A message to the moderate Arabs: With Hamas there's no reconciliation, only confrontation

This is the shortened version of my weekend column (with Aluf Benn). This time, we both were in Israel while writing it.


1.


From Olmert's standpoint, the Winograd committee's announcement a couple of days ago that it would issue letters of warning was the best possible news. As he had hoped, the final report will be postponed until next year, if not longer. If that happens, it will be transformed from a political threat into a moldy historical document in which no one is very interested.


Even before the Winograd Committee agreed to postpone its report, and the assessment within the political establishment was that a boiling point would be reached around the time of the High Holidays in September, Olmert was extended a life preserver by his good friend, U.S. President George Bush. In his speech on the Middle East, on Monday, Bush announced the convening of an international peace conference in the fall, with the participation of the Israelis, the Palestinians and neighboring countries that recognize Israel's right to exist.


In one stroke, Bush solved two problems: He provided Rice with diplomatic employment, rather than to have her sit around in Washington and complain to him about how her hands are being tied with regard to the Israeli- Palestinian track. And he gave Olmert an opportunity to rebuff the most immediate threat to his government. In all likelihood, the Winograd Committee wouldn't dare call for the ouster of a prime minister on the eve of a historic peace conference. And it would be even more unlikely for Ehud Barak to take Labor out of the government just when a Palestinian state was in the offing.


2.


For the peace conference to save Olmert from the Winograd Committee's wrath and from Barak's ambitions, media gimmick, like the participation of a senior representative from Saudi Arabia, is needed. A "standard" regional conference, with Egypt and Jordan, could be pulled together any time, and would have zero influence on Israeli public opinion. Only Saudi Arabia can provide a boost in public support for the prime minister. The problem is that this is a thin and flimsy branch on which to rely. Last November, Riyadh turned down a previous attempt to get it to participate in a conference with Olmert.

What's changed since then? On the evening of the president's speech, the Americans could not point to any indication of Riyadh's readiness to participate in the conference, at least not at a price acceptable to Israel, nor, apparently, to the United States. The closer Bush's term in the White House is to its end, the greater the Saudis' inclination to be wary of cooperating with him. And, at the same time, the price tag for any gesture on their part continues to rise.

The Saudis would have agreed, perhaps, to come to a conference that would serve as a platform for talks on the final status accord, especially if Israel would accept the Arab Peace Initiative as a basis for the discussions. But this is not what the Americans have in mind, and officials in Israel are confident that they won't be pressured to adopt the Arab initiative in its current form. The fall conference is intended, according to the president, "to give diplomatic support to the parties in their bilateral discussions and negotiations," but by no means to replace them. The target date which the president envisions for final status talks is also hazy. Rice wanted a more explicit commitment, but her stance was rejected. Bush believes that there is no point in such talks before progress is made in building up the Palestinian institutions. He prefers a process that lasts years, if necessary, to shortcuts. The example of his predecessor is ever-present in his mind: a lame-duck president nearing the end of his term, rushing to hold a conference that's supposed to solve an age-old conflict all at once. But Bush has no intention of ending up like Bill Clinton, who discovered to his great misfortune at Camp David that the parties were not yet ready for an accord, that the Palestinians still had no leadership or institutions with which to hold a serious dialogue or whose word could be counted on. In Bush's mind, Clinton's Camp David is not a model; it's a warning sign.


3.


Here is a clarification that was issued this week: The Bush administration has no interest in a dialogue with Hamas. This was one of the main messages in Bush's speech, and it was directed at important listeners in three Arab cities: Ramallah, Cairo and Riyadh. Having been burned by the surprise of the Mecca Agreement, and the formation of the Palestinian unity government, the Americans wished to make it clear this week to PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, publicly, that they would not look with understanding upon another reconciliation attempt that would essentially bring Hamas back into the arena. They hope, but are not entirely certain, that the message will be received by the Egyptians and also the Saudis - the perpetual potential facilitators of a "Palestinian reconciliation." The United States does not want a reconciliation. It wants a confrontation. It wants a decisive victory.


The flip side of the Hamas boycott is the very high regard in which Fayad is held in Washington. Bush's speech was, to a great extent, the prize Fayad received for taking on the job of prime minister in the West Bank. The president depicted him as an equal partner to Abbas and ignored their difference in status, as well as the fact that Abbas was elected by a large majority while Fayad heads a transitional government whose legality is a matter of controversy.


It is against this backdrop that the covert message to Israel must be understood: You ought to close a deal with Fayad and Abbas. For seven years you've been complaining that there's "no partner" on the Palestinian side. First it was Yasser Arafat and then it was Hamas. Now you've got the dream team over there. You won't get anything better.

Olmert, Barak and Livni are proceeding with caution for now: Saying a few nice words, making a few nice gestures, talking about the good chemistry with Abbas and Fayad, and continuing to shy away from a final-status accord. It will be interesting to see what happens before long, when pressures for a renewal of negotiations grow: Will they suddenly remember in Jerusalem that Fayad isn't even a member of Fatah and that his political standing in the territories is weak?