Legend has it that on the morning of January 12, 1994, when Basel Assad, the eldest and also the favorite son of Syrian ruler Hafez Assad, was killed while driving in a thick fog to the international airport in Damascus, the president's subordinates had a hard time deciding how to break the bitter news to him. While Hafez Assad was still asleep, they decided that the country's senior army and security figures would come to the presidential palace early in the morning and tell him what had happened. They all entered his room but none of them dared to speak. After a lengthy silence, President Assad asked, "Well, which of you carried out the coup against me?"
Years passed and Hafez Assad passed away and was succeeded by his son Bashar, who had not been intended for the presidential post. Initially he followed in his father's footsteps. After assuming the presidency, he replaced all the key officials of the previous regime with his personal loyalists from the Alawi community, to which he also belongs. Nevertheless, the son cannot feel more secure than his father, as the leader of a minority community that accounts for less than 20 percent of the country's population.
During most of his long rule as president, Hafez Assad leaned on the support of the Soviet Union. After its collapse, he decided wisely that he should try to curry favor with the one remaining superpower, the United States. Thus he took the U.S. side in the first Gulf War, hooking up with the large international coalition that assaulted Iraq. Washington repaid him by taking the lead in rough negotiations between Assad and Israel, devoting all its power and influence to the effort.
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The United States was on the very brink of success, and the reasons for the misunderstandings that brought about Hafez Assad's rejection of the final proposals made by President Clinton at their meeting in Geneva in March 2000 have been the subject of a public debate ever since. In the two and a half months that Hafez Assad had to live - he died in June 2000 - he did not forsake the American orientation that he had adopted in his last years.
Bashar abandoned his father's path. Ahead of the second Gulf War, in 2003, he took the Iraqi side against the United States. He allowed thousands of combatants to cross the Syrian border into Iraq, where they inflicted heavy casualties on the U.S. forces; he deepened Syria's cooperation with Iran far beyond his father's tactical cooperation; and he intervened so blatantly in Lebanon that France, Syria's traditional friend, this year led an initiative in the United Nations Security Council that ended in an unequivocal resolution calling for the full withdrawal of Syrian military and intelligence forces from Lebanon. Effectively, Bashar Assad has brought about his country's isolation, and for his broad strategic failure, the Syrian ruler will pay a steep price, perhaps even the loss of power.
In the months ahead, Lebanon will be the center of international attention, being not only the arena in which Syria will vie for its continued influence in a country whose independence it has not recognized to this day (there is no Syrian embassy in Beirut and no Lebanese embassy in Damascus), but also and concurrently an arena in which Iran vies for spheres of influence. The Shi'ites, including Hezbollah, a potent forward arm, are deployed along Israel's northern border, and the missiles in their possession continue to pose a threat to those of Israel's population centers that are in their range. The UN Security Council resolution on Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon also obliges the simultaneous disarming of Hezbollah. The northern sector is liable to become an unstable arena as the processes of democratization in Syria and Lebanon gain momentum. Against this background of instability on the northern border - and not only there, but also in several other countries in the region - Israel is about to embark on the path of shaping the final-status settlement with the Palestinians in direct negotiations with the United States.
Kingdom come, kingdom go
Washington's behavior toward Syria demonstrates its determination not to accept Syria's continued "rampage" in Lebanon - or anywhere else, for that matter. After the flames of democratization start to singe the corners of the kingdom in Damascus, the days of the minority Alawi regime will be numbered. That is a sure consequence of the new American policy in the Middle East, which revolves around encouraging and cultivating democratic regimes throughout the region.
If Syria is a positive example of the wisdom of U.S. policy, once it reaches the stage of implementation, it is liable to be far more problematic in a different part of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy ruled by the ramified royal family of the House of Saud. There are not many countries that are named for the ruling family. The women in the kingdom are effectively denied civil rights, and with the exception of assemblies of the royal family, no governmental institutions possess genuine status and real powers. Clashes are occurring between groups of extreme religious fighters and the security forces in various areas of the desert state, in which both sides often suffer heavy casualties.
Unemployment is rife in Saudi Arabia, and some of the jobless are in any case unqualified for work of any kind. Jobs for university graduates are far from meeting the great demand. True, the steep rise in the price of oil has increased the country's revenues dramatically, but little of that income is earmarked to improve the standard of living of the population as a whole. In recent years, the government of the 5,000 princes that fostered a generation of Islamic fundamentalism has been struggling with its violent streams, and so far has not succeeded in overcoming either the resulting internal threat or its international ramifications. The Saudi administration has become the target of the extremist movements that sprang up inside the country, but apart from the security measures taken to protect the kingdom and preserve the regime, there is neither domestic nor foreign policy aimed at coping with the roots of the distress that engendered the internal and external threats and that continue to nourish them.
Whereas the United States has been able to articulate a clear policy toward some of the countries in the region, including Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, it has found it difficult to formulate a holistic policy toward Saudi Arabia. This is due mainly to the Americans' economic dependence on the vast oil reserves of the Arabian Peninsula. Not long ago a senior official in one of the world's largest oil companies told me that he wakes up every morning fearful that he will turn on his bedside television set and see reports of a coup in Saudi Arabia. One of the great concerns in Washington two years ago, on the eve of the war in Iraq, was that a U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fall of Baghdad would spark the fire of revolution in Riyadh and throughout the kingdom. That was the consideration that prompted the first President Bush to order a cease-fire in the first Gulf War and refrain from having coalition forces occupy an Arab capital.
At present the United States is torn between the immediate need to ensure a safe flow of oil, while maintaining close ties with the existing government in Riyadh, and the fear that every day that passes without genuine reform in Saudi Arabia is not only bringing the fall of the House of Saud closer but is also heightening the danger that the new rulers will take an extremist approach to the "infidel" states of the West. Thousands of citizens from Western countries live in Saudi Arabia, in well-fortified compounds that protect their families. These extreme measures of protection reflect the constantly widening gulf between the local population and the foreign guests.
Few observers of the Middle East scene are actually taking a good hard look at the situation in Saudi Arabia and examining coolly the terrifying scenarios, one of which might ensue. Some believe that there is a real danger that extremist religious figures will seize power in Saudi Arabia and establish an "Al-Qaida state" in Riyadh. Others note that the national identification of large numbers of the country's population with the Saudi entity is feeble and that their main attachment is tribal or local-regional. Thus, a revolutionary situation might cause the disintegration of the state and the creation of parallel regimes in various regions of the kingdom.
In a visit to the United States two weeks ago, I was told by several well-informed observers that should one of the more severe scenarios come to pass, the United States will have no choice but to deepen its presence in the Middle East. To that end, it will have to renew the draft, to ensure that there are enough forces to deal with developing situations in countries like Saudi Arabia.
Superpower in the `neighborhood'
From being a superpower that exerts a potent influence in the Middle East, the United States has become a player that is present in the region. Its pattern of activity in Iraq illustrates not only the determination of President Bush to act consistently to realize his policy in Baghdad. There is a good possibility that Iraq will not be the last country in the region that will require a lengthy American military presence. The U.S. campaign in Iraq was perceived as a signal of long-term American commitment to do whatever is required and to stay in the "neighborhood" for as long as needed. It was none other than Martin Indyk, the former U.S. ambassador to Israel, who not long ago raised the idea of establishing an American trusteeship regime in the areas of the Palestinian Authority, if it should turn out that the Palestinians are not ripe for self-rule. That arrangement would require an American operational military presence along Israel's border with the Palestinian territories.
The shapers of the basic political approach of the Bush administration say that the United States plans "to be in the area" for as long as 10 years and more, if needed. Speaking in a semi-closed forum during a visit to Israel a few months ago, Bill Kristol, one of the most influential "neocons" (neoconservatives) in the United States, noted in this connection that the American presence in Europe after World War II lasted for nearly 60 years. Israelis who are trying to promote a role for NATO in the region, in one form or another, are actually promoting a generation-long American presence.
Two cheers for democracy
The belief of the United States in democracy as the healthiest and most just system of government ever devised - and, as such, appropriate for every corner of the world - led it to undertake a first experiment in democratization in the Middle East in Iraq after its liberation from the yoke of Saddam's dark regime. From Washington's point of view, the experiment succeeded. The guerrilla forces of the Sunni minority, which had ruled the country since the establishment of the new Iraq at the end of World War I, were unable to prevent the process, and millions of Iraqis went to the polls and voted for candidates for the constituent assembly. What happened in practice is that the ethno-religious communities seized control of the democratic process, and the outcome of the elections reflects the numerical balance of forces between them - apart from the Sunni minority, some of whom boycotted the elections, while others did not go to the polls out of fear or out of disgust at a system that formally ended its rule in the country.
Holding similar elections in all the Persian Gulf states would undermine the present governments, because in nearly every case the original local residents have become a minority. Holding full and free elections in Saudi Arabia would bring the country's Shi'ite population into the intra-political process, in a situation in which no one knows how many Shi'ites there are in the country - and, consequently, their possible influence - as no census has been held for many years.
Few of the countries in Israel's part of the world have succeeded in shaping a national identity capable of overcoming the local tribal and religious affiliations. Egypt is the salient example of a country that did succeed, along with Jordan, which under King Hussein and King Abdullah has promoted "Jordanization" in particularly difficult circumstances. Many of Jordan's citizens of Palestinian origin are full integrated into the country and no longer dream of returning to their old homeland across the river. However, in other countries of the region, an attempt at Iraqi-style democratization will place power in the hands of religious-tribal entities, while in others it will topple regimes that identify with the United States and with the West in general.
The international campaign and the struggle of each Muslim state with fundamentalist Islamic terrorism are at their height. It is highly doubtful that dressing Middle Eastern countries in democratic garb, in the circumstances I have described, will help them in their fateful battle against Al-Qaida and similar groups.
It is an irony of fate that the country in which the freest general elections are held - relatively speaking, of course - is the country that is considered, and rightfully so, the most dangerous to regional peace and, to a certain extent, to world peace as well. Iran, which is going nuclear, is not a democracy in the American-Western style - for one thing, the extremist clerics who effectively rule the country strictly vet the candidates for election. Nevertheless, a struggle is under way between the conservative elements, who have the upper hand, and the moderate majority which wants to lead a free life. The international siege of Iran has lately become tighter and international opinion on the subject is, unusually, being led by the unlikely trio of Britain, France and Germany, with the public support of the United States.
From many points of view, this is the most fascinating and significant experiment taking place today, as it is obvious that Iran is trying to extricate itself from this international pressure and is using various modes of deception to conceal the truth and trick those that are negotiating with it over its nuclear program. Iran cannot, ostensibly, allow itself to lose in this struggle, but at the same time the European leaders cannot allow themselves to be duped and be perceived as the village idiots. In any event, the United States will not follow in Europe's wake if it tries to escape to the fringes. Israel, for its part, could not hope for a better combination of players and circumstances in the political campaign that is under way in relation to Iran's nuclear project.
The campaign against that project is taking place in regional conditions that are not convenient for Iran: Its Syrian partner is being led by a leader who is not very smart; Hezbollah, its forward arm in Lebanon, is under Security Council pressure to disarm; and the American military presence to the west in Iraq and to the east in Afghanistan is heightening the danger of regional isolation that Iran has long feared. On the other hand, of course, Iran is benefiting from the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, which forced Tehran to agree to a cease-fire following their eight-year war (1980-1988), which Iraq launched in September 1980. However, the consolation Iran felt at Saddam's fall is fading as it becomes clear to Tehran that the Shi'ite majority that holds power in Baghdad does not intend to defer to it.
In the light of the accumulated weight of all the developments cited above, it is possible that the favorable surprise of the years ahead will be nothing less than the containment of Iran and the neutralization of the danger it poses to Israel - without Israel's having to consider whether to cope alone in the face of what it justly construes as the potential of a genuine existential threat.
Lost on the road map
Another element in the shifting political landscape since the United States liberated Iraq two years ago is the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the still existing confrontation between Israel and parts of the Arab world. The first to identify publicly the connection between the broader regional reality and the Israeli-Arab configuration was Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who disclosed his famous initiative in the spring of 2002 in a conversation he held with Thomas Friedman of The New York Times. The very fact that the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia acted contrary to the regime's traditional reluctance to take the initiative or become involved in the Palestinian conflict, showed that a sea-change had occurred in the Saudi understanding of the connection between our conflict and the broader context. Afterward, in a series of practical moves, the Saudis stepped up their heavy pressure on the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, and were a prime player in forcing Arafat to submit and accept solutions not to his liking both during the first siege of his headquarters in the Muqata and in the siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem.
In the eyes of the Saudi prince, the rise in the level of tension, violence and enmity in our conflict had the effect of significantly strengthening the extremists in his country and throughout the Arab world - hence the sudden pan-Arab burning interest in lowering the height of the flames that Arafat fanned with all his might. Potential new allies appeared for Israel in the Arab world alongside Egypt and Jordan, with which Israel made peace at differing levels of warmth. In that period, Israel worked diligently on an initiative of its own - to rally the United States and the rest of the world behind its concept that a change had to be fomented in the Palestinian leadership and in the structure of the Palestinian Authority so that Israel would have a reliable partner with which to conduct negotiations leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state in temporary borders. In June 2002, less than a year before the war in Iraq, President Bush adopted the concept in its entirety in his famous White House address, as did most of the countries of Europe and Asia, as well as many Arab states in the Middle East.
However, in the period between June 2002 and March 2003, the original intention went awry and various drafts began to appear of what was known as the "road map," which was ostensibly meant to translate the president's policy as enunciated in June 2002 into practical terms. The initiators of the road map sought to amend the president's policy and make it more balanced, because in their view the June 2002 declaration was tilted too far in Israel's favor.
The result was that the road map changed the original policy fundamentally. The terms of the road map were considered so negative from Israel's point of view that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon prohibited discussion of its details with foreign officials for fear it would become a worthy document for negotiating purposes. In practice, Israel said little about the road map. An election campaign was then under way and Israeli officials argued that a transition government was not authorized to make decisions of principle such as those relating to the road map.
The fact is that we fell asleep on our watch: Israel was taken totally by surprise when President Bush decided to adopt the road map as reflecting his policy just one week before he went to war against Saddam Hussein. After the war, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was elected prime minister of the Palestinian Authority and not long afterward Prime Minister Sharon acceded to the firm demand of the United States and adopted the road map. The Israeli cabinet followed suit, but added 14 reservations, which have absolutely no diplomatic or international validity.
I do not know what brought about the shift in the president's policy and afterward in the prime minister's policy. Probably, part of the reason has to do with the fact that a connection at the international level was drawn between our conflict and the broader regional and international conflict. The basic Saudi approach that prompted Prince Abdullah to formulate his initiative bore fruit.
What did Israel commit itself to in the road map? It gave its agreement to a plan that aims to bring about a permanent solution of the conflict and committed itself to a three-year timetable to arrive at that solution. No longer are we talking about a temporary solution, a new leadership for the Palestinian Authority and temporary borders, a long-term interim solution, but, as Phase 3 of the road map stipulates, "Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR [UN Resolutions] 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides (this signifies Israel's acceptance that the Palestinians have a political locus standi in Jerusalem - E.H.), and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and a sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side by side in peace and security."
As I noted, the 14 points Israel appended to its agreement do not have, and never did have, any validity, and in any event the United States, to whom the Israeli document was transmitted, never recognized the 14 points, much less adopted them. The prime minister has of late stopped referring to them, understanding that they are irrelevant.
The disengagement bypass
It was not by chance that Prime Minister Sharon looked for a way to bypass the road map. When he announced the disengagement plan, he emphasized that it was separate from the road map and not a step leading to it. The problem is that when the prime minister met with President Bush, he conducted substantive negotiations with him about some of the elements of the conflict and obtained from him a letter relating to the future of the Jewish settlement blocs within the framework of the final-status settlement and a statement about the solution of the refugee problem. This was the effective start of the negotiations on the permanent solution.
With Bush committing himself to his letter, Israel gave him a unilateral commitment to take steps relating to the immediate dismantlement of outposts that were established since March 2001. That clause also appeared in the road map within the framework of a series of mutual commitments by the two sides. Henceforth this became a separate and unconditional commitment by Israel to the United States and not to the Palestinians, and its implementation is to be immediate.
This particular development illustrates the substantive difference that occurred in Israel's perception of and approach to the resolution of the conflict. It is no longer a case of negotiations between the sides, because "there is no partner" and "Abu Mazen is a disappointment and is not doing his part according to the first phase of the road map."
President Bush is relentlessly promoting the road map, which he views as an important instrument to execute his policy. At first, the process of Israeli-American negotiations seemed to create a convenient starting point for Israel and appeared to give Israel achievements in relation to the U.S. position regarding various aspects of the permanent solution. However, it makes negotiations between the sides superfluous. It makes the United States the exclusive arbiter in all issues of the conflict and in the future will make it impossible for Israel to exert pressure on the Palestinians in relation to subjects on which the Americans adopt the Palestinian position.
The assumption that the United States will always reject Saudi or Egyptian or Palestinian approaches that are not acceptable to Israel requires proof. If there are developments in the region that adversely affect the situation of the United States to the point where it must repay one of the countries of the Arab world, or if the United States is asked to intervene in Saudi Arabia or in the northern system and feels it must prove that it is not facing off frontally against the Arab world, there are clauses in the road map that will make it possible for Washington to accept a particular Arab position without departing from the road map.
The final and binding judgment about the implementation of the road map by the sides rests exclusively with the "Quartet" - the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations - and Israel agreed to let them have the final word. What is emerging is that Israel and the United States have created the framework for an imposed resolution of the conflict, as it will not be the result of negotiations between the sides but of negotiations between each of them and the United States.
President Bush will strive to complete the task before he leaves office at the end of 2008. It is also possible that Israel's veteran leaders will want to strike a final deal while they are still in office, believing that because of their singular past and unique experience they bear historic responsibility to end the conflict as their contribution to the coming generations.
Everything will be decided according to the road map, and the validity of the permanent solution will rest mainly on the preservation of the power and presence of the United States in the region. The imposed permanent settlement will be established in one of the less stable periods in "our neighborhood." Thus the circle that links the general regional situation with our conflict will be closed. The disengagement will be the first link in the chain of shaping Israel's permanent borders. The continuation will be decided in the next three years not only by the balance of forces between Israel and its neighbors, but in large measure by the outcomes of the other campaigns that are taking place around us. This is the configuration within which our destiny will be propelled in the years to come.
Efraim Halevy is the former chief of the Mossad and the National Security advisor to Ariel Sharon.
Haaretz.com, the online edition of Haaretz Newspaper in Israel, offers real-time breaking news, opinions and analysis from Israel and the Middle East. Haaretz.com provides extensive and in-depth coverage of Israel, the Jewish World and the Middle East, including defense, diplomacy, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the peace process, Israeli politics, Jerusalem affairs, international relations, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israeli business world and Jewish life in Israel and the Diaspora.
