There is nothing new about the tension at the senior levels of the Palestinian Authority. The appointment of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as prime minister was imposed on Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, who waged a lengthy battle to retain governmental powers and not transfer them to the prime minister. The consequences of that struggle now have crucial implications for the ability of the Palestinian Authority's government to combat the terrorism of Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
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The division of powers between Arafat and Abbas left the Palestinian prime minister and his minister of internal security, Mohammed Dahlan, with responsibility for only some of the security units, primarily those of the Preventive Security apparatus (the counterpart of the Israeli Shin Bet security service). Arafat succeeded in retaining responsibility for the large apparatus of National Security (the counterpart of army units) and established a National Security Council, which also diminishes the powers of Abbas and Dahlan.
Abbas tried the path of dialogue with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in part because of his fear that he lacks sufficient forces to confront them militarily. In the Gaza Strip, for example, the Palestinian defense establishment includes some 50,000 people on salary (about half of whom bear arms), but only a few hundred of them are part of the Preventive Security apparatus, which is subordinate to Dahlan. The majority of the security forces have effectively remained subordinate to Arafat.
There are various estimates about how many of those who bear arms are members of the terrorist organizations known as the Iz a Din al-Qassam Battalions (the military arm of Hamas) and the Al Quds Brigades (the military arm of Islamic Jihad) in Gaza. The estimates range from a few hundred to about 2,000. Confronting them are the members of the Preventive Security force, which is accountable to Dahlan, in Gaza, and the ordinary policemen, whose ability to deal with terrorist groups is limited. This is not a sufficient force to disarm Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
In order to take on the terrorist groups in Gaza, Abbas and Dahlan need to mobilize all the security apparatuses in Gaza, including those that are subordinate to Arafat and his aides. At the moment, Arafat refuses to transfer to Abbas and Dahlan the command and responsibility for all the security forces.
This state of affairs is of course no secret to the decision-makers in the Israeli government. The situation obliges the government to try to assist the Palestinians who want to fight terrorism - that is, Abbas and his group - achieve their goal. The Israeli reaction to the suicide bombing of the bus this week in Jerusalem therefore needs to take into account the status of the Abbas government.
Actions like the assassination yesterday of Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab in Gaza, which immediately drew announcements from Hamas and Islamic Jihad about the cancellation of the hudna, could make it very difficult for Mahmoud Abbas' government and eliminate the small chance that exists to revive the peace process on the basis of the road map, which both sides have accepted in principle
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