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| Since the Yom Kippur War & the Lillehammer affair, the Mossad has had nothing but failure after failure with the 1990's being the most failure-prone period in its history. Do you think the Mossad will ever be able to carry out successful operations again, or is it in its twilight period? |
Michael Bilu
Ramat Gan, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| It is customary, I know, to attribute to the Mossad a list of failures. If you look at the list, I believe that for 50 years of Mossad existence, it is an astonishingly short list. How many times can you repeat mention of the Lillehammer affair, the Khaled Mashal affair and the odd cases of Mossad operatives being apprehended - and, by the way, ultimately released? Luckily enough, the Mossad's successful operations rarely bear mention and it is my hope that this will continue to be so. I think that Mr. Bilu should be a little more confident when he thinks of the performance of the Israeli intelligence community since its inception. |
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| Mr. Halevy, you wrote a comprehensive and impressive article in Haaretz a few weeks back describing Israel's precarious situation vis-a-vis its Middle Eastern neighbors and its closest ally - the USA. What do you think Israel should do under the circumstances? Is there a way back? |
Michal
Shoeva, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
I think that Michal of Shoeva has indeed focused on one of the problems that we are now facing in Israel's relations with its neighbors and with the United States. As already stated this evening, I believe that Israel should make every effort to revert to direct negotiations with its neighbors inside the region. I do not think that what has been done must be undone. A decision to go ahead with disengagement has been taken and there should not be any way back. The ultimate wisdom of the decision taken will become a subject for historians to analyze and discuss, and there is no merit in endlessly discussing what should have been done and what was not done.
I believe that the only real chance of relative peace in the region lies in both sides making very painful concessions. If only one side makes the concession and the other sides restricts himself to being a recipient of such concessions, then the process is doomed to failure and I do not believe that an imposed solution will last because each party to such a solution will seek very possible way to release itself from the clutches of the imposed solution. |
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| How do you see the disengagement and the formation of a Palestinian state in Gaza being any different from our retreat from Lebanon where the Hezbollah has control of the border and has us at their mercy with the threat of firing thousands of Ketyushas at their leisure? As a security official do you believe it is at all possible to defend the State of Israel and securing its citizens by giving a state to a nation which today shoots Qassam rockets on Sderot and openly admits that when the IDF leaves and when they have freedom to run around and do more they will only continue to harm us and our citizens?? |
Noam Federman
Hebron, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| Knowing the views of Mr. Federman, I assume that the questions he asks are those to which he himself has already given answers. From his questions, I deduce that he think it is not possible to defend the state of Israel by giving the Palestinians the opportunity of creating a state of their own. If we assume, for argument's sake, that a state should not be given to the Palestinians, then we must come up with a viable alternative for the millions of Palestinians living inside the territories. If we believe that they should not "have freedom to run around" then we must contemplate the possibility of having to maintain very large forces within the territories to police and subdue the population. It is true, as Mr. Federman states, that after we left Lebanese soil, the Hezbollah paramilitary force is maintaining a form of mutual deterrence with Israel. This is highly undesirable, to say the least. But he who says that this is an intolerable situation must also ask himself why it is that the Hezbollah is not taking advantage and is not firing Katyusha and other rockets into Israel. Maybe there is more here than meets the eye. And possibly the current situation highlights the limits of Hezbollah power and capabilities rather than its false claim of freedom of action. |
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| The current situation with Iran seems to be a controlled chaos. A nuclear Iran is not in the best interests of the United States, and of course Israel. I don't expect for you to devulge future missions, but how can Israel uproot these evil-minded mullahs, win the support of the population, and get rid of the nuclear question? |
Charlie Gelber
Portland, Oregon, USA |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
I do not believe that it is in the power of Israel or in its interests to determine the composition of the regime of any country in the region, including that of Iran. It is the Iranians and the Iranians alone who must determine the nature of their government and I am of the opinion that ultimately Iran will not remain a theocratic state run by extreme religious leaders.
When it comes to the issue of Iran's insistence on developing nuclear capabilities of a military nature, Israel is in the fortunate position of observing the cooperation of key powers and countries around the world in a joint effort to prevent the Iranians from obtaining nuclear security options. These efforts are still underway and have not reached their conclusion, but it would be wrong to conclude in advance that the effort is futile. If it is does prove futile, then it will be for the nations of the world to determine how to proceed. |
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| Assuming Hamas takes over the Gaza Strip and Israel disengages from the area, how can Israel respond to what will be celebrated as an Arab victory? |
Steven Stein
Toronto, Canada |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| If Israel supports the policy of democratization in the Arab world, then it must accept the results of freely held elections in the Palestinian territories. Democratic elections do not entail a guarantee of victory by one particular party and therefore one must assume that there is a possibility that Hamas will play a role in the political life of the Palestinian Authority and Israel will be powerless to prevent this from happening. Hams today represents between 30 and 40 percent of the Palestinian population. These 30 to 40 percent are much more cohesive than the "silent" 60 percent of Fatah and its associates. Therefore, realistically, we must envisage a situation in which Hamas will be sitting at negotiating tables and will continue to be a political force in Palestinian society. There is no point in Israel having to discuss what response it will fashion to what will be celebrated as "an Arab victory." Israel is one of the most powerful nations in the Middle East, powerful in terms of its defense and military capabilities, powerful in terms of its economic and social successes, powerful in terms of its international networking with the economies of the world, and powerful in terms of the degree of internal national solidarity despite the many divisions that characterize Israel's society. Rather than cringe in the face of "an Arab victory" Israel must exhibit its superior capacity to move resolutely towards a reconciliation with the peoples of the region out of a position of inner conviction and strength. |
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| Dear Mr. Halevy, I read with much interest your essay on the "Pax Americana" to come. In particular, I found very challenging your statement about the American intention of having a stable presence in the Middle East for "at least ten years." However, I wonder how such thing may be possible without generating a definite rupture between the U.S. and the Arab world, and would too demanding on American resources. On the other hand, a stable presence may be the only successful strategy for the war on terror. Could you explain how do you suggest the White House may find a balance between these issues? |
Anna Momigliano
Milan, Italy |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| I believe that for the U.S. to be able to reap the benefits of its very bold policies in the Middle East, it will be necessary for successive presidents to maintain a formidable military presence in the region for quite some time to come. The U.S. has set in motion a sea change in the entire region and we are only witnessing the preliminary phases of this change. The forces of democracy and of freedom in the region are not yet strong enough to take over leadership. And in order for them to succeed, it will be vital for the U.S. to make it clear to everybody that American forces will not leave before the mission has been accomplished. I am not sure that this realization has gained ground either in the U.S. or in the region; rather, I believe, there is still a false hope that within a relatively short time "the boys can come home" and peace and prosperity would be enjoyed forever after in the Middle East. It is therefore imperative that the stakes and the policies and the intentions on these key issues be made crystal clear. I am confident that this will indeed come about before very long. I believe that this can be done without causing a rupture between the U.S. and the Arab world and I think there will be many in the Arab world who will come to appreciate the enormous contribution that the U.S. is making to the future of the societies of the Middle East. But for all this to happen, the U.S. must stay the course. |
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| Mr. Halevy, You have worked for so many years and through a number of crisis on the promotion of a solid bilateral relation between Israel and Jordan. In your opinion, what is the cause of the current state of distrust between Jordan and Israel? How can this situation be rectified? |
Ashraf
Amman, Jordan |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
I believe that Mr. Ashraf apparently knows more than I do the current state of Israel's relations with Jordan. I believe that the relations between the states are not only good but also extremely mutually beneficial. What is lacking - and this is a serious deficiency - is the absence of popular support in Jordan for peace with Israel. I think that this is a result of misconceptions in Jordan concerning the role and interests of Israel in the region and concerning Israel's policies towards the Palestinians.
I would strongly urge Mr. Ashraf to encourage his fellow Jordanians to promote cross the boards cooperation between the peoples of Israel and Jordan and should this come about both sides would be the beneficiaries. |
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Has the intelligence community in Israel ever come to the conclusion that it is important to Israel's long term security to give the Palestinians their total freedom and a state of their own?
Does the intelligence community foresee the occupation as a viable long term plus for Israel's security? |
Dave Berg
Santa Margarita, USA |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
It is not the job of the intelligence community of Israel to determine if the Palestinians should be given total freedom and a state of their own. These are questions which have to be addressed by the population as a whole and the leadership of the country. What the intelligence community can and should say is that anything less than statehood will not propel the Palestinians into acceptance of the legitimacy of the State of Israel. It is a mistake to view the control of Israel of much Palestinian territory as an ?occupation.? At the war of Independence in 1948, Israel had temporary armistice lines beyond which Jordan ruled the West Bank and Egypt ruled the Gaza Strip. For 19 years, the areas to which the Palestinian Authority lays claim were in the hands of Arab brethren and it was they who decided for reasons of their own not to grant the Palestinians independence in the territories they controlled.
In 1967, Egypt, Jordan and Syria supported by Iraq and others, were involved in a war against Israel. And as a result of this war the territories formerly controlled by Jordan and by Egypt fell into the possession of Israel. It was only after the Palestinians changed, or appeared to change, their policies towards Israel that negotiations could begin between Israel and the Palestinians over the territory which the Palestinians had never had never had any type of sovereignty or control in the past. Israel ultimately granted the Palestinians territory, which neither Jordan nor Egypt had granted them in the past and was anxious to negotiate with the Palestinians and to seek a reconciliation with them, which would entail ceding much additional territory. |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| The question put by Mr. Berg appears to me to be wrongly formulated. The question is not whether occupation is a viable long term plus for Israel's security, rather the question is do the Palestinians have both the capacity and the will to create an independent state and are they capable of assuring that the state will act within the norms of accepted international conduct? No state is entitled to launch terrorist activities against another state under international law and under the norms of international law, and it is up to the Palestinians to prove that they have the will and the capacity to act as a responsible state. |
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| If the "intifada" reignites again (as many commentators seem to think), how well prepared is the IDF to deal with a new wave of attacks, that will probably be more sophisticated and more frequent than what has come before (witness Iraq where large-scale attacks happen just about every other day)? |
Art
Sydney, Australia |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| It is entirely possible that if the peace process falters and Palestinian attacks against Israel are renewed, they will be more sophisticated and more deadly. I have no doubt that the IDF is prepared for any and every possible contingency in this regard. However, one should not deduce from what I have said that in order to prevent a new wave of Arab violence, any and every possible concession must be made to placate the Palestinians. It is my view that there will not be a viable reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians until there is a mutual recognition of each side related to the basic rights and basic narratives of the other side. Thus, just as Israel is called upon to accept the right of the Palestinians to exist as a national entity, so is it incumbent upon the Palestinians to subscribe to the legitimacy of Zionism. These are tall orders and it would be very difficult to obtain them. But without such a mutual acceptance and recognition any agreement between the Palestinians and Israel will be of a temporary nature. |
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| Do you think the Palestinian Authority will ever become a true democratic state? |
Zack Stavsky
Jerusalem, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| The Palestinian Authority has shown a measure of endurance, which is quite exceptional. It has held democratic elections, and the results have been quite impressive as compared to some of the longer-standing Arab states in the region. I think the Palestinians have a chance of fashioning a truly democractic state and it is only they who can determine whether this will happen or not. |
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Dear Mr. Halevy,
Following your article in Haaretz several weeks ago, what should be done to prevent a collision course between Israeli-USA strategic relations in the future? I say this in light of accusations of Israeli arms sales to China, the arrest of Larry Franklin, and the "Day after the Gaza Withdrawal." |
Daniel Shahrabani
New York, U.S.A. |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| I do not believe that there is a real danger that Israel and the United States will collide in midstream, so to speak, on basic strategic issues related to international security. There could be differences of opinion and different shades of approach but Israel and the United Sates share not only common values but also common goals in the international arena. I do believe that when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, there might come a time when the U.S. will refrain from accepting every position Israel is taking. And similar to the way it has expressed itself to the delight of the current Israeli leadership on some issues, it could express itself similarly on other issues to the delight of the Palestinian leadership. It would be very difficult for Israel to accept the support of the U.S. when it suits it and to confront the U.S. when it's positions are not to Israel's liking. It is my view that the main channel of negotiation must be between Israel and its immediate adversaries and that at least in the initial stages, the U.S. should not be called upon to take positions on substantive matters. I would like to recall that the three negotiating rounds that ended in partial or full agreement between Israel and its negotiating partners were rounds that were held in secret with only the two parties present. This goes for the Egyptian treaty, the Jordanian treaty and the Oslo agreement. This is not to say that the U.S. does not have a key role in cementing viable agreements once a major breakthrough has been affected between the sides. But to resort to a method whereby the U.S. pronounces its views before serious negotiations between the parties has taken place, opens up options that not only Israel might seek to benefit from. |
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Dear Sir,
What do you think of Iran's reaction to Israel's [opposition] to its nuclear facilities? How do you get information about Iran's nuclear activity? |
Reza Homam
Baghdad, Iraq |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
I have great respect for a person who sends us a question from Baghdad, Iraq. I would like to respond to Madam Reza Homam. Iran is very close to Iraq and the memories of the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran 1980-1988 are still very vivid both in Baghdad and in Tehran. Therefore, sensitivity in Baghdad to Iran's nuclear ambitions is more than just understood. Iran, unfortunately, has as its declared policy, that the State of Israel has no right to exist. Given Iran's continued efforts to obtain capabilities in the field of nuclear weaponry and delivery systems tailored to them, Israel has to maintain a very clear vigil in monitoring Iran's activities and intentions.
I do not think it's appropriate to enter into any discussion related to methods employed to obtain information in Iran, but I would like to draw attention to a statement made a few days ago by the director of Military Intelligence, General Ze'evi-Farkash, to the effect that the possibility that Israel would be surprised by Iran is very low. I believe that this is a sufficient statement and without doubt a very credible one. |
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Shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein you were interviewed on one of the major international news networks (BBC or CNN I believe) stating that you had "not a shadow of a doubt" that weapons of mass destruction would be found in Iraq. They have not.
Did we have bad intelligence or can you offer another explanation? |
David
Jerusalem, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
You might be surprised if I say that not withstanding the fact that weapons of mass destruction have not yet been found in Iraq, I would not rule out the possibility that they might be found in the future. Iraq is a vast country, and only several months ago, a full squadron of aircraft was discovered buried in the sand.
I do not believe that Saddam Hussein risked the fall of his regime and his own capture just out of false pride. He doggedly and continuously refused to cooperate with the United Nations missions which tried time and time again to set up a credible monitoring system in Iraq after 1998.
I know this reply goes against some of the very definitive statements that have come out of Washington in recent months, following the findings of the Senate select committee on the Iraqi campaign and I know that there have been others who have searched Iraq high and low and who have not come up with anything in their hands. Yet all I can do is commend to you the findings of the British commission set up under the leadership of Lord Butler. Butler concluded in his report that he could not state definitively that weapons of mass destruction would never be found in Iraq. |
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Is the disengagement plan a wise decision in your opinion? What implications will it have on the situation in terms of security? Do you think there should be a 'disengagement - part two'?
With how many Arab countries do you think Israel establish new diplomatic ties in the coming five years? Which countries are most probable to follow after Egypt, Jordan and Mauritania? Thank you. |
Rai de la Nano
Berlin, Germany |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| It is immaterial to discuss whether the disengagement plan is a wise decision or not at this particular stage of the game. This question should be left to historians. It is clear that barring the unforeseen circumstances disengagement will go ahead and if the Palestinian side will decide to encourage Israel to taking further steps by improving security after disengagement then probably disengagement will have a positive effect on the situation in Israel. Turning to the future, I believe there should not be a second disengagement; it is my view that we should revert to negotiations with our Arab partners and any future ceding of territory should be the result of agreements wherein the Palestinians and the Arab countries take their own painful decisions and table their own concessions in return for Israel's steps. |
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Mr. Halevy, one goal of disengagement is to transform the conflict with the Palestinians from one of "resistance" and "national liberation" into something more like a classical inter-state conflict.
Successful disengagement would clearly recast the Palestinians as the aggressors, should terrorism continue. How rapidly do you see this process unfolding? What will be the consequences of handing over the Philadelphi corridor to Egypt? |
Oliver
Montreal, Canada |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| The issue of disengagement is now on the front burner, both of Israel and the Palestinians. Much will depend on the resolve of the Palestinian leadership to establish a credible system of government including law enforcement. The quicker the Palestinians get their act together, the better will the process of disengagement be smooth and successful and the better the chances that the Palestinians themselves will act to prevent use of the Philadelphi corridor as a route for smuggling weaponry into the Gaza Strip. It is obvious that if Israel hands over the Philadelphi corridor to Egypt. It will be taking a risk because it will be placing the responsibility for prevention of arms smuggling entirely into Egyptian hands. Will Egypt have the resolve to take every necessary action to prevent arms smuggling? It is too early to tell, but every negotiation and every agreement entails risk-taking. There is no such thing as comprehensive insurance in matters like these. |
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Why did the Mossad give such little importance to finding the MIAs from Sultan Yakub in the 1982 "Peace for Galilee" Operation?
To this day the Israeli Government claims they don't know where the MIAs are. Is this a cover up for past inaction? |
Yona Baumel
Jerusalem, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
| Out of respect to Mr. Baumel, who has posed the question and who is a father of one of the three MIAs from Sultan Yakub, I think it is not appropriate for me to avoid answering the question although I believe that a serious discussion of this very painful and very poignant subject would best be served if it were discussed away from the glare of the media. It is incorrect to state that the Mossad paid little importance to finding the MIAs; the opposite is the case. I believe that from the purely intelligence point of view, the status of the MIAs is unfortunately all too clear and somber. When it comes to their precise location, for reasons that Israel has unfortunately experienced over many years, Arab governments and Arab movements treat anything related to the MIAs and bodies of fallen soldiers as chips in negotiations. Apparently, those who are in possession of these specific MIAs do not believe that the time has come for them to negotiate the resolution of this problem. |
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| If, in a post-withdrawal framework, international forces sit in Gaza and parts of the West Bank, how will Israel guarantee its right to self-defense? |
Aaron Liebman
Jerusalem, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
The question contains a basic misunderstanding concerning the role and authority of third party presence along borders or temporary cease fire or
armistice lines.
They can only be deployed with the approval of both parties and their role is to assure that both sides respect the cessation of hostilities.
If the Palestinians will try to exploit the international presence as a shield, behind which it will sanction or permit the launching of attacks against Israel, there will be no option left to Israel but to initiate the departure of the international force.
Once such a request/demand is made by the Israel Government, the international force will have to comply. This threat in itself should serve to encourage the Palestinians to make every possible effort to avert such a contingency because once the international presence is gone, due to its cynical exploitation by them, Israel will feel free to act as it deems fit to safeguard its security. |
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Being a law student, I am 1000 percent of the view that the State of Israel has a legitimate right to exist. Yet, it has never expressed a willingness to establish friendly ties with Pakistan.
On the other hand, our government should also do something in this regard. I, being an ordinary citizen, hope that the majority of people of both countries should force our respective governments to show some excellence in this regard. What are the things going in Israel? |
Shahbaz Haider
Lahore, Pakistan |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
I am much encouraged by your sentiment of establishing ties between Israel and Pakistan.
I suggest, Shahbaz Haider, that you take this up
with your government and I will encourage mine. |
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When will the Israeli government put a stop to the brain-washing of its citizens about the Palestinians and terror?
Everyone knows that if there were two states next to each other living in peace then all the attacks would stop. If the Israeli community looks deeply at the Palestinian attacks they will find out that anyone living under occupation and bad conditions would do the same.
I am not with the attacks on the civilians of both sides, but I will support the attack on the IDF soldiers since they are occupying our land. Will the Israeli people ever have chance to know? Thank you. |
Kosay
Cairo, Egypt |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
I welcome the comment of Kosay from Egypt although I differ from him in appraising the situation.
Israel is a free democracy, it has a free press and a very vocal media; out of a 120-member chamber of Parliament, over ten parliamentarians are Israeli Arabs, and they are the most active of
all members of parliament. They speak excellent Hebrew and their views and comments are disseminated widely both inside Israel and in the entire region.
It is simply technically impossible for the Israeli Government to brainwash the population on any issue whatsoever, including that of Terror.
Time and time again, Israel has stretched out its hand to the Palestinians and invited them to negotiate in all seriousness on condition, of course, that the use of violence on both sides be renounced. The Israeli civilian population has suffered from the waves of suicide bombers who have been sent by those who oppose any reconciliation between the parties.
If, Kosay, you support attacks of Palestinians against Israelis, you cannot object if the Israelis fight back; but there is a different possibility - to sit down quietly with Israel in a quiet atmosphere and try and sort things out.
Why not give it a try - Kosay? |
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What do you think about Israel's hard-line approach to any peace proposal and its sole dependence on the United States. Is that not dangerous - to base the existence of Israel on one pillar?
After all, the United States may one day fall out of (super)power status, and/or change its foreign policy. |
Beate Zilversmidt
Holon, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
The United States is a strong and vital ally of Israel, the single most important ally that we have.
If you read my article in the Passover edition of the Haaretz magazine, you will find a detailed expose of my view that Israel should negotiate the terms of its accomodation with the
Palestinians, first and foremost with their leadership rather than engage the United States in negotiating with Israel on the detailed substance of the permanent solution. |
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Since you are originally from the U.K., why do you think that the Prime Minister is so opposed to British Gas selling their offshore Gaza gas to Israel?
Over the last 6 months since Arafat's death and the disengagement plan I would have thought that progress would have been possible, but last week Putin and Sharon discussed at length Russia becoming Israel's third gas supplier. Thank you. |
Gina Cohen
Herzliya, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
The question of determining Israel's supplier of natural gas is a complex one. In my view, there is much merit in linking the decisions to be
taken to Israel's strategic and regional interests.
Thus, in my view, the creation of a strategic link between Israel and Egypt on gas supplies serves a basic interest of Israel, to engage Egypt in a big way on the economic front in order to forge a strong common bond between the two countries on tangible economic matters.
Likewise, there is an aspect of Israel-Russian
relations in the field of energy that requires close examination. The Palestinian Authority is still a fledgling creation and it still has to
prove itself as a credible long -term economic partner . The time has not yet come when Israel can feel safe to "mortgage" part of its energy
interests into Palestinian hands. |
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| Can Israel trust Abu Mazen [Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas]? |
Paul Halpern
Tel Mond, Israel |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
The question of whether Israel can trust Abu Mazen is a complex one.
Abu Mazen has never been nor will he ever be a staunch member of the Zionist Movement. He will be a very tough negotiator on behalf of his
people, and he will try to drive very hard bargains as far as Israel is concerned.
He will do his very best to honor agreements that he will make, and he will try to reduce violence initiated by the Palestinians, because he
believes that perpetrating violence contradicts Palestinian interests.
Making agreements with him will be risky, because Abu Mazen cannot guarantee one hundred per cent implementation on his part; neither can
Israel at this given moment. |
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Given that Abbas is allowing Hamas to act as a political party, run in elections, and gain political power without disarming, what does Abbas have left to offer Hamas as an incentive to disarm?
If he has no incentives to offer, will he use force, or will the Hamas remain armed? |
Giusseppe Ben-Attar
Rome, Italy |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
Mahmoud Abbas is offering Hamas a role in the political system of the Palestinian Authority if the movement stays its fire; if the cease-fire
will stick for a considerable length of time, he will move to "domesticate" the Hamas movement and to get it to lay down its arms for all practical purposes.
I do not believe that Abbas will forcefully disarm the Hamas; but, there is a chance that Hamas will opt for a political role inside
the Palestinian national movement rather than risk being ostracised.
It is necessary to recall that in the recent municipal elections, the Hamas registered dramatic gains at the polling booth. Abbas cannot
realistically confront more than a third of the body politic and coerce it into submission . This will simply not work, and Abbas will not risk a "fitna," an internal civil war. |
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| Why and how did you get into the Mossad? |
Parviz Kahen
Los Angeles, Cal., U.S.A. |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
I was recruited into the Mossad because two Mossad officers who knew me or of me, thought that I was a suitable candidate.
I was tested and screened and found a worthy candidate; I entered at a relatively low level
and over the years rose in the ranks.
In reply to this question and the question [regarding new immigrants], I was not a native-born Israeli. |
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| In an interview with Haaretz following your resignation as director of the National Security Council, you said you had deep misgivings about the road map, calling it dangerous for Israel. Do you still have these misgivings, or have the regional changes that have taken place since then also changed your position? |
Zal Tager
Albany, Cal., U.S.A. |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
The events in the region have not mitigated my concerns over the "Roadmap" which is no less than a detailed plan designed to lead to an
imposed solution of the Israel- Palestinian conflict.
I have detailed my reservations in my article published in the Passover magazine edition of
Haaretz; in my view, regional developements have made the implementation of the roadmap a closer reality than before. |
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I am curious to know what qualities the Mossad values the most in its recruits. Aside from superior knowledge of languages and intellectual and social acumen, what intangibles define a successful agent? Are all agents native-born Israelis, or do olim hadashim [new immigrants] also make the cut on occasion?
(A similar question was asked by Izel from New York) |
Yuri Kruman
New York, USA |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
In my understanding, a Mossad officer must be first and foremost a "mentch"; a person whose credibility is second to none, a person whose
devotion to his country and nation is exemplary , a courageous individual who alongside being a man or woman of conviction, is also one who values
compassion and acts accordingly. |
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| First of all, I'd like to say that I've always admired the Mossad for its efficiency even though the last few years have not been good for the organization's reputation. My question is as follows: Is it true that the Mossad warned the United States about the possibility of September 11th attacks several times, including as late as the beginning of September 2001? |
Martin Blecher
Stockholm, Sweden |
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| Efraim Halevy: |
Normally I would not respond to a question that relates to on-going dialogues with foreign services, because this might compromise extremely
delicate and valuable links and areas of cooperation.
However in this particular instance, given the gravity of the issue and the incessant rumors that have been circulated on this subject, I think it only fair and fit to state very simply that there is no truth to the assertion contained in the question. |
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