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Bush in Jerusalem: Speaking about "pressure" and "nudging"
This will be the last time I write a weekend column with Aluf Benn in Tel Aviv, at least for the next six months. He will be spending these months as a think tank personality.
Anyway, the full version of our column is here (2000 words), and a shortened version (700 words) is right here:
Ariel Sharon always contended that in relations with friendly countries, it is not enough to make do with professional cooperation between the intelligence authorities. He was thus accustomed to sending senior members of the Mossad, the Shin Bet security services and Military Intelligence to prepare his visits in foreign countries (and at the same time, to make the heads of intelligence beholden to the prime minister). Sharon brought his military secretary, General Yoav Galant, to the White House, in order to present Bush with satellite photos of Iranian nuclear facilities. This time, Olmert volunteered to act, himself, as the president's intelligence officer.
The recently published American National Intelligence Estimate, which determined that Iran froze its military nuclear program about four years ago, was a blow to Israeli hopes that Bush would bomb and destroy Iranian nuclear installations before ending his term. Bush's trip to the region was to a large extent designed to reassure Saudi Arabia and Israel, and to promise them that America is still committed to confronting Iran, "which was, is and will be a threat," as the president said in Jerusalem. As far as Olmert is concerned, it is preferable to have Bush deal with the Iranian bomb and release Israel from the dilemma of whether to act on its own - a move that in any case would require a green light from Washington.
Meanwhile, the president and his administration are concentrating their efforts on Iran by strengthening the deterrence front. In advance of the president's visit to Saudi Arabia, the administration decided to take action, and asked Congress to move up its approval of the large weapons deal with the Gulf states by one day - from January 15 to 14 - as a gift to the Saudis, who will be hosting Bush that day. Republican Congressman Mark Kirk, one of the heads of the coalition of legislators who are concerned about that deal, told Haaretz two days ago that he had not yet received clarifications from the administration that would enable him and his colleagues to approve it.
Just as Olmert acts as a lobbyist on the Iranian issue with Bush, Bush does the same with Olmert on the Palestinian issue. In Jerusalem the president sounded more determined than ever in his willingness to become involved in the political process, even speaking about "pressure" and "nudging." In private talks he was more outspoken and direct, and urged the sides to take action, or run the risk of losing the attention of the president, which will be turned to other issues. Bush spoke disparagingly of Syrian President Bashar Assad.
Bush's words at the press conference indicate that he is aware of the Israeli and Palestinian tendency to exhaust each other with mutual complaints about "ongoing issues" instead of getting down to the roots of the conflict. After all, what is the president's tremendous power when compared to Olmert's coalition problems, or the internal problems of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, not to mention Hamas, which controls Gaza? Bush was aware of the fact that even just news of his intended arrival in the region spurred Olmert and Abbas to begin discussions of the "core issues."
In a briefing for reporters on Wednesday, Steve Hadley, Bush's national security advisor, tried to explain why a Palestinian state will not be established during Bush's term. Hadley said that it was not a matter of a "deadline," but of a "goal." But the president has long since stopped deluding himself about the possibility of a real state. The building of Palestinian institutions "is going to take some time." The implementation of the road map "is going to take a little time." The practical steps will take "longer than the time required to negotiate the outlines and the details of a Palestinian state."
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