Rosner's Hamas Time-Saver

Illusions

Ross:

Rice should have no illusions about producing an agreement on the core concessions in the next few weeks. I know she is hopeful based on her private discussions with the two leaders. But the leap from private conceptual discussions to public concrete agreements is huge and, even if possible, never comes quickly or easily.

So what should she aim for now? Having raised expectations that the meeting will be a transforming event in peacemaking, she cannot suddenly fall back to launching negotiations with no follow-through. That argues for waiting -- and convening the meeting only when she has a clear "day after" strategy for what will follow it.

The content of the meeting matters; setting an arbitrary deadline for it should not.

As for the content, she should aim for agreement on principles that would represent a step forward without pushing for what neither side can do today. Three principles might be doable and meaningful. First, Israelis will commit to withdrawal and Palestinians to security. Second, on Jerusalem, each would accept that there would be two capitals for two states. Third, on refugees, each would agree that the issue must be resolved in a way that is consistent with a two-state solution.

These principles would not resolve the conflict -- but would create a negotiating framework for doing so over time. Given where we are today, that would be a real contribution.

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Crossroads

Robert Zelnick, a Journalism Professor of National Security Studies at Boston University and a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
"We are standing now at an unusual and ironic crossroads in the Middle East where the growing threat from Iran, coupled with serious U.S. setbacks in Iraq, are providing a rare opportunity to end what may be the most enduring conflict in the modern world. Leading Arab League states are convinced that their security would be enhanced by an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the full normalization of relations with Israel. They have signaled their enthusiasm for a compromise by reconfiguring the Saudi Peace Plan into a shape more in line with Israel?s demands and endorsing the document. The bellwether Sunni states?Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan?have gone further, quietly adopting a flexible approach to such critical final status issues as the ?right of return? of Palestinian refugees to Israel and the withdrawal by Israel to the borders that existed just prior to the outset of the 1967 war. But it will be up to the U.S. to turn goodwill into lasting peace. This translates into a series of steps the late Ronald Reagan might have characterized as ?simple, but not easy:?

First, in both public and private diplomacy, support the Saudi/Arab League peace plan. Hail its vision, its flexibility, it deference to the will of the parties themselves.

Second, endorse the concept of an accelerated move toward final status negotiations. So long as the parties understand that accord on these issues does not obviate the need for compliance with substantive political and security commitments, the potential good would seem to outweigh the potential harm. Certainly any accord reached will become a target for extremists on each side, and certainly it will be tricky business for the PA to reclaim Gaza from Hamas. But the benefits of spelling out the promise of nationhood, freedom and self-determination and letting people in both countries vote on it would dwarf any difficulties. In this respect the experience gained in settling the dispute in Northern Ireland holds some relevance in that the terms of a settlement were spelled out early but commitments undertaken by the parties to end violence and disarm had to be implemented before the accord took full effect. The accord also benefited from steady and consistent oversight by the government of Tony Blair, now actively engaged in minding Israeli-Palestinian developments.

Third, without rocking the boat with the sort of excess energy likely to capsize it, the Bush administration and its successors must continue to maintain that the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran is totally unacceptable. In all likelihood this means support for international diplomacy and?to the extent possible?sanctions. It also means the promulgation of a firm but classified presidential decision to take all necessary steps to prevent any such development.

Fourth, act prudently in Iraq. A lot is at stake there, including the ability of the U.S. to help shape the future of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship."

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Nablus

CSM: Much of the progress at the peace table is expected to be predicated on Palestinian police in Nablus going after the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, the insubordinate foot soldiers of Abbas's own party.

"For the Americans and the Israelis, it is important because it makes the partner more credible instead of just being a paper tiger. How can the PA sit at a table and negotiate big issues if it can't solve small issues like an assertion of its own power?" asks Mohammed Dajani, a professor of political science at Al Quds University in Jerusalem.

"This is an attempt to give the PA some stature and some respect among Palestinians by saying it can enforce its sovereignty. The rule of the gangs was beginning to grow here as it was in Gaza. It was spreading to the West Bank. Unless the PA reasserts their presence and authority within society, then everyone can buy a gun and establish their own fiefdoms," he says.

And so, after being banned by Israel for most of the intifada, PA security officers armed with AK-47 machine guns in Nablus have returned to the streets in their green patrol jeeps. Over the weekend, Israeli forces at the Nablus perimeter let in hundreds of reinforcements fresh from European-run training courses in the West Bank city of Jericho.

Even though the Palestinian police don't have the last word on security in Nablus like in the 1990s ? Israel's army is reserving the right to chase after fugitive militants in the city when it sees fit ? expectations are high among residents who want to see police officers arrest those responsible for frequent shooting sprees and carjackings.

"The big challenge is Nablus. We have taken Nablus as a model. And we would like to perform," says Intelligence Chief Tawfiq Tirawi, considered the top PA security chief in the West Bank. "If we are capable of consolidating law and order in Nablus, then the rest of the West Bank is a piece of cake."

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Challenge

Makovsky: Rice faces daunting challenges on the road to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations this fall. The low expectations that have accompanied her diplomacy until now have given the key players -- Olmert, Abbas, and Rice herself -- a chance to hold talks away from the public eye. The question now is whether Rice will be able to identify the key gaps and then find ways to formulate clear, achievable objectives in an exceedingly short period of time, all while managing varying public expectations in the United States and Middle East alike. This is a tall order, and the odds are not on her side.

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Corner

Is Hamas loosing? Backed into a corner, Hamas will eventually snap. The question is, how? The first instinct is to warn they will again flip the switch on suicide bombings against Israel. It was reported over Yom Kippur that a suicide belt found in an apartment in the trendy Tel Aviv neighborhood of Neve Tsedek was a Hamas operation. But there is reason to doubt that Hamas will return to the tactic of suicide attacks that it used during the second intifada. Though Hamas members will never admit this, there is a consensus among many Hamas analysts that the Islamists concluded that their suicide bomb campaign damaged the movement as Palestinians partly blamed Hamas for the tough Israeli countermeasures including the wall. There is also a big question mark around the movement?s ability to effectively wage such a campaign today, given the Israeli lock down on the West Bank and Gaza. Finally, a new Hamas violence campaign would only further alienate the international community, especially countries like Egypt and Saudi, whose support is crucial to Hamas.

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Capability

Washington Institute: Since Israel's 2005 disengagement from Gaza -- and especially since Hamas's more recent victory over Fatah -- Hamas has significantly enhanced its military capabilities across a range of areas. This is likely to protect the group from domestic challenges for the foreseeable future as well as provide it with more options, both offensive and defensive, in the event of a confrontation with Israel. However effective the economic and financial blockade against Hamas may be, there is no sign that such efforts have dented the group's control over Gaza or slowed the pace of its military development.

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Posturing

From the Foreign Policy blog: Is this just posturing on Meshaal's part? It might be, since the Hamas leader knows he won't be invited to the table. On the other hand, it might be a sign that Meshaal and his Syrian sponsors are more pragmatic than they seem. But with Israel's internal-security services warning of major new attacks and Hamas leaders sending mixed signals, I'd bet Meshaal is posturing. Expect bombings.

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Patience

CSM: what the bright yellow star of "Tomorrow's Pioneers" on Hamas-owned Al Aqsa television lacks in muscle he makes up for in fervor. Speaking in a recent episode, Nahool vowed to help take back Jerusalem from the "criminal Jews" and expressed his hope that he and all of his listeners would grow up to become holy warriors. The show, along with paramilitary-style summer camps for Gazan boys, reveal a key element in Hamas's long-term strategy. Like Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, which spawned Hamas, the group takes a patient approach to tapping religious conviction to build political support. It is the movement's youth focus, critics say, that sets it apart from Hamas's rival, Fatah, which controls the West Bank and enjoys US and Israeli support.

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E xhaustion

PALESTINE IS NOT the only place where the very idea of the nation is so weak that its violent eruptions seem to be dismal admissions of failure, writes Marty Peretz of the New Republic. But, however impoverished the reality, it has caught the fancy of many outside Palestine. The fact is that, had these outsiders--some cynical, some hopelessly muddle-headed--not embraced the cause, the cause already would have perished from its own exhaustion.

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Jihad

Can Hamas control the Jihad? "A Hamas spokesman, Sami Abu Zohri, claimed that Gaza's new rulers would soon talk with other militant groups to persuade them to abide by a Hamas cease-fire with Israel. Mahmoud Zahar, a senior Hamas leader, said that Hamas could, if it wanted, stop the rocket attacks out of Gaza. "But nobody will be the protector of the Israeli border" he vowed, meaning that Hamas would never agree to act as Israel's policeman in Gaza, a role that Abbas' militia at least pretended to do. But acting as enforcer over its fellow comrades may be the only way for Hamas to convince Israelis that it can deliver on its promises of a truce."

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Autumn

Rob Satloff: President Bush's speech reflected the fundamental tension between his continued commitment to core principles about the need for Palestinian internal reform as a precondition for discussion of statehood and his sense of urgency about investing in Abbas -- politically, diplomatically, financially, and militarily -- so that the West Bank does not go the way of Gaza. As summer turns to autumn, there will be increasing pressure on the White House to telescope the reform process and feed the sense of urgency with ever greater political content. As Bush hinted in the very first line of his speech, when he referred to the national debate over Iraq, pressure on the Palestinian issue will come at the precise moment when pressure on the Iraq can be expected to reach a boil. In other words, the president seems reconciled to the fact that Washington is likely to have not just a hot summer, but a hot autumn, too.

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Map

Daoud Kuttab: Skeptics of U.S. motives have good reason for concern. To overcome mistrust based on past failures, President Bush will need to spend substantial political capital. In the early days of the Bush administration, the idea of using the cachet of the office of the president was anathema because of Bill Clinton's failed attempts to broker a peace agreement. But such high-level influence is critical today.

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Symbols

Dennis Ross: Results on the ground and real hopes will help Fatah. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would do well to keep this in mind. A credible negotiating process is one thing; a symbolic event like an international conference where only hard-line speeches are given that highlight how little prospect of agreement there is, and where there is no practical follow-up, is another. Palestinians are not looking for symbols now. They know the difference between symbols and reality. Let's hope the Bush administration does as well.

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