Last update - 00:00 31/01/2007
Vietnam and Iraq: apples and oranges
By Michalis Firillas
For most Americans the debacle in Iraq is a reminder of the dark days in Vietnam, more than a generation ago. In and of itself that is sufficient excuse for pressing their government to pack up and leave Iraq, the sooner the better. "Let it bleed, so long as we are not doing the bleeding," is the basic thinking. Notwithstanding the many similarities, Iraq and Vietnam are not the same. As the cliche goes: they are both fruit, but when you mix them together, you get fruit salad.
Both Vietnam and Iraq were wars the United States marched to on a false pretext: the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964 held as much water as Iraq's WMD farce. Both Vietnam and Iraq were ideologically motivated: In the former, the domino theory of Communist expansion motivated American involvement; in the latter, the Bush administration got caught up in its own "democratizing" dominoes. American soldiers lose their lives daily in Iraq, as they did in Vietnam, and in both cases the mayhem is broadcast back home in technicolor. The surge is also reminiscent of Westmorland asking LBJ for more and more troops. Just like in Vietnam, most people - not only Americans - are insufficiently informed about Iraq, and not for lack of information. In fact, there are so many sound bytes coming out of Iraq, that the conclusion for the average person is that the U.S. must pull out immediately.
However, unlike Vietnam, which was a continuation of a struggle for national liberation already underway since the end of World War II, the chaos in Iraq is not motivated by "resistance" to American occupation. This is an oft repeated claim by those who recognize that the U.S. presence in Iraq is the only obstacle to their predominance in the country, groups like the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr. Unlike Vietnam, the carnage is the result of a free-for-all among armed groups representing very narrow, local and familial interests. The random, indiscriminate violence is so chaotic and difficult to define, for both Iraqis and outsiders, that the tendency is to frame it in terms we can understand - usually the Sunni-Shi'a divide. In Vietnam, which had its own mix of ethnic and religious groups with a variety of political and cultural approaches to life, the main war effort was carried out for the purpose of reunifying the country. Many thousands of non-Communist Vietnamese in the south contributed and sacrificed for the sake of national liberation.
Vietnam emerged from the war battered - having made enormous sacrifices that stymied its development for more than a generation - but victorious and with its territorial integrity intact. This is unlikely to be Iraq's destiny, certainly not if the U.S. scurries home. If America leaves Iraq, the vacuum of power will likely pull in its neighbors, each vying to preserve their national interests in the region, probably under the pretext of safeguarding their national or religious minorities. The Vietnam War spilled into weak, neighboring countries, like Cambodia and Laos, and the American withdrawal contributed to the rise of the genocidal leadership of the Khmer Rouge.
Vietnam was sufficiently powerful to invade Cambodia and overthrow its former ally, Pol Pot, and even prevail in a local war with China. On the other hand, Iraq will become a battling ground for Turkey, Iran, and the so-called "moderate" Sunni Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, each supporting their proxies, and probably trying to avoid direct confrontation with each other. That will be extremely difficult to achieve. After all, the number of dissatisfied factions that will emerge in Iraq if regional powers fill the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal, will make escalation as a result of provocative terrorist attacks highly likely, resulting in a full-fledged confrontation that may involve non-conventional weapons.
With historical perspective, there are very few people who will say that the Vietnam experience was worth the trouble. But its results were not catastrophic for the U.S., primarily because then we lived in a bipolar world, and the two camps knew the limits. We are currently in a multi-polar world, and one of these poles is the Muslim world - and it is closely watching the developments in Iraq. And others too: Chavez and his neo-coms (neo-communists); Putin and his neo-mons (neo-monarchists); Beijing and it neo-caps (neo-capitalists); and of course the Al-Qaeda style NGMs (non-government militias). But, unlike Vietnam, the stakes in Iraq will reverberate throughout the world for a generation and more if the United States falters.
The blunder of the Bush administration in lifting the top off the pressure cooker called Iraq will not be undone by a rushed departure motivated by the ghosts of Vietnam. This would only bring about a bigger catastrophe on America and the world. The surge will not stabilize Iraq, but the goal of stabilizing the country and retaining its territorial integrity, should remain a priority. What is necessary is flexibility and cooperation. Bush's unilateralism has brought American influence around the world to an all-time nadir. That is why the U.S., both in the waning days of this administration and in the next, must initiate a dialogue with the countries bordering Iraq. Instead of opting for the "good guy vs. bad guy" dichotomy, the "moderates vs. the evil axis," Washington needs to adopt a very realistic approach to Iraq and the region in general: talk to the countries that can influence Iraq immediately, and talk to those whom you want to influence in the long term. These include Syria and Iran. It also includes allies like Turkey and the Europeans.
The U.S. should operate on three axes: it should reposition its forces in the safest part of Iraq, the north, where it will continue to play an important but less intrusive role; it should urge the "moderate" Sunni states to negotiate with Iran a balance of power in Iraq, the Gulf and Lebanon; and it should take steps to create an effective federal structure in Iraq. The multi-polar nature of the world, the growing cracks in the non-proliferation regime, and the scarcity of resources - increasingly exacerbated by climate change - demand that the U.S. begin to lead by consensus and not through confrontation. As for Vietnam, that belongs to a different era.