The NIE and the freedom to grumble

My weekend column (with Aluf Benn) is here (2400 words). For those who do not have the time or the patience, here is a very short version (770 words):

1.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert suspected that the Americans had eased up a bit in their determination to deal with the Iranian problem, and before he left for the Annapolis conference, he spoke - by way of giving a little background - about the military option. Perhaps he thought that was the way he would arouse a sense of urgency among the Americans. Olmert and other senior Israelis who visited Washington last week told reporters about perfect understanding with President Bush. Olmert related that in the first of his two meetings with Bush, "I spoke very directly about the issues - and this was accepted without ambivalence and in an extraordinary way - [and] about the freedom we reserve for ourselves and what we will do and what we will not do." Are you referring to Gaza, Olmert was asked. "Not necessarily," he replied without elaborating.

But the freedom ostensibly reserved for Israel this week is mainly the freedom to grumble. Under a flood of reports and reactions, its complaints came across like a musty old tune from a different era, when the world still believed that Iran wants nuclear weapons. Serious analyses were washed away in the great, soothing wave of good news from the intelligence community. On Wednesday, various sorts of spokesmen were still worrying whether and to what extent Israel should take part in the internal American debate that is heating up. Olmert, at the advice of Defense Minister Ehud Barak, asserted that we mustn't argue with our friends from America, even if Israel does not like what was written in the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).

2.

It's not only the Israelis who find it difficult to understand the rationale at the basis of the lenient American analysis. They have been joined by professionals from Britain and France, but these, perhaps under instructions from their political superiors, have on the whole preferred to remain silent even in the face of many questions.

Senior sources in both the U.S. and Israel agree that the basis for the information in Israel's hands is very similar to that which guided the American assessment. There isn't anyone who is going to complain about the cooperation between the intelligence agencies of the two countries. And even if Israel does have a few more details, which it has held back for reasons of protecting sources, they are marginal. In any case, it wasn't in the intelligence arena that Israel suffered a blow this week, but rather in the public opinion arena. The U.S. public, which the surveys say has become convinced over the past several years that Iran is dangerous, is liable to change its mind.

Nearly all the American commentators and experts sang the same refrain together this week: The military option is dead, long live dialogue.

3.

In a discussion that he held on Wednesday, Olmert said that Israel's working assumption would not change. As far as Jerusalem is concerned, Iran still has an active nuclear program, which is liable to push Israel, which will feel isolated, to consider "difficult decisions" in the (expected) case that the diplomatic effort fails. Olmert believes that if he concludes that Israel is in danger of annihilation, Bush will give him the permission to take off.

An Israeli attack on a distant country like Iran - and not on any neighbor across the border, such as Syria - entails American agreement. The reason is that en route from Israel to Iran, there are tens of thousands of American soldiers, in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, who would be at risk of an Iranian reaction should Israel attack the nuclear installations at Natanz and Arak, and should the U.S. be accused of cooperating with it.

4.

It is difficult to understate the importance of the blow that landed on Olmert and his policy this week. "A terror attack by intelligence," is what one Israeli defense source called it. If Olmert wanted to play the Iranian card and hazard the chance that the U.S. would destroy the nuclear installations in order to enlist support for another withdrawal in the West Bank - "Itamar in return for Natanz" - he has lost this card. And it is also going to be a lot harder for the Americans to persuade Israel, which has been left isolated on the Iranian front, to take security risks vis-a-vis the Palestinians and also perhaps with respect to the Syrians.