of war, for example, while providing Israel with much-needed military assistance (as was the case during the Yom Kippur War),the U.S. took steps to prevent Israel from completely destroying the military power of its opponents and repeatedly exerted pressure on the Israeli leadership to limit the scope of its military operations. During the recent war in Lebanon, the Administration's perception of the conflict as another facet in the all-encompassing struggle against global terrorism largely outweighed the fear of alienating and enraging the U.S.'s regional partners in the region, and consequently gave Israel an unprecedented margin of maneuverability and latitude. This posture was largely backed by American public opinion, which-by a huge plurality-expressed strong support for the Israeli position, motivation and objectives during the war.

As to whether this support will last, while it is safe to predict that American public opinion will continue to support basic Israeli positions in the conflict in the near future, the possibility of an erosion in the scope of this support should not be discounted. Such a swing of the pendulum from the pole of unbounded support for Israel toward a somewhat cooler and more critical approach might be the outcome of a prolonged and acute energy crisis, with a coalition of oil-producing states resorting once again (as was the case in 1973) to the oil weapon as a means to coerce the U.S. into modifying some of its traditional pro-Israeli positions.

Under such adverse circumstances, even a most supportive administration is unlikely to remain oblivious to a growing domestic predicament with clear political overtones and ramifications.

Another possibility is that a domestic backlash against President Bush and his strategic agenda will ultimately spill over from the limited context of Iraq and thus adversely affect his entire regional agenda, including the level of public support for Israel as a by-product of the growing fatigue and disillusionment with his combative, apocalyptic vision of the world and of the region. In other words, the growing public resentment of President's strategic agenda - particularly against the backdrop of the quagmire in Iraq-might affect other derivative or related issues.

Since Israel has been viewed by Bush as pursuing virtually the same objectives that the U.S. has been pursuing against the forces of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy, a possible domestic setback for the administration (such as on November 7) would likely act as a constraint upon the administration's latitude of choice in other policy contingencies, including in the context of the continued pursuit, by the administration, of the special relationship with Israel.

This trend is likely to further accelerate after November 2008 if the next presidential election results in a victory for a candidate whose world view is significantly different from Bush's belief system.

Dear Avi

In your new book on American foreign policy, you deal with American policy toward Israel and with the so-called "special relationship" between the two countries, so let's start with that. How strong do you think this relationship really is, and what have been the key elements in keeping it in tact for the last couple of years?

Best

Rosner

Dear Shmuel:

I view the "special relationship" between the United State and Israel as the key to the alliance and as outweighing the purely strategic dimension of the relationship. In essence, the special relationship orientation reflects the still pervasive perception, which is shared by broad segments in American public opinion, that there is a basic similarity-if not total identity-in terms of core cultural values, the historical legacy and ethos, social composition, ideological beliefs and vision of the future, between the two societies and political cultures.

In other words, whereas the tendency in the recent public discourse has been to focus almost exclusively on organizations and lobbies which promote pro-Israeli measures and legislation, one should not ignore the fact that the continued success of these groups and organizations should be attributed primarily to the fact that the values which they advocate are fully compatible with the values and preferences of most Americans.

Almost six decades after the establishment of the state of Israel, most elements which comprise the special relationship orientation have remained strong and viable on the domestic American scene. They include a broadly-based support for Israel's democracy, an appreciation of the continued Israeli endeavor to absorb new and diverse groups of immigrants-which is viewed as similar to the American experience-and an identification, shared by many Christian evangelists, with the religious mission assigned to the people of Israel in the land of Israel.

In recent years, the special relationship gained further momentum when it became reinforced and augmented by an additional cluster of considerations, which justified support for Israel on purely strategic grounds. The fact that, in the administration's thinking, Israel has been perceived as a central strategic asset in the region and as a crucial bulwark in the confrontation against the forces of radicalism and Islamic fundamentalism, therefore added another layer of strength to the cultural and social attributes of the special relationship and thus helped to further consolidate and diversify the sources of support for Israel.

Under these circumstances, Israel could now be supported not only by virtue of being an island of democratic values and beliefs in an authoritarian Middle East but by also virtue of its potential and actual contribution to the struggle against terrorism. In conclusion, the essence of the special relationship orientation has not faded into the background of the American-Israeli framework in recent years. America-both socially and politically-is still overwhelmingly supportive of Israel on issues which pertain to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its resolution as well as the struggle against the regional representatives of the axis of evil.

In other words, the fact that the cultural and ideological components of the special relationship in fact do not face any opposition in official Washington but are instead further reinforced by additional and fully compatible strategic considerations help explain the fact that support for Israel is still broad and widespread in both the White House, Capitol Hill and American public opinion.