Last update - 00:00 16/08/2007
Enthralled by alchemy
By Israel Harel
When Ehud Barak reached a decision-making level in the army and eventually in the government, he was enthralled - as were others who came out of the ground forces - by the charms of technological solutions. These, and not traditional offensive and deterrent warfare, are supposed to solve Israel's security problems.
Barak took part in the decision to develop the Nautilus, based on laser technology, as a weapon against Katyushas fired by Palestinians, and after a while by Hezbollah from Lebanon. The Americans, who for a number of years collaborated with Israel in developing this response, concluded that it is expensive even for the American treasury and (perhaps) mainly, that it cannot provide an appropriate response to a number of rockets fired simultaneously.
Anti-ballistic missiles like the Arrow, launched after offensive missiles have been identified as having been fired from thousands of kilometers away - from Iran, for example - and interceptor missiles have enough time to hone in on offensive missiles.
In contrast, when short-range missiles are fired simultaneously (let us assume from the area of Rantis in western Samaria, eight kilometers from Ben-Gurion Airport), a few missiles will always break through the most sophisticated defense system. These would be enough to paralyze Israel's only international airport, with all the strategic significance of such paralysis.
The response to short-range missiles, as Lebanon should have taught, is preventive action by ground forces: an invasion of those missile-saturated areas, destroying them, and maintaining a presence in the area to prevent missile launches. Despite these lessons, the defense minister announced last week - as usual with great assurance - that "three to five years will pass before we develop the response to the missiles that are threatening the population centers." Therefore, in his opinion, "until that time there should be no talk of leaving the territories." That is, after we create "the response" we will leave the territories.
If Israel had had anti-Katyusha missiles during the Second Lebanon War, and could have intercepted 3,000 of the 4,000 missiles that were fired at northern Israel, would the strategic outcome have been different? Hundreds of thousands of civilians would have left the North even though only a quarter of all the Katyushas had fallen on them. The economic damage due to factory closures would have been no different, while the outlay by the military on research, development and production of thousands of short-range interceptors - which as noted would not provide a suitable strategic response - would have been huge.
Moreover, the Israel Air Force fired hundreds of rockets - much more advanced than short-range interceptors at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars each - against Katyushas and other Hezbollah weapons. But had those rockets been effective, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert would not have been forced to appoint the Winograd Committee.
Criticism of Barak's statement focused on the political aspect (until the completion of the "response" we must not withdraw from the territories; that is, from the missile launch areas). No one criticized the concept proven wrong in both Lebanon and Gaza that where there is technology there is no need for strategic depth and fielding ground troops.
Unfortunately, instead of leading the nation's mood, Barak and many other high-level political and military leaders are following the mood of that part of the population that is tired of the struggle for its existence and has put its faith in technological or political alchemy.