A meeting of leaders under siege

WASHINGTON - Just as it is today for U.S. President George W. Bush, the state of Louisiana was also a key state for then president Ulysses S. Grant - the one that guaranteed the rival party's control over the House of Representatives. Bush delayed sending soldiers to Louisiana to rescue the victims of Hurricane Katrina, thus convincing its voters that his administration is impotent and incompetent. Grant rushed to send soldiers to Louisiana to suppress an uprising by opponents of the emancipation of black slaves, and thus convinced its voters that as long the Republicans were in control, calm would not prevail in America. Both suffered from a familiar political ailment: the sixth year of their presidency.

Grant was defeated in that election, in 1874, and his long-term policy for the Southern states was torpedoed for years to come. But not every president who lost a midterm election suffered a similar fate. Bush has two years left to prove that he can overcome this obstacle and make his presidency felt even without the guaranteed majority that he had in Congress. The big question is what, exactly, he wants to do. Which programs will he choose to implement before the end of his term? In any case, next week he will meet an Israeli prime minister with a similar problem - a politician without a political program.

What will the two discuss, and what concoction will emerge from their meeting? Americans and Israelis are having difficulty answering that question. There are quite a few people in both countries who believe that the meeting is forced and superfluous. The answer offered by many of them indicates the essence of the problem: First, let us see what the situation on the ground is. In other words, Bush has become a follower instead of a leader, a reactor instead of an initiator.

Soon he will change his plans in Iraq as a consequence of his lack of success there. He may decide to try to speak with Syria; this would also be a decision caused by distress. And when it comes to the Palestinian Authority, the approach is similar: Let us wait and see what comes of the new government that is taking shape in the territories. Meanwhile, the only practical plan is General Keith Dayton's plan for bolstering PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. In other words, bolstering the very person of whom senior members of the administration have long since despaired, as they see no chance of his demonstrating genuine leadership.

Bush has proven in the past that he is capable of presenting daring, revolutionary plans, but these were also the source of his political downfall. It is difficult to work with these plans - but without them, it is not clear where he is going. The Democratic Party, which wanted to teach him a lesson in yesterday's election, did not bring impressive proposals of its own to the table. Even regarding the most burning issue, American policy in Iraq, the Democrats did not formulate a consensual agenda or present an orderly solution, beyond blaming the person standing at the head of the system. But what exactly will they propose doing if their hope is realized and the president fires Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld?

The meeting between Olmert and Bush is a meeting of leaders who are conducting holding operations in the face of continuous attacks. The surveys show that neither is popular at home, and voices from the rest of the world indicate that they are not particularly admired abroad. The problems are piling up, and there are no new solutions. Two days ago, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that she saw no alternative but to continue promoting the democratization initiative, while trying to deal with and soften some of its shortcomings. That is one possibility open to Bush: continuing on the same path while making small tactical changes that would improve his ability to maneuver in an unstable situation.

But there is also another possibility: adhering rhetorically to democratization, while attempting de facto to stabilize the Middle East at the expense of his declared values. That is the approach that James Baker's report, which is expected very soon, will probably recommend. The final policy could also be a combination of both approaches: In some cases (Lebanon), the administration would adopt a more ambitious approach, and in others (Iraq), it would seek a solution that would bring quiet. The key question for Israel is what it will do about Iran.

Whichever approach Bush chooses, Jerusalem will have to maneuver carefully around an administration in need of short-term relaxants that will enable it to keep functioning, to keep treading water. And the results of Bush's choice will be felt in Israel as well. The choice of democratization would mean a continuation of the shake-up, along with a growing risk of wars and a lack of regional stability. The choice of stabilization would usher in a demand for Israeli assistance, a diplomatic payment in the form of concessions and gestures that would enable America to hold talks with the Arab world without having to deal constantly with its complaints about the Palestinian problem.