Why can?t we learn the truth that as long as Iran?s nuclear enrichment is under NPT inspection, and enrichment of Uranium is less than 4%, we can?t tell the difference between a peaceful atomic energy program and one that could, in the future, be converted to bomb production (requiring enrichment to over 80% and throwing out the IAEA inspectors)?
Most experts believe that harsher sanctions against Iran will not change their unified national commitment to Uranium enrichment, and that bombing of Iran?s nuclear facilities would only temporarily interrupt their nuclear program and cause enormous and disastrous counter-reaction.
On the other hand, if we negotiate enhanced and intrusive inspections (Additional protocol +) in return for internationally controlled enrichment, Israel and the US would have far more security and information than it does now. Iran has already indicated it is interested in this type of solution, so we might make far more rapid progress than if we pursue the hopeless insistence on zero enrichment. |
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