Somalia as an allegory for the state of the world

Madeleine Albright, then United States ambassador to the United Nations and later secretary of state, commented in the summer of 1993: 'The decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall back into the abyss or to stay the course and help lift the country and its people from the category of a failed state into that of an emerging democracy.' This reads like a page from current President George W. Bush's book. And it is but one anecdotal example of the way Somalia could serve as an allegory for the state of the world.

The United States decided to 'stay the course' in Somalia of the early 1990s, just as in today's Iraq; until it crashed into the bloodbath known today as 'Black Hawk Down.' The Somali militias intercepted two helicopters, slaughtered the Delta Force soldiers aboard and drove the superpower out with its tail between its legs. The Americans fled, but the chaos remained. Last week, as happens periodically between its bouts of oblivion, Somalia was again in the headlines. The Ethiopian army invaded it to drive the Union of Islamic Courts, which had taken over almost the entire country, out of the capital, Mogadishu.

The ongoing conflict in East Africa is complicated; it consists of tribal, religious, national and global struggles. Somalia was a pawn on the superpowers game board in the days of the Cold War, and today it is a battlefield in another struggle, whose borders are blurrier. Many unique characteristics distinguish it from other battlefields, but there are many similarities as well. Like in the Palestinian Authority, the local population received some benefits from the Islamists takeover: It received order instead of chaos, relatively proper conduct instead of rampaging corruption. And, like in Israel's war in Lebanon, Ethiopia is acting in Somalia with the blessing of the Americans, who hope that it will defeat the Islamists, who are supported by global Jihad movements.

Somalia, which is riven among tribes and armed militias, is even more convenient than Lebanon for conducting such proxy wars. This is what happened between the U.S. and the Union of Islamic Courts; first using local militias, then through a friendly state. This is also what happened between Somalia's neighbors, Eritrea and Ethiopia, which are using its territory to settle other accounts, just as Iran, Syria and Israel did in Lebanon.

Like in the Gaza Strip, Iraq and Lebanon, forces greater than Somalia are involved in the struggles there. The temporary government, which is recognized by the West and was brought back to the capital by the American-trained Ethiopian army, is an extreme model of a wretched central government that cannot control the state of which it is nominally in charge. It is weaker than Mahmoud Abbas, shakier than Fouad Siniora and more isolated than Nuri al-Maliki. But the consequences of its weakness endanger the region in amazingly similar ways.

The ongoing arguments about the policy needed to restore a measure of quiet and sanity to the region are also painfully familiar. The U.S. and Europe deliberated and disagreed, for example, on whether the preferred approach was dialogue with the Islamists or trying to crush them. The possible involvement of an international force raises questions as to what mandate it would be given and who its members would be. Regional stability is also an issue. Could the clash in Somalia overflow and turn the entire region into a battlefield? How would a dangerous flare-up in a region adjacent to global oil routes affect the world?

The problems are similar, the actions are similar and the failures are similar. The Security Council has been shown up as incompetent, as it was in Darfur and Iran. The neighbors appear to be helpless, as they were in Lebanon and Palestine. America is being dragged straight into the heart of the great darkness.

'We can get in,' said the first George Bush's national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, when the question of sending American soldiers to Somalia was first raised. 'But how do we get out?'

At the beginning of last summer, in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations, Ted Dagne of the Congressional Research Service gave an answer that was appropriate to Somalia, but also to some of the other battlefields mentioned here. His answer should bring all the drafters of plans, writers of papers and planners of revolutions back to earth.

'The options for the United States are limited, and success largely depends on how Somalis manage their own affairs,' he said.