Last update - 00:00 15/02/2008
Don't break out the champagne just yet
By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff
"It would be irresponsible to mention names, targets, hit methods. The situation becomes dangerous when people with military experience start naming names. The targets will simply disappear on us." When Defense Minister Ehud Barak issued that warning on Tuesday morning, on his way to an official visit to Turkey, he seemed to be talking about Hamas. After all, Sunday's cabinet meeting had become a platform for operational proposals, including the systematic liquidation of the Hamas leadership. On Wednesday, after the assassination of Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Imad Mughniyah, his comments suddenly took on a completely different meaning. Barak, like the Prime Minister's Bureau, promised to check out that mysterious incident before issuing a response - a response that, naturally, is yet to be delivered.
These days it is almost impossible to ask Barak a question without being subjected to a harangue on the need to maintain field security, on disappearing targets, on the soldiers who could be hurt and on the foreign leaders who would be offended if the content of their talks with Israel were published.
It was actually Mughniyah who displayed an uncharacteristic lack of caution: He deviated from his strict operational behavior and was exposed and killed by an explosion that ripped through his Mitsubishi jeep in Damascus. The next morning, the reporters who accompanied Barak to Ankara began feverishly comparing schedules. Is it possible, they wondered, that the note they had seen Barak's military secretary, Brigadier General Eitan Dangot, hand his boss shortly before midnight contained something important? Even before the story broke in Damascus, Dangot took the step of displaying the note, which dealt with far more prosaic matters.
Assuming that the assassination was Israel's doing, it can also be assumed that Barak was kept in the loop about it. Despite the political friction between them, Olmert and Barak work well together in the security sphere. One thing is certain: Barak's tight schedule did not leave him time to sneak out of the hotel, put on a blond wig and travel secretly to Damascus, in a reprise of the famous "Aviv Neurim" operation in Beirut 35 years ago.
Mughniyah was a focal point for the Israeli intelligence community for at least 16 years, since the first terror attack in Argentina, in March 1992. For years, it could not even obtain a current photo of the man. All the Israelis had was an image dating back to the 1985 TWA hijacking in Beirut, showing Mughniyah in half profile and threatening the pilot with a pistol.
In 2000, shortly after the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, Mughniyah could not resist traveling south from the town of Jibsheet to survey the outposts abandoned by Israel. He was captured by intelligence cameras. Maybe the operational plans to take him out were incomplete at the time, maybe someone at the top (Prime Minister Barak?) hesitated for fear that an assassination would heat up the border again. In any event, the opportunity was missed.
Mughniyah became more cautious, but his name remained on the liquidation shortlist. During the Second Lebanon War Israel searched intensively, but fruitlessly, for both Mughniyah and for Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.
Intelligence experts said yesterday that an operation like Mughniyah's assassination takes six months to prepare. It would entail locating the safe house in which he probably stayed during his weekly visits to Damascus and identifying his car, as well as infiltrating agents to follow him and perhaps employing high-tech tracking devices. But in the end, someone at the highest levels must make a fast decision.
The assassination of Nasrallah predecessor Abbas Mussawi in 1992 is taught in intelligence training as an example of an ill-considered decision made in the hope of an operational achievement. Mughniyah, in contrast, was on Israel's shortlist of individuals who are to be eliminated if and when the opportunity arises, even at the risk of paying a price in the future. It not only sent a message, it also knocked out some of Hezbollah's ability to execute future attacks. The liquidation of Nasrallah, as the organization's political leader, would require more consideration (although it is hard to imagine Israel restraining itself).
The Hezbollah leadership, known as the Shura Council, was last elected in August 2004. It consists of seven Lebanese Shi'ites, including Nasrallah and his deputy, Naim Qassam, and two Iranian representatives. Mughniyah was the only one of the nine who was not a cleric. In recent years he acquired the title of deputy secretary general for military and security affairs, and was subordinate only to Nasrallah. His description as "Hezbollah chief of staff" in some reports is probably inaccurate. The organization's commander on the ground is Ibrahim Akil; the film taken by an unmanned aerial vehicle in February 2000, documenting his evasion of an Israeli assassination attempt, surpasses any Hollywood scene.
The brains
Mughniyah was also the brains behind extraordinary terror attacks throughout the world, as well as being Nasrallah's chief security adviser. One of his first assignments in Hezbollah was as head of personal security for the organization's spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah.
The high point of Mughniyah's terrorist career is probably his creation of an international Hezbollah terror network, which in certain regions rivals the capabilities of organizations identified with Al-Qaida. Some Military Intelligence officers suspect that Hezbollah also implemented this know-how in the service of its allies. The reports of the inquiry commissions into the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri - the third anniversary of which was marked in Beirut yesterday in a mass rally - describe a global mission, which almost certainly could not have been implemented without crucial input from Mughniyah.
In recent years, Nasrallah has sought to rebrand Hezbollah as a Lebanese political body, and Mughniyah's image interfered with this. Hezbollah representatives even explained to experts from a U.S. research institute who visited Lebanon after the war with Israel that Mughniyah was not involved in the fighting and was not part of Hezbollah.
Ironically, it was Mughniyah's death that restored him to the movement's fold. For several hours on Wednesday, the Hezbollah television station Al-Manar broadcast Koranic verses chanted against a background of quiet music, and an official announcement calling Mughniyah a shahid (martyr) was read repeatedly.
On Israeli TV stations the atmosphere after the assassination was somewhat festive. One can only hope that the descriptions of champagne bottles being opened at Mossad headquarters were only media hype. Whoever was behind the assassination has every right to mark the achievement in secret.
Even if the operation sounds like something out of a James Bond movie, its ramifications are likely to be very serious. The year and a half of quiet on the Hezbollah front, about which Olmert boasted at last month's Herzliya Conference, is probably over, although Israeli intelligence officials believe the target will be far from the northern border. Hezbollah is not Syria, which has shown restraint since last September's air force strike. Most indications are that Hezbollah will try to respond relatively quickly, with a terror attack designed to make a big impression.
The dramatic news from Damascus made everyone forget the events in Sderot for a day or two. But the Gaza problem is still on the government's agenda. After Mughniyah, escalation could come on both fronts concurrently. The Gaza challenge is immeasurably more complicated, one that cannot be solved by obliterating a jeep.
Israel is approaching a large-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip, whether in another month or in three. To some degree the leadership faces a situation there similar to the one on the Lebanon front on August 9, 2006. The intention to launch an extensive operation is there, but its implementation depends on developments and on a decision by the prime minister and the defense minister. Like Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who on Wednesday toured the Gaza border with 60 foreign ambassadors, this week both Olmert and Barak worked to create an international front, in Germany and in Turkey, respectively.
Olmert, Livni and Barak are under no illusions. Europe will not issue emotional declarations of support when IDF soldiers enter the alleys of Gaza. But a detailed survey of the considerations and constraints - prior to any operation - might help others understand the trap that Israel faces, and which could lead to a major operation.
As matters stand today, the IDF is heading toward Gaza. What is not known is whether it arrive before, after or during the escalation on another front, against Hezbollah.