The axis of fear

A piece I wrote for Slate uses the Mecca agreement between Fatah and Hamas as to ask about the prospect of having the "moderate Sunni regimes" helping achieve the goals of American policy makers.

The Bush administration is now counting on the Saudis to help contain Iran. That's one reason we don't hear much these days about democratization and political reform - or criticism of the Saudis, an authoritarian regime that provided most of the manpower for the 9/11 suicide missions. What we hear from American policy-makers is a conciliatory message aimed at the "moderate Sunni regimes" - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. Supposedly, those regimes are tasked with the mission of countering the "Shiite extremists" - namely Iran and its allies, organizations like Hezbollah, and states like Syria.

As the tensions marking the Sunni-Shiite divide grow, U.S. officials have high hopes that these Sunni-led countries will lend a hand. With their help, Washington would like to contain Iran, advance the peace process with Israel, reform the Palestinian Authority, isolate Syria, and rehabilitate Lebanon. Perhaps fear of Iranian expansionism will achieve what time and persuasion didn't do. They actually thought that this alliance of fear - that is, the fear of the growing Iranian influence - might help them to bring about peace.

On paper, it seems logical, but the theory has one flaw the administration can't seem to understand: The Saudis don't really trust America. Nor, of course, does Tehran. Three days ago, in Munich, Germany, an Iranian official blamed the United States for the current Middle East flux. "The [U.S.] policy of denial, isolation, adventurism, sanctions can only serve instability in our region," said Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani.

Everybody noticed that he was echoing the criticism made a day earlier by President Vladimir Putin of Russia - but some quietly admitted that Larijani was also reflecting a common sentiment among many so-called U.S. allies in the Arab world, the Saudis among them. "They have no confidence that the Americans will be able to clean up this mess they created," an Arab diplomat recently told me. Thus, the "moderate" countries - branded "responsible regimes" by administration officials - may take their "responsibility" more seriously than the Bush team would like.

Just take a look at the most recent example: The Saudis, initially with Washington's blessing, brought together the two Palestinian adversary groups, Hamas and Fatah, striking a deal to create a national unity government that will make U.S. policy more difficult to implement. The Saudis see the Palestinian agreement as a way to block Iranian influence in the Palestinian territories. Hamas might be extreme, they say, but it's also a Sunni organization, and the Saudis will be ready to serve as its savior, as long as it prevents Iran from playing that role. And there is a similar pattern of Saudi diplomatic independence in the talks they are conducting with Iran over the future of Lebanon.

Any side effect of such talks - namely, the possible interference with the goals of the Bush team and the annoyance of the administration - is a sad but also inevitable result of the new "moderate Arab" policy. It also reveals how the "the axis of fear" perceives the current state of affairs: The Iranians might be scary, but at least for now, the American display of incompetence is even more frightening.