Weekend notes: Jewish Lobby, Korea, Lebanon, rabbis

Lobby

Some updates to the story I wrote Thursday afternoon on the planned new Jewish lobby (What happens when U.S. Jews forward the peace process?):

1. I stated that the American Jews are dovish - which is true - but didn't differentiate between their general dovishness and their views on Israel. Some readers protested, saying I should have, and they are right. Surveys show that the views of American Jews are much more mainstream on Israel than they are on internal social issues. AJC's annual surveys have shown in the past that American Jews usually support the Israeli government's approach by a 3-1 margin or more.

2. Charles Bronfman will probably not even consider taking part in the new initiative, as he is a Canadian citizen, and wouldn't want to give money to an organization whose main aim is to influence American policy (I already reported that Edgar Bronfman will not join this project).

3. I wrote about the new initiative not only here, but also in my print edition weekend column (the one I usually share with my friend a colleague Aluf Benn). What we said there, among other things, is that "There is no mistaking the trend that is described. Among American Jews, many of whom are very liberal - definite leftists - there are those who are fed up with AIPAC's clout and especially its policy. Wars of ego and influence also affect the attitude toward AIPAC. Smaller lobbying groups are trying to gnaw at it, but with no evident success for the time being. They complain, sometimes justifiably, of its hawkishness - but they have yet to face the crucial test: the investment of time and resources, the establishment of a volunteer system and activists. It is possible that now, all of a sudden, the masses who are prepared to give of their time and energy for the sake of Israel, but not via AIPAC, will be found. It is equally possible that they won't."

Korea

We also wrote about North Korea, Iran and Israel (on which I wrote previously here): "From Israel's perspective, the North Korean explosion is an important propaganda card. One can guess that in the coming days and weeks new revelations about military cooperation between Tehran and Pyongyang will appear in the Western press. This is how the Israeli "low profile" policy works with respect to the Iranian nuclear threat: The leaders refrain from making many statements, the intelligence community disseminates information to the media, research institutes and shapers of public opinion in the West, quietly and with an "Israeli fingerprint." The stories will always quote "Western intelligence sources" or some other cover, with the aim of strengthening the sense of danger and encouraging governments to act.

Among experts in Israel, there has been a debate for several years now regarding the course of action in facing the appearance of nuclear weaponry in Iran. Should we see this as an inevitable development and prepare to create a regional balance of horror, Cold War-style? Should Israel change the policy of "nuclear ambiguity" that it has followed since the 1960s and move to open deterrence? And what if Iran also adopts ambiguity? These are weighty questions, the answers to which necessitate careful coordination with Washington."

Read it all here.

Lebanon

I've been wanting to write about the new study on Lebanon by David Makovsky and Jefferey White for some time now but never got to do it. It is the most comprehensive analysis of the post-war I've read - although some of the conclusions related to Israel's politics might be outdated by now (a whole week is a long time in Israel when it comes to politics).

You can read a couple of paragraphs here, but for those who really want to know more I will recommend the full study (it's not a short read):

"Two critiques have emerged from Israel's political decision making at the start of the conflict and the government's subsequent management of the war. The predominant public critique is that Israel did not have a strategy to obtain its ultimate objective of delivering an unrecoverable blow to Hezbollah and did not use sufficient manpower and firepower on the ground early on to obtain the necessary territorial objective. Specifically, these critics say, an immediate ground thrust temporarily taking all areas south of the Litani River, thirteen miles from the border, would have given Israel a better chance to knock out Hezbollah's katyusha rockets, which are virtually impossible to destroy from the air before they are launched against northern Israel.

The alternative critique, associated with Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni, is that Israel's objective was never realistic; therefore, it would have been preferable to have started with a more modest but achievable goal. According to this view, Israel should not have launched a war that it was ill prepared to successfully prosecute or conclude. The thesis is that it would have been more effective to launch a limited operation of a few days, such was done on the second day of the war when Israel hit fifty-nine of Hezbollah's permanent rocket launchers in thirty four minutes."

Rabbis

A couple of days ago I wrote about the Rabbinic Leadership Survey conducted by STAR - Synagogues: Transformation and Renewal (Rabbis with hope).

"Rabbi Hayim Herring, the director of STAR," I wrote there, "says he was surprised by the rabbis' desire to express support for Israel, and by the willingness that all of them displayed to talk to the "other branches" of the Jewish community. But the optimism reflected in the survey impressed him most of all."

A Star representative called to say that rabbi Herring never said he was "surprised" by any of the findings, and after reviewing my notes I must admit that I misquoted him. Herring was mentioning three things he found "the most interesting" in the survey, but never said he was surprised by them.