Last update - 00:00 15/11/2006
Gal Hirsch: MI warning would have prevented soldiers' abduction
By Nir Hasson, Haaretz Correspondent
Attorney Dror Brotfeld, a friend of Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, outgoing commander of Division 91, was highly critical Tuesday of the Almog report into the Hezbollah raid and the abduction of two Israel Defense Forces soldiers in July.
According to Brotfeld, Hirsch is being made a scapegoat by those who had marked him and set as their goal his removal from the army.
Hirsch met with Brotfeld on Monday, and the two agreed that the lawyer would undertake to write the general's response to the Almog report. The response will be presented to the Winograd Committee, which has been appointed by the government to investigate the second Lebanon war and events that led to it, beginning with the IDF pullout from the security zone in May 2000.
The brigadier general would like to prove that, contrary to the Almog report, he is not to blame for the abduction of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, two reservist soldiers serving in Hirsch's division.
"Our aim is to discredit the conclusions in the Almog report. Gal was a scapegoat in this affair," Brotfeld says.
Major General (res.) Doron Almog headed an IDF probe into the conduct of Division 91 and the incident of the abduction, and presented a scathing report regarding the division commander on Sunday. Subsequently, Hirsch submitted his resignation from the IDF.
Brotfeld insisted Tuesday that "this report is the result of a personal agenda of certain people. They have decided to shake up the army, and Gal [Hirsch] is paying the price for it."
The report, Brotfeld added, "is a collection of conclusions, with very few facts, and is therefore very difficult to counter."
The main argument the Hirsch camp has to make is that in view of the conditions along the border, where Hezbollah was allowed to fortify positions on the fence following the IDF withdrawal in 2000, it was impossible to prevent the kidnapping of soldiers without early warning.
Hirsch points to four cases, in which sufficient warning was available and an attempted kidnapping was foiled. The commander of Division 91 goes further: he accuses Military Intelligence of failing to provide him and his staff with intelligence on plans to carry out the raid.
"If a mere 10 percent of what they knew would have been transferred to us, the abduction would have been prevented," Brotfeld said.
A source involved in the in-house IDF probe into the incident refused to corroborate these claims.
One recent development is that the chief of staff did ask for Almog's panel investigation to expand its examination to include Military Intelligence. Conclusions on this matter are due in the next two to three weeks.
Hirsch also attacks the Almog investigation for its suggestion that Hirsch's soldiers were a poorly prepared battalion of reservists serving in that part of the front. The Division 91 commander says that the battalion received thorough training and that its members were familiar with "Carthage," code name for the orders Hirsch issued in an effort to safeguard the troops against an attempt by Hezbollah to abduct soldiers.
Hirsch also feels that the report goes to great lengths to absolve the chief of staff, Dan Halutz, of any responsibility in the abduction. The brigadier says that it was Halutz who ordered a "low signature," or low-level presence, along the fence on the basis of intelligence received prior to the Hezbollah raid.
"According to the [Almog] committee, Hirsch should have ignored the orders of the chief of staff, as if there is no such thing called intelligence. This is a fundamentally absurd claim, since in the situation that developed on the northern border, intelligence constituted an essential element on a practical level. This involved an order from above and it was impossible to ignore," Brotfeld says.
Hirsch's attorney also claims that both his client and GOC Northern Command, Udi Adam, had warned their superiors of weak points along the fence, and had requested that observation cameras be placed in those locations and that preventive actions be considered. According to Brotfeld, not only does the Almog report ignore this fact, but also that both Hirsch and Adam had been told that their requests for greater security measures could not be met because of budgetary constraints.
Regarding the way Hirsch conducted himself during the war as division commander, Brotfeld says that he excelled among his colleagues.
"He managed nine brigades, something that has never been done before. He faced a situation in which the war is managed by the government, and the chief of staff constantly issues new orders. Nonetheless, his division had excellent results. At the end of the war, he [Hirsch] felt that he was being attacked from behind, by the public and the media. He did not expect this," Brotfeld says.
Hirsch "had no choice but to resign," his attorney adds.