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Last update - 00:00 28/01/2007

Winograd Committee questions Halutz for 7 hours on conduct of war

By Amos Harel and Nir Hasson, Haaretz Correspondents

Outgoing Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, appeared Sunday before the Winograd Committee for seven hours for questioning on the conduct of the second Lebanon war.

His testimony was the longest the panel has heard yet. Committee members asked Halutz a long list of questions regarding the IDF's readiness for the war in Lebanon, and the progression of military operations over the course of the war.

Halutz was asked about the decision-making in the General Staff headquarters during the war, about the level of coordination with the political leadership and the planning and training of the IDF in the two years preceding the war, during which Halutz served as deputy chief of staff and then chief of staff.

The investigation also touched on whether Halutz - who spent his life in the air force - was fit to serve as chief of staff and to command the ground forces.

Halutz had been expected to tell the committee that responsibility for the war's blunders lies with the political leadership, which was involved in the planning of the war down to the smallest details.

He presented the panel with the operations plan he had delivered to the government at the start of the war, and detailed the plans drafted for countering Hezbollah rocket fire. Meanwhile, the panel asked him about the IDF's failure in halting the rockets.

The panel asked Halutz why reserve forces were not called in earlier to prepare for a possible ground war. Committee members also asked why a ground attack was ordered in the last two days of the war, after the United Nations Security Council already adopted Resolution 1701, which called for a cease-fire.

The committee will be hearing several key testimonies this week before drafting its interim report. Halutz' testimony was to be followed in the coming days by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky and Udi Adam, who headed the Northern Command during the war and stepped down in its aftermath.

Statements made by Halutz during and after the war, and conversations held with people close to him, indicated that he would tell the committee the following:

  • All military action was coordinated in advance with the political leadership down to the smallest details and approved.

  • During the first days of the fighting, the chief of staff assumed that it would be an operation of between 72 and 96 hours' duration, after which a cease-fire would be achieved. Neither the premier nor the defense minister ordered an all-out war against Hezbollah during the war's initial stages.

  • The day soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were abducted, the IDF proposed several alternate strategies, giving preference to a "great" and a "medium" scenario. Only the former involved targeting Hezbollah's Fajr missile battery. IDF researchers predicted about 300 Lebanese civilian casualties as a result. The IDF did not give its clear backing to either plan, but expected that either would result in the firing of Katyusha rockets into Israeli territory.

  • Defense Minister Amir Peretz supported the broader plan, which was approved. Lebanese civilian casualties from the operation against the Fajrs amounted to only a few dozen, but Hezbollah nonetheless launched massive Katyusha attacks against Israel that precipitated an all-out war.

    In private conversations, the outgoing chief of staff said he is convinced that the media and the public are wrong in finding him entirely accountable for the errors made in the war.

    Halutz was expected to try to give a detailed account of the order of events before the Winograd committee in order to prove he is not to blame for the blunders that took place during the war.

    Halutz consulted with confidants during his extensive preparation for the testimony, but refrained from hiring attorneys officially.

    The Winograd committee's interim report is expected to be published in late February or early March. Witnesses who have already appeared before the committee have come under the impression, from the wording of questions and the topics investigated, that the report will likely be harsh and will bring about a "political earthquake."

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