Last update - 02:58 08/12/2006
The probe matters more than the truth
By Amos Harel
Colonel Avi Peled was one of the speakers at the farewell ceremony for Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, commander of Division 91, who resigned this week following the report on the abduction of two Israel Defense Forces reservists in the North.
Peled, Hirsch's deputy, is one of the best field commanders in the IDF in recent years. During the second intifada, he commanded the elite unit Egoz, and a brigade operating in the Gaza Strip. But just like his outgoing commander, Peled also bears a failure from his recent past. Two and a half weeks prior to the abduction in the North, Corporal Gilad Shalit was kidnapped while under Peled's command in the South.
Hirsch is leaving the IDF to protest the recommendations of the report by Major General (res.) Doron Almog, banning him from a command position. Meanwhile, the commander of the Gaza division at the time of Shalit's kidnapping, Brigadier General Aviv Kochavi, was appointed as chief of operations at the General Staff.
Similarly, while Colonel Chen Livni, the regional brigade commander at the time of the abduction in the North, was also banned from a command promotion, Peled's path upward was not blocked.
Both Hirsch and Livni got a public dressing down from Almog. However, in Kochavi and Peled's cases, a discrete reference was made - behind closed doors - to Chief of Staff Dan Halutz by Major General (res.) Giora Eiland, who headed the investigation into the abduction in the South.
A committee on top of another committee
The differences in the investigations into the handling of the two kidnappings stem in great part from the investigating officers' distinct characters and outlooks. If Almog considers himself a great reformer, who caused the army to face up to its failures and halted the tendency toward whitewashing, Eiland combined in-depth analysis with clemency in his conclusions. The story repeats itself in the dozens of in-house investigative teams examining the war in Lebanon.
Parallel to the serious flaws in Division 91, hair-raising problems were also found in Division 162, under Brigadier Guy Tzur, and in the reservist divisions of brigadiers Erez Zukerman and Eyal Eisenberg. But the spirit guiding the investigations varies and are not guided by a similarly tough standards. The General Staff did not bother to set a clear policy on this matter - and it seems that in view of their current mood, the reservist generals would not have accepted any such dictates.
On one level, disqualifying Hirsch and Livni for promotion shocked many of the field commanders - even though many do not like Hirsch on a personal level. On the other hand, a strange procedure emerged in which a hearing was set up - a sort of committee on top of another committee, which discussed the case of an officer who had already announced his resignation. In the background, there is a great deal of negotiation over Almog's recommendations regarding three major generals. If everything is open to negotiation, and it all depends on how assertive Halutz vis-a-vis the investigating officer, then what is the purpose of an investigation?
This raises questions about the extent of our knowledge of the in-house investigations that the IDF has undertaken, and which will be concluded this month. In talks with many of the officers involved, contradictory views emerge. Many say the process is thorough and independent; others believe that various interests are guiding those involved in the investigations. When so much is at stake, why should the commanders tell the whole truth? When the vast machine moves forward, the minions are crushed under its steel wheels.
The main question is what will they do with the results of the investigations?