Martin Indyk

Martin Indyk, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, served in several senior positions in the U.S. government, most recently as ambassador to Israel and assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs. He was also a founding executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has published widely on Palestinian-Israeli peace and other topics in Middle East policy, and is now working on a study of the Clinton Administration's diplomacy in the region.

Indyk will address questions regarding the current crisis in Lebanon along with other issues dealing with Middle East negotiations. He will specifically deal with a paper he recently published with his colleague Tamara Cofman Wittes, called Dual Dilemmas: U.S. Policy Options for the Israeli-Palestinian Predicament.

Readers can send questions to rosnersdomain@haaretz.co.il.


Mr. Indyk

Many world leaders - including Kofi Annan, Tony Blair and the EU
Commission - have called for the deployment of an international force
of peacekeepers in southern Lebanon. However, I wonder how effective ground troops are while the conflict is fought mainly with rockets
(Fajr-3 having the capacity of covering at least 50 km) and air force.
What are the realistic prospects, if any, of an international force stopping the conflict?

Thanks,

Anna Momigliano
Rome, Italy


The idea of an international force that would be interposed between the warring sides makes no sense. It might hinder the Israel Defense Forces from operating in Lebanon since Israel would not want to be involved in a military confrontation with the countries that supplied the force (e.g. Britain and France). However, Hezbollah would have no such reservations. Just as they bombed the U.S. Marine Barracks at Beirut International Airport in 1983, so too would they likely attack the international force if it tried to stop their attacks on Israel.

However, an international force could play an important role once a ceasefire were agreed on and implemented. Such an agreement would likely provide for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to take control of southern Lebanon and to patrol the border between Lebanon and Israel. The Lebanese Prime Minister has already declared his intention of taking extending his government?s sovereignty to the south. And the Israeli Prime Minister has called for this as a necessary component of any ceasefire agreement. However, the LAF does not have sufficient capability to fulfill that mission and prevent Hezbollah from operating in the south. A combat-capable international force (in contrast to UNIFIL's observer role) would be needed to enhance the LAF's capabilities. Similarly, an international force could support the LAF's efforts to control Lebanon's borders to prevent the resupply of Hezbollah with rockets and missiles from Iran or Syria.

Although the United States would need to support and help pay for the force, it would be unwise and unnecessary for U.S. forces to participate. Instead, battle-hardened troops from countries like Australia, Britain, France and Canada could do the job effectively. But they could only play an effective role if the Lebanese government made a sovereign decision to invite them into Lebanon and the Israeli government acquiesced in the deployment.


Dear Ambassador

Our readers sent many questions but as time and space are limited I selected one to represent each issue.

On Syria: At the end of his first comment, Ambassador Indyk raised a
question: "How to get Hezbollah to acquiesce in the deal?" Since there are not many options, perhaps the best route is through Syria. What if third parties helped Israel and Syria strike a deal: Syria would
support the removal of Hezbollah from south Lebanon and its disarmament. Syria would also stop facilitating Iranian support for Hezbollah. In exchange, Israel and Syria would go back to the negotiating table with the aim of signing a peace treaty including full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. Is that scenario possible?

Jeremy Pressman, Ph.D.
University of Connecticut

This is a logical way forward and the Syrians would actually love to have Condi come to Damascus and ask for their help. But there are two problems with your approach:

1. The Bush Administration has treated Syria like an enemy. It's not so simple for the President now to treat them like a friend in need.

2. And it would be a betrayal of the Cedar Revolution, for Bush would in effect be inviting Syria back into Lebanon to stabilize the situation.

What you're actually suggesting is that Bush give up on his "freedom drive" and return to traditional American diplomacy which sought stability and peace rather than democracy and regime change. I don't think Bush is willing to make such an about face because he actually believes his way is working.


On Lebanon: Is it too cynical to think that the Bush administration under neocon influence is looking ahead to subdue first Syria then Iran, and is quite happy that Hizbollah has lit a fuse for them? Or do we believe the tone of Bush's captured aside that if Hizbollah stops this "shit" it's all over?

Tony Serve

I think some in the administration would be happy for Israel to hit Syria as part of the agenda you allude to. However, the experience in Iraq has made the President and his Secretary of State more cautious. Nevertheless, this conflict could escalate to a confrontation between Syria and Israel whether the Bush Administration intended it or not. At that point, the U.S. would have to intervene and make it clear that if Syria and Iran were not willing to curb Hezbollah, Syria would suffer a huge battlefield defeat. I'm not recommending this course of action and I don't think Israel is up for it. But I suspect that if Syria and Iran thought the war was going to engulf Damascus they would act to extinguish the flames.


On the Palestinians: Given the decided tilt, starting under Clinton
and culminating under Bush, to a Likud-like outlook and positioning on Israeli Palestinian issues, the U.S. has lost substantially all of its
credibility with the Palestinian people as an honest broker seeking
peace and justice. Is it possible for the United States to recover any
of its credibility with the Palestinian people?

Mark Sherry

America's credibility with all the Arabs depends on its ability and willingness to influence Israel and to stand up to those who would prefer to make war rather than peace on Israel. As much as the Palestinians dislike America's pro-Israel stance they know that the only external power that can make a real difference to their fate is the United States.


On Iran: It is generally agreed that Iran has instigated the present
outbreak of fighting and is continuing to resupply Hezbollah. What, if
anything, can be done to ensure that Iran ceases to be capable of
doing this in the future?

Murray Teitel, Toronto

Tough question. At the moment, Iran thinks it can act with impunity, that it holds all the high cards in Iraq, in Lebanon, in the Palestinian arena, and on the nuclear issue. The United States, however, should be able to use this crisis to convince other powers that the problem is not just Iran's nuclear program, it's also its sponsorship of Hezbollah. The G-8's condemnation of Hezbollah was a useful move in this direction. But the notable absence of any finger-pointing at Iran suggests we still have a ways to go. When Iran is before the UN Security Council because of its unwillingness to negotiate over its nuclear program, its support for Hezbollah should also be on the agenda. Hopefully, China and Russia will eventually be convinced that the only way to get their attention is through sanctions. And if that doesn't work, I fear a confrontation will become inevitable.

Dear Ambassador

Being original in a week such as this one is not an option, so my first question will be the obvious one: What policy should the U.S. administration pursue in light of the ongoing crisis in Lebanon? Do you want to see the U.S. more heavily involved, and how can it help the parties get closer to a reasonable solution to this deteriorating situation?

Best

Rosner


The U.S. has to walk a fine line in this crisis. On one side, it must stand by Israel in the face of Hezbollah's unprovoked act of aggression. On the other side, it must support the government of Lebanon, which was democratically elected and is (with the exception of its Hezbollah ministers) pro-Western and anti-Syrian. Given Hezbollah's status as a terrorist organization, and the backing it enjoys from Iran and Syria, the United States cannot afford for Hezbollah to emerge victorious from this confrontation.

Instead, it needs to use the crisis to finish the job the Bush Administration first started when it sponsored UNSC Resolution 1559. That resolution called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon AND the disbandment and disarming of all militias. Bush and Chirac insisted on the implementation of the first requirement but they ignored the second. Just as in the case of the Road Map's requirement for the dismantlement of the infrastructure of Palestinian terror, the Bush administration preferred to believe that elections would produce governments in Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority that would then be able to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. Instead, Hezbollah took advantage of the Lebanese elections to enter the government where it has wielded a veto over any attempt to disarm it. And we all know what happened in the Palestinian elections. So the Bush administration needs to use this crisis to make progress on the disarmament issue in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. It should be clear by now that a failure to do so will doom Bush?s democratic adventure on both fronts.

Achieving that objective is complicated by the fact that the U.S. does not have a lot of leverage over Hezbollah. Having insisted that Syria leave Lebanon, it cannot now turn to Syria to disarm Hezbollah. And the Iranians do not take the United States seriously given our problems in Iraq and our failure to extract any price for its repeated flouting of the demands of the international community when it comes to their nuclear program.

So the only real American leverage is through Israel's use of force. But that is a blunt instrument. Hezbollah hides behind civilians which means that the more force Israel uses to attack Hezbollah targets, the more Lebanese civilians die. And the longer Israel's bombardments go on, the more Lebanese become angry with Israel rather than Hezbollah. And at a certain point in the not too distant future, the international outcry may become so great that the Bush Administration is forced to abandon the effort and to insist instead that Israel stop.

Therefore, the Bush Administration needs to lay the groundwork now for a diplomatic initiative that will kick in when Israel has succeeded in denting Hezbollah's capabilities. That initiative would need to have the following elements: